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This study focuses on rhetorical discourse of the 2002 presidential election campaign 
in Zimbabwe. The thesis analyses the rhetoric used by the two major contenders of 
this controversial election - the incumbent president Robert Gabriel Mugabe, 
candidate of Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the 
challenger Morgan Tsvangirai, candidate of the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC). The study first traces the origin of rhetoric, the art of persuasive 
communication, to ancient Greek and Roman traditions. Following Hanson (1997), 
the study treats Kenneth Burke's and Chaim Perelman's different rhetorical theories 
as complementary. The argument is that, although the two contemporary scholars 
offer different views on the nature and process of rhetoric, these views are two sides 
of the same coin as the ultimate goal is to convince people, to create a communion 
between the rhetor and the audience. The study shows that both parties used negative 
advertisements in the election campaign. This persuasive attack produced negative 
images of both candidates. The rhetoric induced political cynicism of the candidates 
in the minds of the voters. Mugabe used collective memory and nostalgia in four 
funeral speeches in order to persuade the voters to vote for him. As the chief 
interpreter of past events, he chose those events that presented him as the vanguard of 
the values of the liberation struggle. His rhetoric called on the voters to guard against 
forces of imperialism by voting him back to the presidency. Consistently, Mugabe 
centred his campaign rhetoric on the achievements of his government over 22 years 
since independence in 1980 and attacked his opponent as a sell-out, a puppet of 
Britain and the whites in the country. Mugabe's land rhetoric was popular with people 
in the rural and peri-urban areas whose lives depended on land. Tsvangirai's rhetoric 
focused on the need for a change of government. He attacked Mugabe and his 
government for mismanaging the affairs of the country, resulting in the economic and 
political meltdown in the country. Tsvangirai offered practical ways of delivering the 
country from its economic and political quagmire and end the suffering of the people. 
This study argues that Tsvangirai's rhetoric of change was so persuasive to voters that 
had the electoral process been free and fair, he could have easily won this election. 
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1.1 Background to the study 
This thesis is an analysis of the rhetoric of the 2002 presidential election 
campaign in Zimbabwe1• The main focus of the study is on the rhetoric used by 
the incumbent president, Robert Gabriel Mugabe who was the candidate of the 
ruling Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and by 
the challenger, Morgan Tsvangirai, candidate of the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC). The presidential election was held on March 9, 10 and 11 2002. 
This campaign is of particular interest in the study of rhetoric since it 
generated a huge amount of political campaign communication whose goals were 
threefold: to reinforce the parties' already existing support, to persuade leaning 
voters to cross the divide and to convert new voters to support the parties (Shea 
1996). The 2002 election campaign is also of much interest because, for the first 
time since the attainment of independence in 1980, and with Zimbabwe having 
been de facto a one-party state, a trend supported by the elections of 1985, 1990 
and 1995, the sitting president could not take victory for granted when the MDC's 
strong showing in the 2000 parliamentary elections was considered. This time 
around, Mugabe, the 'easy' winner of the preceding four elections, was facing his 
strongest ever challenge from an opposition party presidential candidate, 
Tsvangirai. Predictably, the resultant election campaign was characterized by an 
1 Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia, is a Southern African country which attained independence in 1980 
following years of political agitation by African nationalist organizations and the subsequent armed 
struggle against the British settlers. 
abundance of political rhetoric from the rival parties. Subsequently, and in 
consequence, both ZANU(PF) and the MDC embarked upon a vicious 
propaganda trail against each other, with ZANU(PF) making use of state-
controlled media and the MDC being 'adopted' by the private and independent 
media. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to analyse the campaign rhetoric from both 
parties, and show how it was meant to influence the electorate to vote for or 
against either party. What can be said from the onset is that this presidential 
election campaign exhibited a pattern that was characterized by serious 
polarization between the two major contending parties. 
Generally and consistently, ZANU (PF) rhetoric insinuated that voting for 
Tsvangirai was similar to selling the country to Britain, the former colonizer2• 
Similarly, the MDC's rhetoric increased distrust of Mugabe among the voters by 
pointing out that his bad governance was responsible for the political and 
economic meltdown in the country. These two hypotheses guide the analysis of 
political campaign communication the two candidates and their parties used in 
this election campaign. 
1.1.1 Rhetoric and Rhetorical Theory 
Rhetoric is defined for the purpose of this study as the art of persuasive 
communication in a given situation. In other words, rhetoric refers to the use of 
language in communicating a theme or an idea in an effort to convince an 
audience. Literature traces the origin of rhetoric as an art to the first century BC in 
2 The Herald, March 5 2002 
2 
ancient Greece. Rhetoric was then popularized by the Sophists or rhetoric teachers 
like Protagoras and Gorgias in the fifth century BC. 
Ancient philosophers like !socrates, Plato and Aristotle followed this 
period of the Sophists. These challenged the teachings of their predecessors and 
developed their own approaches to rhetoric. Plato observed that "the sophists 
cared not for the truth of an argument, but only how they might appear to win it" 
(www.preacahersfiles.com). Aristotle, Plato's student, defined rhetoric as an "art 
of finding in any given case the available means of persuasion" (Garver 
1998:307). To Aristotle, an argument must be won by the persuasive position of 
truth rather than the swaying of an audience through an emotional appeal. In 
addition, Aristotle described rhetoric as comprising three sources of persuasion, 
namely, ethos (the character of the speaker), logos (argumentation) and pathos 
(the emotions of the audience). Aristotle also divided rhetoric into three types 
which he called deliberative rhetoric (for political purposes), forensic rhetoric 
(used in legal situations) and epideictic rhetoric (for ceremonial occasions). 
Modem rhetoric uses these sources of persuasion and the three types of rhetoric. 
The Romans later borrowed the art of rhetoric from the Greeks and great 
rhetoricians such as Cicero and Quintilian were produced. Cicero and Quintilian's 
works were an extension of Aristotle's work. Quintilian identified the following 
five aspects of rhetoric which we find in modem rhetoric: 
Inventio (invention) is the process that leads to the development 
and refinement of an argument. Once an argument is developed, it 
is up to dispositio (disposition, or argument) to determine how it 
should be organized for greatest effects. Once the speech content is 
known and the structure is determined, the next steps involve 
pronuntiatio (language) and elocutio (delivery). Finally, memoria 
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(memory choice) comes to play as the speaker recalls each of the 
elements during the speech (www.preacahersfiles.com). 
The Romans are credited with publicizing Greek philosophical and 
rhetorical works which might have remained unknown to the outside world. 
Contemporary rhetorical theory has been influenced by the two different 
social rhetorics advanced by Kenneth Burke and Chaim Perelman. Perelman's 
rhetorical theory focuses on argumentation. He contends that "all argumentation 
aims at gaining the adherence of minds, and by the very fact, assumes the 
existence of an intellectual contact and that this contact of minds creates a 
community of minds."3 Inherent in this definition of rhetoric is the ability of the 
rhetor to use language as a vital tool to gain the audience's adherence to his thesis. 
Perelman's rhetoric advocates dialogue which affords reasonable compromises on 
conflicting views and thereby creating an environment for pluralism. It denies any 
one group absolute power. Further still, Perelman's stress on the audience implies 
that there must be close interaction between the rhetor and his audience. The 
linguistic system that is used in effective argumentation breaks the barrier 
between the rhetor and his audience so that the two enter into a communion 
Burke defines rhetoric as "the use of language as a symbolic means of 
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols" 4• The 
definition alludes to the one of the descriptions of language as an arbitrary system 
of symbols. According to Burke, rhetoric's major concern is "the Babel after the 
Fall". His treatment of rhetoric goes further than the intellectual contact 
3 J. Hansons, 1997 
4 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 23 
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mentioned by Perelman. Burke's rhetoric takes into account exterior influences, 
thereby treating the human being in as a whole. For Burke, the rhetorical process 
centres between identification and division. He contends that the division of 
people results in identification and this in tum bonds people together as they 
attempt to unite that, which was separated, and in the process, new division 
(consubstantiation) arises and the process repeats itself like that. Burke says his 
theory is based on the fact that human beings appear to have a desire to overcome 
division as well as to cerate it at the same time. While Burke's and Perelman's 
rhetorical theories seem to be incompatible, they both advocate communion 
among people. Because of this and following Hanson (1997), this study treats 
Burke's view and Perelman's view on rhetoric as complementary. 
1.1.2 Rhetorical Situation 
In order to present a comprehensive analysis of the rhetoric Mugabe and 
Tsvangirai used in the election campaign in question, it is important to briefly 
reflect on the rhetorical situation in the country. According to Bitzer a rhetorical 
situation is 
a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an 
actual or potential exigency which can be completely or partially 
removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so 
constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant 
modification of the exigency.5 
The 2002 presidential elections were held with a backdrop of three major 
events in the country. First there was the rejection of a new constitution sponsored 
5 Martin J. Medhurst (ed.), Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1996. 
p. 3. 
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by the government in a referendum in February 2000. The "YES" vote advocated 
by the government lost to the "NO" vote that was supported by the opposition 
party, the MDC, the National Constitution Assembly (NCA) and other civic 
organizations. The "NO" vote meant that the government could not engage in 
constitutional reform. Among other things, the government accused the NCA of 
having connived with MDC and western countries to bring down the gains of 
independence by campaigning against the adoption of the new constitution. 
Chief among the reasons for urging the people to vote against the 
government sponsored constitution, the NCA raised the issue of the section on 
terms for the presidential post and the absolute powers the head of state was 
vested with. They argued that it was not different from ratifying dictatorship. The 
NCA also accused the government of having tried to hijack their initiative 
because they had lobbed for the replacement of the "outdated" Lancaster House 
Constitution with a home grown one. Although initially the government had kept 
a blind eye on the initiative, they were soon to realize that they could only do that 
at their own risk. They responded by appointing a Constitution Commission. This 
Commission was tasked to come up with a constitution in less than six months, a 
period critics felt was far too short. There were fears that the Commission would 
rubber-stamp a government document that already existed. Another dent on the 
credibility of the government-sponsored constitution was that the Commission 
consisted of people publicly known to be sympathizers of the ZANU (PF) 
government. The chairman of the Constitution Commission, president of the High 
Court, Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku, was hand-picked by President Mugabe. Thus 
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the MDC, the NCA and other civic groups campaigned vigorously against the 
proposed new constitution. When the "NO" vote won in the referendum, the 
MDC, the NCA and other civic societies celebrated the "victory", dubbing it "the 
people have spoken". Indeed, for the first time in twenty-two years, the people 
had spoken against a government initiative and the government that had hitherto 
enjoyed unquestioned support took this as a betrayal. 
The government responded to the defeat in the referendum by sponsoring 
invasions of the white commercial farms by the war veterans of the liberation 
struggle and other ZANU (PF) sympathizers. This was the second major event. 
The farm invasions were described by the government as "peaceful 
demonstrations" by the landless black people, but in reality they were very 
violent, leaving behind them a trail of plunder and death. The ZANU (PF) terror 
campaign left at least 35 MDC supporters dead6 and the decline of the rule of law 
continued unabated. The white commercial farmers whose farms were occupied 
were paying for openly supporting the opposition MDC. 
The third major event was the June 2000 parliamentary elections. The 
results of these elections were testimony that the ZANU (PF) government was 
losing popularity at an alarming rate taking into account that the MDC was only 
nine months old in June 2000. Out of the 120 contested parliamentary seats, 
ZANU-PF won 62 and the MDC garnereq 57. ZANU, an ethnic party of the 
Chipinge enclave got only 1 seat. Despite the violence, torture and intimidation 
that accompanied the campaigns for this plebiscite, it was clear that the people of 
6 Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, "Are they accountable? Examining alleged violators and their 
violations pre and post the Presidential Election March" 2002, p.16. 
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Zimbabwe wanted a change of government. The MDC's remarkable performance 
in these elections shocked ZANU (PF). Judging from these results, it was evident 
that people craved for a change of government. It was clear that the MDC had a 
groundswell of supporters. ZANU (PF) sensed that if it did not employ some dirty 
tactics, the MDC would continue to attract more and more supporters. 
The March 2002 presidential election campaign was arguably the noisiest 
and most crucial campaign ever held in post-independent Zimbabwe. This was 
because the ruling party ZANU (PF) faced the stiffest challenge from the MDC, 
the most vibrant opposition party to enter the political scene in Zimbabwe since 
the attainment of independence in 1980. These presidential elections were 
characterised by heavy polarisation between the two major parties. As stated in 
the introduction, the major contenders of these watershed elections were the 
incumbent president Robert Gabriel Mugabe of ZANU (PF) who had been the 
leader of the country for twenty-two years, and the challenger Morgan Tsvangirai 
of the MDC. 
During the presidential election campaign both parties produced so much 
rhetoric that there was no doubt that the parties considered rhetoric the lifeblood 
of the success of their candidates in the 'do-or-die' elections. This rhetoric was 
disseminated through various media in order to market their candidates to the 
electorate. According to Trent and Friedenberg (2000), political election 
campaigns in general are communicative processes. The two scholars argue that it 
is this campaign communication or rhetorical discourse that is at the centre of 
presidential campaigns. Rhetorical discourse therefore forms an interface 
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between the goals of the candidate and the electorate, ')ust as it serves as the 
bridge between the dreams or hopes of the voter and the actions of the candidate" 
(Trent and Friedenberg (2000: 17). In other words, presidential rhetoric in 
political campaigns helps the candidates to develop and maintain public support 
for themselves and their policies (Buchanan 1991; Joslyn 1990; McKelvery and 
Ordeshook 1984). 
1.2 Brief review of literature 
In addition to Burke's and Perelman's rhetorical theories, the study also 
adapts Goffman's (1974) dramaturgical approach in analysing the rhetoric used in 
the 2002 presidential election campaign. This approach describes rhetorical 
communication using a theatrical metaphor. De Wet ( 1991:1 03) briefly explains 
Goffman's approach as follows: 
More specifically, Goffman explains impression management in 
terms of performers and teams in a theatre utilising front and back 
regions to foster an impression on an audience. He, after all, 
recognises that man is also a role player and manipulator of 
"props" (any object or furnishing that helps to convey desired 
impressions to recipients), costumes, gestures and words. 
To add on to the image ofthe political stage that Goffman talks about, (De 
Wet (1991 :96) says that "politicians rise to power mainly because they can talk 
persuasively to voters and political elites". This statement implies that presidential 
candidates' speeches and other forms of addresses they make have rhetorical 
power on the electorate. 
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The research on issues and images done by Stuckey and Antczak (1995) 
also shows that the issues at stake in presidential campaigns are communicated in 
words and images, that is verbally and non verbally. Their research is informed 
by Burke's (1969) "master tropes"7• In other words Stuckey and Antczak agree 
with Burke's assertion that since all language is tropic, it follows that it 
selectively defines reality. The significance of Stuckey and Antczak's work is that 
during political campaigns, it is the candidate who selectively defines reality of 
any issue or image using language which is tropic, and it is this reality that 
dominates that of the voters. Stuckey and Antczak observe that 
[ t ]he tropic nature [of language] allows us to focus attention on the 
ways in which candidates seek to dominate and control the 
processes of defining issues and images in a national campaign to 
create the appearance of identification with, and thus 
representation of, the electorate (p.118). 
It can be deduced from the above observation that the major aim of 
campaign rhetoric is to establish the authority of the candidate's perspective of 
issues or political reality on the voters. In cases where the candidate's rhetoric 
succeeds in doing so, voters begin to see the political world through the eyes of 
the candidate. For example, the electorate may be convinced by a challenger's 
rhetoric that the high rate of unemployment in the country is the result of bad 
economic policies of the incumbent president. In this case the candidate has 
defined the issue of unemployment in his political campaign communication. This 
definition of the issue is not the same as the one given by the incumbent candidate 
7 Burke's "master tropes" are useful in political campaign communication as they help the voters to see one 
reality in terms of another. They are metaphor (perspective), metonymy (reduction), synecdoche 
(representation) and irony (dialectic). They explain the figurative nature of language. 
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who might define it as economic sabotage by those who control the means of 
production and his enemies. This is similar to what happened in the Zimbabwean 
situation. The opposition MDC attacked the ruling party ZANU (PF) for 
mismanaging the economy of the country while on the other hand ZANU (PF) 
held the MDC and its sympathizers responsible for the economic meltdown in the 
country. In ZANU (PF)'s campaign rhetoric, the MDC and its sympathizers were 
presented to the electorate as economic saboteurs. Issue definition is therefore 
crucial in political campaign communication as it helps in persuading voters to 
support the views of the candidate. 
Gronbeck and Miller (1994:8) provide an interesting example of how an 
issue can be defined and used in presidential rhetoric when they argue that 
[a] coal field is but compressed and solidified petroleum until 
political-nationalist values are attached to it in a dispute between 
France and Germany [for example] and it has no political 
significance until people contend for its energy-producing 
capabilities. A coal field is but a natural phenomenon until 
converted symbolically into a political value, i.e., until it is 
assigned human significance and made an object of collective 
worth. 
The way the land issue was used in the presidential rhetoric of ZANU 
(PF) in Zimbabwe during the 2002 elections fits squarely in the argument put 
forward by Gronbeck and Miller in the above quotation. The land rhetoric was 
meant to have a hypnotic effect and therefore whet the black people's long-
standing appetite for land. In his campaign rhetoric, Mugabe argued that he was 
reclaiming the land from the remnants of former white oppressors and giving it 
back to its rightful owners, the black majority. For the twenty-two years the land 
issue had not taken the prominence it did now, showing that Mugabe and his party 
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had redefined the issue using such metaphorical slogans as Land for Economic 
Empowerment and Land is the Economy and the Economy is Land (ZANU-PF 
Election Manifesto 2002). This 'fast-track' land redistribution exercise, which 
was chaotic in most cases, proved attractive to the electorate, particularly to the 
rural voters whose lives revolve around agricultural activities. 
Spearheaded by the war veterans of the liberation struggle, the invasions 
of white commercial farms, dubbed The Third Chimurenga8, redefined the issue 
of land and the land rhetoric proved not to be mere rhetoric but something 
practical. This explains why Mugabe used the land issue as the opening salvo of 
his campaign. Attack rhetoric mounted by ZANU (PF) portrayed Tsvangirai as a 
protege of the British who wanted to reverse the gains of the liberation struggle 
when voted into power. Mugabe and ZANU (PF) claimed that Tsvangirai would 
do this by giving back the land to the minority white commercial farmers whose 
farms had been compulsorily acquired by the government for resettlement without 
compensation. Part of ZANU (PF) land rhetoric reads: 
Sellout opposition parties such as the white controlled movement 
for destruction of our country, the so-called MDC, are misleading 
the people claiming that the land question must be addressed 
outside and separate from the economy. As the revolutionary party 
that brought democracy to our country, we in ZANU (PF) know 
only too well that LAND IS THE ECONOMY AND THE 
ECONOMY IS LAND, hence our gallant Third Chimurenga. Our 
major challenge today is to make the economy work for all our 
people, especially those in the communal and resettlement areas by 
ensuring that land is given back to the people (p.l7). 
8 This is a Shona word which means revolution. The Third Chimurenga can be described as a revolution 
that was used by ZANU (PF) to compulsorily reclaim land from white commercial farmers and redistribute 
it to the black majority. The First Chimurenga (1896-7) was waged by the blacks against the white settlers 
while The Second Chimurenga (1965-1979) culminated in the attainment of independence in 1980. 
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The above quotation is used here to emphasise the point of 
issue definition and to show that the land issue was at the core of ZANU (PF)'s 
campaign communication during the presidential election campaigns. What is 
interesting to note is that ZANU (PF) appeared to have found in land a panacea 
for the economic woes the country was facing at the time. The syllogism Land is 
the Economy and the Economy is Land was ZANU (PF)'s a magic formula or 
catchy phrase for economic transformation. This proved not to be so as most of 
the haphazardly resettled new farmers had neither the means nor ability to surpass 
the agricultural production of the commercial farmers whose farms had been 
compulsorily acquired. At the time of writing this thesis, three years after the so-
called Third Chimurenga began, Zimbabwe's economy has not improved. Instead, 
the economic crisis in this country, once dubbed Africa's 'bread basket' and 'the 
Jewel of Africa', continues to drift towards the cataracts by the day with no signs 
for positive change in the near future. No wonder why this 'fast-track' land 
redistribution was heavily criticised by the opposition and most non-governmental 
organisations as a vote-buying gimmick that was used by the ruling party in order 
to remain in power. 
On the land issue, the MDC argued that 
... while much political rhetoric has been directed towards the land 
issue, there is no comprehensive national vision of how to address 
the land question, in terms of how land reform relates to 
development and macro-economic policies, the distribution of land 
values, entitlements and use in urban and rural areas, how to 
manage claims to land based on historical grounds, of men and 
women, of farm workers and of different productive sectors (MDC 
Manifesto 1999:21 ). 
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The MDC promised that it "[would] manage land redistribution through a 
transparent, technically sound process under a Land Commission that involves all 
interest groups" (p.22). The above quotations from ZANU (PF) and the MDC are 
further testimony that the definitions that candidates give to public policy issues 
form the basis of action that they promise to take if voted into power (Bennett 
1993; Edelman 1977). 
At the centre of MDC campaign rhetoric was the call for a change of 
presidential leadership and government. Calling for a change of government and 
its entire leadership is one of the seven strategies used by challengers in political 
campaign communication that Trent and Friedenberg (2000: 1 06) identify and 
describe. They are: 
• attacking the record of the opponents 
• taking the offensive position on issues 
• calling for a change 
• emphasising optimism for the future 
• speaking to traditional values rather than calling for value changes 
• appearing to represent the philosophical centre of the political party 
and 
• delegating personal attack or harsh attacks m an effort to control 
demagogic rhetoric 
14 
When we analyse the rhetoric of speeches and advertisements from the 
MDC during the campaign period of this study, we highlight that to a large extent 
the above strategies were made use of by the opposition, in varying degrees of 
course. For instance, Tsvangirai called for a change in leadership in order to "get 
the country moving again" and promised the electorate " ... a better tomorrow -
... when justice [would] prevail, and when health, wealth, and happiness [would] 
be more than just vague illusions" (p.ll 0). 
This study demonstrates that the kind of rhetoric that was used by the 
opposition MDC leader was "a rhetoric of optimism" and not "a rhetoric of 
despair" {Trent and Trent 1974). It was a rhetoric of self-renewal or rejuvenation 
of national dreams and prosperity that were almost beyond people's imagination 
under ZANU (PF) leadership. This type of rhetoric positioned Tsvangirai 
strategically as the only remaining beacon of hope amidst a sea of darkness and 
hopelessness. One is reminded of the rhetoric of optimism that is contained in Old 
Major's political speech and in the song Beasts of England in George Orwell's 
classic novel, Animal Farm9• Another good example of this rhetoric of optimism 
is found in Dr Martin Luther King Jr.'s famous speech titled "I Have a Dream" 10• 
Through powerful images of hope and change he said in his speech: 
I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of 
former slaves and the sons of former slave-owners will be able to 
sit down together at the table of brotherhood .... I have a dream that 
my four children will one day live in a nation where they will not 
9 The book is a political satire that mocks the ideology of communism. At the beginning of the story, Old 
Major's rhetoric incites the animals to oust Mr Jones, the owner of the farm. The song Beasts of England 
promises the animals" ... joyful tidings ofthe golden future time". 
10 King Jr. delivered this speech on the steps of Lincoln Memorial to a quarter of a million Americans on 28 
August 1963. 
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be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their 
character (www.quoteland.com/library/speeches/dream.asp). 
Dr King Jr.'s speech espoused a new American society that did not 
segregate its members on the colour lines of black and white. The speech 
electrified a quarter of a million people. The following comment sums up the 
essence ofthe speech: 
The speech was structured like a classic tale of good triumphing 
over evil. Using Lincoln's words, King began with a discussion of 
the past: "Five score years." King then spoke of the present: "Now 
is the time." Then King ended with the future: "I have a dream." ... 
Few could argue with King's imagery of little black boys and 
black girls joining hands with little white boys and white girls. 
Within two months of King's speech, Congress passed a new civil-
rights bill into law (www.pbs.arg/greatspeeches/timeline/). 
Commenting on the strategy used in the same speech, Smith (1994:300) 
says that 
[t]he genius of King's speech is that he argued for a fair treatment 
of all Americans, not solely African Americans, and that he did so 
not with the rhetoric of the black experience but with the rhetoric 
of the white middle class. 
Since the aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the campaign 
communication of each of the two major contenders in the presidential election 
under study, the study shows that, by and large, the electorate, especially urban 
and peri-urban voters, found Tsvangirai's rhetoric of optimism quite appealing, 
hence the massive support his party garnered in these areas against all forms of 
political violence such as torture, murder and harassment perpetrated by ZANU 
(PF) supporters. Also, despite a lot of intimidation from ZANU (PF) supporters, 
thousands of people attended MDC rallies to hear Tsvangirai speech about change 
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and a better future. The MDC also got a lot of support from rural areas despite the 
fact that these had been declared 'no-go' areas for the MDC by ZANU (PF) 
supporters and militias during the election campaigns, and were generally 
strongholds of ZANU (PF). But had the MDC been allowed to campaign freely in 
these areas, there is no doubt it would have increased its support base in the rural 
areas. 
Having looked at the rhetorical strategies of the challenger, it is imperative 
that we look at the strategies used by the incumbent. Again our source of the 
general strategies used by incumbents is Trent and Friedenberg (2000). Only 
those strategies that are appropriate to the Zimbabwean situation are considered 
here. These are 
• creating pseudo-events to attract and control media attention 
• consulting or negotiating with world leaders 
• manipulating economy or other important domestic issues 
• appropriating [state] funds/ grants [or loans] 
• endorsements by party and other important leaders 
• emphasising accomplishments 
• creating and maintaining an "above the political trenches" posture 
• depending on surrogates for campaign trail and 
• interpreting and intensifying a foreign policy problem so that it 
becomes an international crisis (p.90) 
In the assessment of the rhetoric used by Mugabe and his party in the 
election campaigns, the above-mentioned strategies are investigated. In other 
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words, one of the objectives of the study is to examine to what extent Mugabe and 
ZANU (PF) used the incumbency strategies. For instance, it is not surprising to 
note there were many pseudo-events that were planned, planted or incited for the 
purpose of media attention (Brown 1983) by ZANU (PF) during the election 
campaign. ZANU (PF) used both the state controlled electronic and print media to 
manufacture news that either inflated the image of the incumbent or deflated the 
image of the challenger. In other words, there were many false events that were 
stage managed by the ruling party in order to manipulate the electorate into 
thinking that voting for the ZANU (PF) candidate was the wisest and patriotic 
thing and voting for MDC candidate was the most foolish and unpatriotic thing to 
do in these elections. 
The newly created Department of Information and Publicity in the office 
of the President and Cabinet hyped or manufactured news that gave a positive 
image of the incumbent while the challenger was presented as a devil. The MDC 
leader was given such derogatory names as 'Tsvangison' and 'Boycott'. This 
name-calling strategy, as shall be seen in the coming chapters, was meant to 
belittle and trivialise Tsvangirai's political stature. Only ZANU (PF) campaign 
advertisements were flighted on the only state controlled television channel and 
aired through the four state controlled radio stations. No meaningful or positive 
coverage of MDC campaign rallies was done by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation (ZBC), which virtually turned the national broadcaster into a ZANU 
(PF) propaganda machinery. Neither did the state-controlled daily newspapers 
The Herald and The Chronicle and other publications from the same stable accept 
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campaign advertisements from the opposition MDC party. These papers published 
stories that dented the image of Tsvangirai and the MDC. 
Throughout the election campaigns, the state media practised, among 
other forms of propaganda, propaganda by censorship. This means "the selective 
control of information to favour a particular viewpoint, and the deliberate 
doctoring of information in order to create an impression different from that 
originally intended" (Brown 1983: 16). The MDC was painted as a sell-out 
organisation that was linked to Britain, the former colonial power that, in ZANU 
(PF) philosophy and rhetoric, had the intention of recolonising the country hence 
ZANU (PF)'s slogan "Zimbabwe Will Never Be A Colony Again". The MDC 
leader was depicted as a dupe of the British by ZANU (PF)'s campaign rhetoric. 
This negative rhetoric was aimed at discrediting the opposition party ahead of the 
elections. 
The Agenda-Setting Hypothesis (McCombs and Shaw 1972) of mass 
media explains why ZANU (PF) churned its propaganda through both the state-
controlled electronic and print media. It also explains why the state-controlled 
media would not accept advertisements from the MDC. The ZBC would not 
allow the opposition leader a chance to address the electorate either through the 
radio or on television yet the incumbent had the privilege of using these media ad 
nauseam on a daily basis. The MDC used the privately owned newspapers for all 
their political campaign communication. Adverts and news reports that could not 
be published in the state controlled media were published in the privately owned 
newspapers such as The Daily news, The Financial Gazette, The Standard and 
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The Independent and monthly magazines such as Moto and Parade. It was in 
these newspapers and magazines that a positive image of the MDC presidential 
candidate was depicted. Most of these privately owned newspapers painted a 
negative image of Mugabe and ZANU (PF). They also used propaganda by 
censorship since they did not cover stories that portrayed a good picture of 
Mugabe and ZANU (PF). They carried stories that blamed Mugabe for bad 
governance and unchecked corruption that were bringing the economy of the 
country to its knees. There was no question that these papers were pro-Tsvangirai 
and the MDC although they did not publicly declare this, hiding behind the guise 
of freedom of the press and democracy. The incompatibility between state-
controlled media on the one hand and the privately owned media on the other 
hand resulted in the polarization of the press in Zimbabwe. 
There is no shred of doubt that the media played a significant role in 
image management of the two chief contenders in the 2002 presidential elections. 
According to McCombs and Shaw ( 1972: 177), "the mass media set the agenda for 
each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes toward the political 
issues." This is to say that the media are used in campaign communication to 
influence the way people view and discuss political issues. Mugabe and his party' 
for example, put the issues of land and sovereignty high on the agenda in their 
campaigns while Tsvanginii and the MDC' s topmost issues were embodied in the 
call for 'change'. Mass media agenda-setting assists candidates in trying to 
convince the voters on particular issues and in shaping voters' opinions about 
them (McQuail 1987). He further notes that 
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[t]he hypothesis presupposes a process of influence from the 
priorities of political or other interest groups, to the news priorities 
of media, in which news values and audience interests play a 
strong part, and from there to opinions of the public (p.276). 
A study carried out by Weaver et al. (1981) to examine the agenda-setting 
hypothesis of the 197 6 American presidential election campaign revealed that the 
mass media play a vital role in shaping the candidates' images. They conclude 
that 
[the] findings support the idea that media agenda-setting (at least 
newspaper agenda-setting) extends to candidate images as well as 
to issues and that media emphasis or de-emphasis of certain image 
attributes to voter evaluations of candidate (p.192). 
In the same vein, Schenck-Hamlin et al. (2000:54) observe 
[i]n campaign advertising, it is likely that campaign strategists 
purposefully use framing devices in political advertisements to 
influence the image of the candidate, the candidate's opponent, and 
the debate about public policy issues. 
Candidate image is the sum of the perceived personal and professional 
characteristics of the candidate (Garramone 1986). Still on the role played by the 
media in the formation of presidential candidates' images, Graber (1972: 50-51) 
asserts that 
[t]he mass media are significant in furnishing raw material for the 
formation of political images. Most people do not invent political 
images from thin air. Rather, they combine current political data 
supplied by the mass media with existing knowledge and attitudes 
and then weave these into a plausible and pleasing GESTALT. 
What this suggests is that the meanings voters associate with a 
presidential campaign are not by chance (Jamieson 1992; Roberts 1995). These 
meanings are arrived at with the aid of the messages that come from the media. 
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Biocca (1991 a: 11) contends that "we can safely postulate that a relationship exists 
between the structure of the political ad and the psychological processes of the 
viewer" or the reader. Similarly, Jamieson (1992) metaphorically refers to voters 
as "pack rats" as they take bits and pieces of information from the media to create 
an overall impression ofthe candidate's image. She notes that 
[l]ike pack rats, voters gather bits and pieces of information and 
store them in a single place. Lost in the storage is a clear recall of 
where this or that 'fact' came from. Information obtained from 
news mixes with that from ads, for example (p.17). 
According to Jamieson, both the news and advertisements about the 
candidates are important sources of information that voters use to form 
candidates' images. This implies therefore that the image management policy of a 
political party must be clear as to what type of messages is disseminated to the 
electorate. In other words, campaign managers must work out or package the type 
of image they want to sell to the public before the information is released for 
public consumption. In their research on shaping a candidate's image in the 
press, Richardson et al. (1994:90) state that 
[i]f we are to understand how the public develops its images of 
presidential candidates, we must understand the process by which 
the images that candidates intend the public to receive get 
communicated to the public through the news media. 
This explains why the news media in Zimbabwe carried different types of 
news items on the two candidates during the election campaigns. They were 
aimed at shaping the presidential candidates' images in the minds of the voters. 
After examining the semantic processing of campaign advertisements on 
the television in relation to candidate image, Biocca (1991 b:27) states that 
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[v]iewed in cognitive terms, the struggle over the candidate's 
image is the struggle over the semantic processing of political 
commercials by voters. In the mind of the viewer the imagery of 
the political commercial is represented by networks of semantic 
nodes and markers radiating from a central concept, the candidate. 
Biocca suggests that the voter has to work out the meaning of an 
advertisement and the mental image that the voter has is centred on the candidate. 
In other words the mental concept that the voter has about the candidate is the 
meaning of the advertisement, that is, the image the candidate wanted to 
communicate. To arrive at this image or meaning, the voter engages in a heuristic 
interpretation of the advertisement (Leech 1983). 
This study shows that two major political parties in Zimbabwe during the 
2002 presidential elections were aware of the influential role mass media play in 
forming the images of their candidates. As a result, the parties strove to have 
access to different types of media in order to reach every corner of the country. 
Regrettably and as earlier noted, the opposition party did not get a fair deal as far 
as the use of the national electronic media is concerned since they were barred 
from using them. In other words, the state media religiously performed the gate-
keeping or propaganda function that allowed only ZANU (PF) campaign 
communication to be disseminated to the electorate. This selective or biased 
reporting was aimed at presenting the incumbent as the best candidate for the 
presidential election and to downplay the potential of the challenger. 
One of the major strategies that were used by both political parties during 
these election campaigns was that of personalised attacks on one's opponent. 





both in the print and electronic media. It has already been noted that as the ruling 
party, ZANU (PF) had the privilege of using both the print and the electronic 
media while the MDC relied only on the former. 
It has also been found that negative advertising that is based on 'vicious 
personal attacks' is more likely to backfire than negative advertising based on 
issues (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1991; Roddy and Garramone 1988). In 
other words what these scholars are saying is that negative messages backlash or 
backfire on their sponsor. This also supported by Roberts (1995: 180-181) who 
asserts 
direct attacks have the greatest potential for backlash, followed by 
the direct comparison. The implied comparison is found to be the 
least likely to create a backlash, because the format encourages 
viewers to generate their own arguments. 
On the same issue, Gronbeck and Miller (1994:9) say 
[t]he public's responses generally are drawn between positive and 
negative poles: at times, they react with hope to portrayals of a 
new world, and at other times, with fear and pessimism to negative 
portrayals of opponents ... .Individuals do all this privately in small 
groups-more intriguingly today - publicly in the form of opinion 
polls. 
This study offers support for these scholars' findings and extends the 
understanding of negative advertisements and their interpretation in general. 
1.3. Summary 
A brief account of the origin of rhetoric from ancient Greece and Rome 
has been given. The rhetorical theories of Burke and Perelman have been 
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described and this study treats them as having a complementary role. The 
rhetorical situation or "exigency" prior to the 2002 presidential elections in 
Zimbabwe has been described. The ZANU-PF government lost in the referendum 
that it so desperately needed to make constitutional changes. This was followed 
by the invasion of commercial farm belonging to white farmers. The people's 
quest for a change of government was shown in their overwhelming support for 
the MDC during the 2000 parliamentary elections despite the orgy of violence, 
torture and intimidation that were targeted at MDC supporters. 
The works of scholars in rhetoric reviewed in this chapter show that in 
political campaigns in general, a candidate "[uses] the appropriate arguments to 
prove what [he] wants to claim" (Whateley 1963:39). These arguments may be 
based on facts and lies as in propaganda. Some works show that rhetorical 
discourse involves "adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas" (Bryant 
1972:26). The role of attack rhetoric in election campaigns has been demonstrated 
by citing the scholars in rhetoric who have done some work in this area. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE RHETORIC IN NEGATIVE ADVERTISING 
2.1 Defining Negative Advertising and Democracy 
As a starting point, the terms "negative political advertising" or 
"negative political advertisement/s" and "democracy" are defined in order to 
situate the discussion. Gronbeck (1994:62) defines a negative political 
advertisement as "one that creates unattractive or undesirable images of one's 
political opponents". He further notes that the function of negative advertisements 
in political campaign communication 
. . . is to destabilize the voter support for the other, either by 
increasing the undecideds (who presumably can be won by one's 
own candidate) or ... even driving voters out of the electorate arena 
altogether in circumstances when one's candidate might be helped 
by a lower turnout (p. 77). 
While this definition on its own would suffice for the purposes of this 
study, it is important to juxtapose it against perspectives of other scholars so as to 
provide a broader understanding of negative political campaign advertising. 
One other way of describing negative political advertising is calling it 
mudslinging. Stewart (1975) as cited by Gronbeck ( 1994:62) says a mudslinger is 
a "person guilty of rumours, making insinuations, perpetuating, telling lies and 
calling names." It is import to point out that not all the characteristics mentioned 
by Stewart may manifest themselves in a single negative political advertisement. 
The bottom line is that as long as an advert exhibits one or more of these features, 
its aim is to deflate the image of the opponent and is, therefore, negative. 
Mudslinging can also be described as the use of "smear tactics and political 
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hatch" (Trent and Friedenberg 2000) or "name-calling, direct personal attacks, 
man-on-the street, symbolic attacks ... to discredit the opponent ... most frequently 
delivered by surrogate speakers" (as mentioned in Gronbeck 1994:61). A 
surrogate speaker is often used to attack the opponent in a negative advertisement 
in order to avoid a backlash11 or to take advantage of the surrogate's ethos 
(Sheckels 2002). This sense of a negative political advertisement concurs with 
what Diamond and Bates (1984) call an "attack ad". Benoit and Wells (1996) 
identify two aspects of political communication, that is "persuasive attack" and 
"persuasive defence". They explain the two concepts as follows: 
[p ]ersuasive attack means messages that attempt to damage the 
image (reputation, face, identity) of a person, group, or 
organization (these attacks may address the character and/or the 
policies associated with that person, group, or organization). 
Persuasive defence on the other hand, attempts to repair an image 
after persuasive attack (p.20). 
To a great extent the negative advertisements that are analysed in this 
study conform with the explanation of "persuasive attack" that Benoit and 
Williams give. The negative messages in the political advertisements attacked the 
images and parties ofthe two major presidential candidates under study. 
On the same issue, Gronbeck (1994) identifies three basic types of 
negative political advertisements: the implicative advertisement, the comparative 
advertisement and the assault advertisement. He explains these by saying that "in 
implicative, comparative, and assault negative ads, we have three different foci: 
the implicative ad focuses on self, the assault, on other, and the comparative, on 
11 A backlash occurs when the negative political advertisements impact negatively on their sponsor rather 
than on the opponent. When this happens, the advertisement is self-defeating (Roberts 1995). See also 
Johnson-Cartee and Copeland (1991) and Garramone (1988) for a detailed discussion on how negative 
advertisements can backfire. 
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both (p.69)." Accordingly, the analysis of the rhetorical structures of negative 
campaign advertisements in this study entails showing which types of 
advertisements each political party used and why they were used. It is the 'assault 
advertisement' that Gronbeck calls a true negative advertisement since it is 
completely centred on the opponent. This is the definition of negative 
advertisement that is used in the analyses of advertisements in this study. Some 
researches reveal that negative messages are rhetorically effective against the 
opponent ifthey are well managed (Kaid and Boydston 1987 and Merritt 1984). 
Since the concepts "rhetoric" and "democracy" are almost inseparable, it 
is also imperative that a working definition of the term "democracy" be given. 
Defining democracy as a system of government for the people, with the people 
and by the people does not adequately and clearly give the features or tenets of 
this system of governing. In most cases politicians parrot this definition without 
actually understanding or practising the fundamentals of a democratic system or 
process. For the purposes of this study, I adopt the definition of democracy made 
in the deliberations of the International Panel on Democracy and Development 
(IPDD) 12• The panel defines democracy as 
... a system whereby the whole society can participate, at 
every level, in the decision making process and keep 
control over it. Its foundation is the full observance of 
human rights, as defined by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Vienna Pacts and Declaration of 
1993. And the promotion of those rights and the respect of 
differences and freedom of speech and thought are 
indispensable preconditions for democracy. There can be 
no democracy without an independent judicial system and 
12 The IPDD was set by the UNESCO Director-General in 1998 to work out the principles of democracy 
and development. The panel, chaired by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, produced a verbatim record of the 
deliberations entitled The Interaction between Democracy and Development. 
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without institutions that guarantee freedom of expression 
and the existence of free media. The power to legislate 
must be exercised by representatives of the people who 
have been elected by the people. Laws must be 
implemented by legally responsible individuals, and the 
administrative apparatus must be accountable to the elected 
representatives. That is why a parliament that is truly 
representative of the people in all its diversity is 
indispensable for the democratic process. In this respect, 
the holding of free and fair elections by universal suffrage 
is a necessary, though not in itself sufficient, precondition 
for the existence of a democratic regime .... democracy can 
be defined as a political system that is capable of correcting 
its own dysfunctions (Boutros-Ghali 2003: 7-8). 
I find this to be a comprehensive definition as it lays down the 
fundamental principles for the execution of a democratic process. For instance, in 
a democratic society there is respect for other people as sovereign power lies with 
the people, there exists rule of law because there is a reliable and independent 
judicial system and individuals have the right " ... to express their opinion [freely] 
within society to which they belong and [have] the right to be heard ... "(ibid: 9). 
In addition, the political environment must be conducive to the free expression by 
civil society both locally and internationally, as the world is increasingly 
becoming a global village. A free press is also another precondition for 
democracy. There is a need to discuss negative advertising as a strategy for 
political influence with this definition of democracy in mind since it is apparent 
that during the 2002 presidential election campaign in Zimbabwe, there were 
gross violations 13 of some of the basic principles of democracy as the campaign 
was characterized by politically motivated violence which claimed the lives of 
many people, most of them supporters of the opposition MDC party (Feltoe 
13 Some details of the human rights developments during this campaign period are contained in the March 
2002 issue of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Bulletin, No.6. 
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2002)14 • This political violence definitely infringed on the rights of the victims to 
express themselves freely and elect a candidate of their choice. The intimidation 
and harassment of voters that were characteristic of the campaign was a breach of 
the principles of a free and fair election campaign. 
It should also be noted that the state-controlled television station and four 
radio stations did not allow political advertisements, whether positive or negative, 
from the MDC. The scenario was that the state-controlled media churned out 
negative propaganda campaign using advertisements and stories against the MDC. 
The following analysis made by the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe 
(MMPZ) 15 shows that the election campaign field was uneven: 
ZBC carried a total of 402 election campaign stories in its 
news bulletins monitored between 1 December 2001 and 7 
March 2002, the penultimate day of the election campaign. 
Of these, 339 of the bulletins (84%) favoured Zanu (PF)'s 
presidential candidate. Only 38 (9%) covered MDC 
activities, but virtually all of them were used to discredit 
the opposition party and its candidate. Radio Zimbabwe, 
ZBC's most popular station, carried a total of 275 
campaign related stories. A total of 237 of them (86%) 
were promotional stories in favour of Zanu (PF), while 20 
(7.3%) were all negative stories about the MDC. ... Out of a 
total of 14 hours 25 minutes that ZBC devoted to the 
presidential election campaign, Zanu (PF)'s candidate was 
granted a total of 13 hours and 34 minutes, or a little more 
than 94%. This compares to the national broadcaster's 
coverage of the MDC and its candidate, of just 31 minutes 
and 30 seconds, a paltry 4%. But even this was subverted 
by ZBC which used the time to attack, denigrate and 
discredit the MDC (MMPZ 14 March 2002). 
14 See also Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Are they accountable? Examining alleged violators and 
their violations -pre and post Presidential Election March 2002: A report by the Zimbabwe Human 
Rights NGO Forum, December 2002 
15 Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe is a Non-Governmental Organisation that analyses media issues 
independently in the country. 
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The above analysis of how the electronic media conducted their business 
during the 2002 presidential election campaign period is one example of the many 
violations of the tenets of democracy as given in the IPDD definition of 
democracy. The MDC presidential candidate could not use the national 
broadcaster to elaborate the policies of his party to the electorate. Neither could he 
use it for the purpose of persuasive defence, that is in trying to repair his damaged 
imaged. 
2.2 Conspirator-traitor rhetoric 
On 13 February 2002 ZTV produced a story from Australian Television 
alleging that Tsvangirai had plotted to assassinate Mugabe before the elections. 16 
According to a specialised edition of "Dateline", a programme on the Australian 
Special Broadcasting Services (SBS), Tsvangirai had contracted Dickens and 
Madison, a Canadian Political and Public Relations Consultancy Company, to 
carry out the assassination of Mugabe. The documentary, entitled "Killing 
Mugabe -The Tsvangirai Conspiracy", showed Tsvangirai discussing the alleged 
plot with executives of Dickens and Madison among them Ari Ben-Menashe, the 
head of the organisation who later 'spilt the beans', so to speak, to the 
Zimbabwean government. The MDC leader denied the assassination plot arguing 
that the MDC had approached Dickens and Madison to help them with a public 
relations thrust and sourcing of funds in North America and that " ... this whole 
16 The Sunday Mail, February 17 2002 gives the full text of Tsvangirai 's alleged conspiracy against 
Mugabe. See also The Daily News issues of 21, 22, 23 and 25 February 2002. The alleged plot received 
wide media coverage both locally and internationally. 
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thing was contrived to damage me politically and to eliminate me from the 
presidential race." 17 
The state-controlled media argued that Tsvangirai had committed a 
treasonous crime and that it would not be easy for him to get away with it. The 
following comment from The Herald was characteristic of how the state-
controlled media viewed the case: "He [Tsvangirai] will not wriggle out of this 
one with a mere denial because everything is on [video and] tape for all to see and 
hear18". The use of the word "wriggle" and the expression "mere denial" suggest 
that it was not easy for Tsvangirai to get out of this case with a simple excuse. It 
seems the paper had already convicted him before trial. 19 The purpose of 
referring briefly to the alleged conspiracy to assassinate Mugabe is to show how it 
was used in negative advertisements that portrayed Tsvangirai as an unscrupulous 
politician who would do anything to ascend to power, including the assassination 
of a sitting president. 
The negative advertisements also portrayed the MDC as a terrorist 
organization. Although there were arguments channelled through the private press 
that the video had been externally edited or doctored, the fact that voters could see 
and hear Tsvangirai discussing the "plot" was detrimental to his image as a 
presidential candidate. In the circumstances, many viewers were likely to believe 
this conspiracy story word for word because of the power of television. Talking 
17 The Daily News, February 22 200. 
18 The Herald, February 19 2002 
19 Tsvangirai was acquitted of this treason case by the High Court on 16 October 2004. In passing 
judgement, Judge President Justice Pardington Garwe's main argument was that the meeting between 
Tsvangirai and Ben Menashe "could not have by any stretch of imagination discussed the assassination of 
the President" and that the witness was "a suspect witness whose evidence should be treated with caution" 
(The Herald, October 16 2004). 
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about the power of television, Shea (1996:208) says "because voters remember 
these images for ... a long period of time, paid political ads often are retained as 
independent news accounts - which is another reason why television is so 
powerful20." 
In order to bolster the impression that Tsvangirai had actually plotted to 
kill Mugabe, ZTV repeatedly re-screened the old footage in which Tsvangirai 
addressed a rally in Harare in September 2001 where he said: "If you (Mugabe) 
don't go peacefully, we will remove you violently"21 • This was screened 
alongside the conspiracy video to buttress the impression that Tsvangirai 
advocated violence. The logic or enthymeme used here was meant to make the 
voters conclude that Tsvangirai was a violent man. The effectiveness of electronic 
media in its propaganda war against Tsvangirai lay in the fact that they did not 
accord him ample time to defend himself from the allegations levelled against 
him. According to the MMPZ, 
ZTV devoted a total of 35 minutes 25 seconds to the 
assassination conspiracy in the news section of the five 
Newshour bulletins that featured the story between 
Wednesday (13/2/02) and Sunday [17/2/02] .... The MDC 
official denial was afforded 15 seconds on ZTV (14/2/02 
8pm). A further 55 seconds was given to footage of 
Tsvangirai addressing a rally in Chitungwiza (17/2/02) in 
which he again denied the allegations (MPPZ 2002:82). 
Given these circumstances, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the use 
of the conspiracy video-tape in ZANU (PF)' s negative commercials had a 
20 See also Theodore F. Sheckles, "Negative Coherence And Antecedent Ethos In The Rhetoric Of Attack 
Advertising: A Case Study Of The Glendening VS. Sauerbrey" in Campaign in Rhetoric and Public 
Affairs, Vo/.5, No.3, pp. 459-477 
21 MMPZ, Media Under Siege: Report on the media coverage of the 2002 Presidential and Mayoral 
elections in Zimbabwe, p.82 
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negative rhetorical impact in the voters' minds as far as Tsvangirai's image was 
concerned. These negative advertisements were also aired on all the four state-
controlled radio stations, reaching the voters in the remote rural areas and those 
without television sets in urban and peri-urban areas. 
The targeting of audiences was important in this case on the part of ZANU 
(PF)'s electioneering machinery. According to Trent and Friedenberg (2000) 
radio advertising is advantageous and much better than other types of advertising 
as it can be used to reach targeted audiences, even in remote areas. It is most 
likely that some people believed the conspiracy story word for word just because 
it came out on radio and television. Trent and Friedenberg note that "[television] 
lends a sense of credibility to candidates and [also] allows for some degree of 
targeting" (Trent and Friedenberg 2000:339). Other people, most of them 
probably MDC supporters, might have interpreted the alleged plot as a dirty tactic 
to smear campaign the MDC leader. It is highly possible that most people felt 
impatient with Tsvangirai for allowing himself to be trapped under surveillance 
cameras by Dickens and Madison. This feeling might have been because ZANU 
(PF)'s electronic advertisements portrayed Tsvangirai as a vulnerable political 
novice who lacked shrewdness and maturity, the prerequisite qualities of astute 
presidential candidates. The message the advertisements sent to the electorate was 
simply that Tsvangirai was unsuitable for the presidency. 
Even the conspiracy advertisements that were flighted in the state-
controlled newspapers attacked Tsvangirai's image as a presidential candidate. In 
one typical advertisement, ZANU (PF) asks the voters two rhetorical questions: 
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"WHAT WOULD YOU VOTE FOR? PLOTS TO KILL OR PLOTS TO 
TILL ?"22 The punning or word play on the word "plots" displays a high degree 
of ingenuity of the staffers of the ZANU (PF)'s Information and Publicity 
department in designing the advertisement. The rhetorical captions have an 
epigrammatic appeal, as they are concise, memorable and rending like aphorisms. 
The use of visuals in this advertisement is worth commenting on. The picture of a 
man holding a gun is in sharp contrast with the picture of a man holding a plough 
in the advertisement. The MDC leader was presented to the voter as a dangerous 
man who plotted to kill a president while the ZANU (PF) candidate was portrayed 
as a benevolent leader who provided people with plots to till. The rhetorical 
function of this advertisement lies in persuading the voters to vote for good and 
not for evil. In other words, the personal foci here are 'Vote for Mugabe' and 
'Vote against Tsvangirai'. The broadsheet advertisement refers to Tsvangirai 's 
assassination plot and the Land Redistribution Programme that Mugabe and his 
government embarked on in July 2000 (ZANU PF Election Manifesto 2002). 
While the violence that accompanied the Land Reform Programme must be 
strongly condemned, there was no question for the need for government to 
embark on a large-scale land reform exercise that would restore land to the 
indigenous people23 . While ZANU (PF)'s policy on the land question was clear 
and attractive to the black people, the MDC seemed wishy-washy on this issue. In 
a related advertisement ZANU (PF) argues that Tsvangirai has sold the land to the 
22 The Herald, March 5 2002 
23Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, December 2002, Are they accountable? Examining alleged 
violators and their violations pre and post the Presidential Election March 2002, p.16 
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British and racist Rhodesians and therefore people should not vote for him. This 
argument is clearly presented in the following advertisement: 
Sliding from 6 points to 5 points and still going down ... 
WHERE HAS THE LAND GONE? 
Zimbabwe Independent, January 18, 2002 
MDC'S 6 Point Plan for a Better Future 
PEACE- Fairness, Justice, Security, Law and Order 
FOOD- Available and Affordable Prices 
JOBS- New industries and Opportunities 
LAND- Orderly, Equitable and Economically Sound 
EDUCATION- Affordable Fees and Funding of Tertiary Education 
HEALTH-Medication and Basic Health Care 
Parade, February 2002 
MDC'S 5 Point Plan for a Better Future 
PEACE- Fairness, Justice, Security, Law and Order 
FOOD- Available and Affordable Prices 
JOBS- New industries and Opportunities 
EDUCATION- Affordable Fees and Funding of Tertiary Education 
HEALTH-Medication and Basic Health Care 
(Picture ofTsvangirai receiving money from white farmers) 
Why have they removed land from their 6 Point Plan? 
BECAUSE TSVANGIRAI has already SOLD the LAND to the British and 
racist Rhodesians. Don't let them short change you again! 
ON MARCH 9 AND 10 VOTE FOR THE PEOPLE: VOTE FOR 
MATURITY, EXPERIENCE AND WISDOM24 
The omission of the land issue by the MDC in the advertisement that 
appeared in the February 2002 issue of the Parade magazine was used in ZANU 
24 The Herald, February I 2002 
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(PF) attack rhetoric as clear testimony that the MDC did not want to take land 
from the white commercial farmers. If voted into power, the rhetoric said, 
Tsvangirai would reverse the gains of the liberation struggle and the Third 
Chimurenga by returning the farms that had already been compulsorily acquired 
to the white farmers25 • This was equal to selling the country to the "British and 
racist Rhodesians." In an attempt to convince the voters that Tsvangirai was 
indeed a sell-out, a picture of him with a group of white farmers26 giving his party 
cheque donations was juxtaposed to the negative message in the advertisement. 
He was seen clapping hands, a gesture of expressing gratitude and appreciation. 
While the denotative meaning of this is that Tsvangirai was simply shown 
thanking the white farmers for donating money to his party, the connotative 
meaning was disastrous. He was depicted as accepting the white men's money in 
exchange of the land that Mugabe had taken from them. This whole act was 
tantamount to selling the land to the white men - the advertisement exhorts the 
voters to believe. This is depictive rhetoric which Osborn (1986:79) defines as 
"strategic pictures, verbal and nonverbal visualizations, that linger in the 
collective memory of audiences as representative of their subjects when rhetoric 
has been successful." Tsvangirai's image in the picture functioned as a visual 
topos of a sell-out, a traitor- an unpatriotic Zimbabwean. This battered his image. 
In order to understand the nature of the rhetoric of ZANU (PF)' s negative 
advertisements following the "Killing Mugabe-The Tsvangirai Conspiracy" 
25 For instance, Fidelis Mhashu, an MDC MP was quoted in the BBC's Hard Talk Programme as saying the 
MDC would return the land that had been acquired by government to white farmers if voted into power. 
26 For the first time since 1980, the white populace became politically active, supporting the MDC openly, 
thus fuelling certain conclusions such as that they feared loss of land. The source of this picture was CNN 
which normally is anti-Mugabe. 
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documentary, it is necessary to view this with the 1988 presidential election 
campaign in America in mind. The focus is on George Bush (Republican) and 
Michael Dukakis (Democrat) as presidential candidates. In this election 
campaign, Bush used the Horton saga in a negative advertisement to attack 
Dukakis (Jamieson 1992; Diamond and Bates 1992; Iyengar 1991; Pratkanis and 
Aronson 1991 ). In short the advertisement told the story of William Horton, a 
convicted murderer who was sent to prison in Massachusetts. Horton committed 
rape and assault while he was on furlough from a prison when Dukakis was 
governor of Massachusetts. 
The advertisement structured the information in such a way that made 
people infer it was Dukakis' responsibility that Horton committed the rape and 
assault crimes while on furlough, yet neither did Dukakis pardon Horton nor 
Horton kill. According to Jamieson (1992:24) Bush even commented that the 
Horton case "had come to symbolize, and represent - accurately, I believe - the 
misguided outlook of my opponent when it comes to crime." The Horton case was 
used to support the widely held opinion that Democrats are "soft on crime" 
(Jamieson 1992; Pratkanis and Aronson 1991). 
So, this advertisement was aimed at making the voters form a bad image 
of Michael Dukakis since it attributed responsibility of the Horton case to him. It 
depicted Dukakis as a man who let out of prison prisoners charged with the crime 
of first-degree murder to go and commit other crimes. He was therefore not fit to 
vote for as president. The Horton saga makes an interesting analogy to the 
Tsvangirai alleged coup plot. 
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The "Killing Mugabe-The Tsvangirai Conspiracy" and the Horton cases to 
a large extent demonstrate that, as Jamieson puts it, 
.. .in politics as in life, what is known is not necessarily 
what is believed, what is shown is not necessarily what is 
seen, and what is said is not necessarily what is heard .... in 
[these cases] consultants exploited the psychological quirks 
that characterize humans (p.24) 
The topos of a traitor is also found in the advertisement that equates 
Tsvangirai to the biblical Judas Iscariot who betrayed Jesus for 30 pieces of silver. 
The full text of the advertisement is as follows: 
DON'T SELL YOUR COUNTRY, QUIT THE MDC AND 
RETURN TO THE PEOPLE 
(Picture of Tsvangirai with a group of white farmers donating 
money to his party) 
"This is how JUDAS ISCARIOT- the traitor of traitors-
sold out." 
Some white people, the British Government and all traitors say: 
"If the MDC had not been formed, the land would not have been 
returned to the people. " What they are saying is similar to what 
JUDAS IS CARlOT, the traitor of traitors said, "If I had not 
betrayed Jesus for 30 pieces of silver he would not have died for 
you!" 
DON'T BE A SELLOUT, RETURN TO THE PEOPLE 
ON MARCH 9 AND 10 VOTE FOR THE PEOPLE: VOTE FOR 
MATURITY, EXPERIENCE AND WISDOM21 
The logos in the above advertisement is interesting. By referring to the 
betrayal of Jesus Christ by his disciple Judas Iscariot, the advertisement is 
appealing to people's emotions to hate Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai is again seen with 
27 The Herald, 5 March 2002 
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the same group of white farmers28 donating money to his party as in the previous 
advertisement. Below the picture is the sentence "This is how JUDAS ISCARIOT 
- the traitor of traitors - sold out." The topos of land is central to the argument 
being given to the voters. Tsvangirai's picture with the white commercial farmers 
has since become a symbol of selling out in ZANU (PF)'s advertisements against 
the MDC leader. In one advertisement the same picture, appears with the Shona 
caption "Tsvangirai achitengesa nyika kumabhunu emumapurazi"29 (Tsvangirai 
while selling the land/country to white farmers"). 
In yet another negative advertisement Tsvangirai is presented as a tea-boy 
who is serving the Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Bliar30 (sic) with tea (map of 
Zimbabwe put in a cup of tea). In the humorous cartoon Tsvangirai asks Bliar 
(sic) "Is this what you want to have on March 9 & 10, Baas?" and Blair answers 
"Yes, yes, my boy Morgan." The connotation of this cartoon is Tsvangirai was a 
Blair stooge. The advertisement goes on to say that: 
TSVANGISON31 AND HIS SELLOUTS THINK ZIMBABWE IS 
TEA 
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR BIRTHRIGHT 
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR HERITAGE 
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR SOUL 
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR COUNTRY 
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR LAND 
ZIMBABWE WILL NEVER BE A COLONY AGAIN 
28 This is repeated use of the same picture found in the preceding advertisement. 
29 The Sunday Mail, February I 0 2002. Note the deliberate wrong spelling of Blair's name. It was used in 
ZANU (PF) campaign discourse to connote that Blair was a "liar" on many issues concerning Zimbabwe. 
30 The deliberate wrong spelling of Tony Blair statement is to present a negative image about him 
suggesting that he is a liar. 
31 ZANU-PF coined the name Tsvangison after Tsvangirai had made reference to whites as "our cousins" at 
a rally, suggesting that he had anglicized himself. 
40 
the same group of white farmers28 donating money to his party as in the previous 
advertisement. Below the picture is the sentence "This is how JUDAS ISCARIOT 
- the traitor of traitors - sold out." The topos of land is central to the argument 
being given to the voters. Tsvangirai's picture with the white commercial farmers 
has since become a symbol of selling out in ZANU (PF)'s advertisements against 
the MDC leader. In one advertisement the same picture, appears with the Shona 
caption "Tsvangirai achitengesa nyika kumabhunu emumapurazi"29 (Tsvangirai 
while selling the land/country to white farmers"). 
In yet another negative advertisement Tsvangirai is presented as a tea-boy 
who is serving the Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Bliar30 (sic) with tea (map of 
Zimbabwe put in a cup of tea). In the humorous cartoon Tsvangirai asks Bliar 
(sic) "Is this what you want to have on March 9 & 10, Baas?" and Blair answers 
"Yes, yes, my boy Morgan." The connotation of this cartoon is Tsvangirai was a 
Blair stooge. The advertisement goes on to say that: 
TSVANGISON31 AND HIS SELLOUTS THINK ZIMBABWE IS 
TEA 
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR BIRTHRIGHT 
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR HERITAGE 
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR SOUL 
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR COUNTRY 
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR LAND 
ZIMBABWE WILL NEVER BE A COLONY AGAIN 
28 This is repeated use of the same picture found in the preceding advertisement. 
29 The Sunday Mail, February 10 2002. Note the deliberate wrong spelling of Blair's name. It was used in 
ZANU (PF) campaign discourse to connote that Blair was a "liar" on many issues concerning Zimbabwe. 
30 The deliberate wrong spelling of Tony Blair statement is to present a negative image about him 
suggesting that he is a liar. 
31 ZANU-PF coined the name Tsvangison after Tsvangirai had made reference to whites as "our cousins" at 
a rally, suggesting that he had anglicized himself. 
40 
ON MARCH 9 AND 10 VOTE FOR THE PEOPLE: VOTE FOR 
MATURITY, EXPERIENCE AND WISDOM2 
Voters are warned not to let Tsvangirai sell their "birthright" "heritage", 
"soul", "country" and "land". The use of repetition in this advertisement has a 
rhetorical impact on the voters as they are being given reasons for not voting for 
Tsvangirai. The repetition sounds formulaic and inherently demands adherence to 
the DON'TS. In addition, the DON'TS are compelling and were designed to have 
a hypnotic effect on the voters. The vow that ZIMBABWE WILL NEVER BE A 
COLONY AGAIN was meant to instil a sense of guilt or shame to whoever 
would want to vote for Tsvangirai, who wanted to sell the country to the British, 
the former colonizers. By using the derogatory, anglicized name "Tsvangison" the 
advertisement gave the impression that Tsvangirai had already sold his soul to the 
British and it followed that he would in tum sell the country to them if voted into 
the presidency. This advertisement is both satirical and sarcastic. 
2.3 MDC's attack advertising 
As stated earlier, both parties used negative advertising or the persuasive 
attack strategy in their campaigns. The MDC's campaign theme or topos was 
calling for change, one of the widely used challenger's strategies in political 
campaign communication (Trent and Friedenberg 2000). The issues that featured 
in the MDC's negative advertising included, among others, Mugabe's age, 
political violence, the land issue, unemployment, inflation and the general 
suffering of people due to the economic crisis in the country. Selected negative 
32 The Herald, February 2 2002. 
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adverts on these five topics are discussed in this section. It is important to note 
that these issues are interrelated and are discussed separately only for 
convenience. 
On the issue of Mugabe's age, the MDC in one of its advertisements 
presented an impression that voting for Mugabe at the age of 78 was the same as 
voting for old thinking. The advertisement asked the rhetorical question "THE 
OLDEST PRESIDENT IN HISTORY?"33 The narrative went on to say that if 
Mugabe was elected he would be the oldest man in history to be sworn in for a 
six-year presidential term. The message ends by saying, "This election is your 
chance to vote for new ideas instead of old thinking. It's your chance to vote the 
MDC and its leader Morgan Tsvangirai." A related negative advertisement 
suggested that if elected to the presidency at 78, Mugabe would be incompetent to 
run the affairs of government. It suggested other people would be doing the day-
to-day business of governing the country. Mugabe's envisaged ineptitude is 
implied in the following rhetorical questions and narrative: 
IF MUGABE WINS, WHO'LL REALLY BE RUNNING 
ZIMBABWE? 
EMERSON MUNANGAGWA? CHARLES UTETE? 
PROFESSOR JONATHAN MOYO? GRACE MUGABE? 
When you vote for a man of 78 for another term of office, your 
guess is as good as ours as to who will really be running the show. 
This election is to vote for a better future. It's your chance to vote 
MDC and its leader Morgan Tsvangirai.34 
33 The Daily News, January 16 2002 
34 ibid 
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By suggesting that someone or other people would be running the show 
the advertisement attacked Mugabe's image as a potential candidate for the 
presidency. According to the above message, he was no longer worth voting for at 
this advanced age. The independent press peddled rumours about Mugabe's 
health, claiming that he was ailing. Consequently the MDC argued that "what 
Zimbabwe need[ed] [was] new blood, not spilled blood."35 The mention of 
"spilled blood" brings us to the rhetoric of political violence. 
Perhaps the most touching of all MDC's negative advertisements against 
ZANU (PF) was the one in which they published the victims of political violence 
and alleged that these were MDC supporters that were killed by ZANU (PF) 
supporters. The following message, quoted verbatim summarizes the purpose of 
the advertisement- to appeal to the emotions ofthe voters: 
WE REMEMBER THEM, WE MOURN THEM, WE SALUTE 
THEM. 
This is the roll of honour of some of the gallant sons and daughters 
of Zimbabwe who died in political violence. They were killed in 
cold blood by Zanu ( P F) for daring to stand up for their rights 
and your rights to be free. This roll does not neglect the women 
who have been raped, the people who have been beaten up, their 
homes burnt. Throughout Zimbabwe, the spirit of democratic 
resistance is rising. We pay tribute to the fraud spirit of the 
Zimbabwean people. They did not die in vain. 3 
This message appealed to voters' emotions (pathos) in a number of ways. 
It was intended to portray a bad picture of ZANU (PF). The publication of the one 
hundred names of people who died in alleged political violence is a solemn matter 
in itself. One cannot help feeling sympathetic for these people and their families 
35 The Daily News, February 2 2002 
36 THE CHANGING TIMES Supplement publication, 3-10 March 2002 
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and relatives. The message used the endearing phrase "gallant sons and 
daughters". This invoked the feeling of anger and hatred against those responsible 
for killing these people. 
The epigram WE REMEMBER THEM, WE MOURN, WE SALUTE 
THEM told the reader straight away that what was contained in the message was 
something of a grave nature. The repetition in this saluting message is a rhetorical 
device that made the idea of the deaths of these victims ring or stick in the mind 
of the voter. By using the phrase "roll of honour" the reader was given a feeling 
that these people were killed doing an honourable thing, that of "daring to stand 
up for their rights and your [voters'] rights to be free." The fact that the message 
said these heroes also died for the voters' rights drew much more sympathy from 
the voters because they (the victims) were portrayed as being selfless- they were 
true Martyrs. 
They were also portrayed as a new breed of heroes who were "killed in 
cold blood by ZANU (PF)" in an independent country fighting for democracy and 
human rights. The implication of the advertisement was that since these heroes 
were "killed by ZANU (PF)", voters were not supposed to vote for its presidential 
candidate, Mugabe. In other words, the MDC, by using the deaths of its 
supporters in the negative advertisement, was saying that the political system was 
undemocratic and that Mugabe had condoned the mayhem in the country. This 
was used as a justification for the need for political change and the restoration of 
the rule of law under the MDC government. 
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The MDC also attacked ZANU (PF) for the high rate of unemployment. 
The voters were given the impression that it was due to the government's 
inefficiency that the country was experiencing the worst economic crisis ever, 
resulting in rampant unemployment. In order to appeal to the voters some of the 
advertisements were presented in Shona, one of the major indigenous languages 
spoken by the majority in Zimbabwe. One of the advertisements said: 
"KUTARISIRA KUZANU (PF) UCHIDA BASA KUGARIRA GUYO 
SEMBWA"37 (It is pointless to expect ZANU (PF) to help with employment). 
The use of the Shona proverb in which a dog waits in vain for the whole day 
expecting its master to give it some peanut butter is quite telling. By using the 
proverb, the MDC painted a hopeless picture for the unemployed. Still on the 
same subject, another advertisement said: "NEZANU (PF) NYIKA Y AZARA 
MAROVHA"38 (ZANU PF has caused a lot of unemployment). In yet another 
advertisement the MDC urged people to desert ZANU (PF). It said "TIZA 
KUZANU (PF) UTIZE UROVHA"39 (If you don't want unemployment, run away 
from ZANU PF). These negative advertisements were meant to entice the young 
voters who were facing hardships due to unemployment. The advertisements 
levelled the responsibility for unemployment on the ZAU (PF) government and 
Mugabe. Mugabe was therefore presented as being incapable of solving the 
unemployment problem. 
The adverts implied that it was only the MDC and its leader Tsvangirai 
who would end the problem of unemployment if voted into power. In the wake of 
37 The Daily News, January 23 2002 
38 The Daily News, February 6 2002 
39 The Daily News, January 23 2002 
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company closures and the big numbers of unemployed youths, there is no doubt 
that the rhetoric on unemployment appealed to many urban voters. Coupled with 
unemployment was the general suffering that the MDC attributed to the bad 
governance of ZANU (PF) and Mugabe. The MDC messages like NEZANU (PF) 
INGA TAYAURA NHAI AMAI!40 (ZANU PF has caused us a lot of suffering) 
and ZANU (PF) Y AKAUNZA NHOKO DZEZVIRONDA 41 (ZANU PF has 
impoverished the people) were used to buttress the claim that all the suffering that 
the voters were experiencing was as a result of the mismanagement of the 
economy by ZANU (PF). 
As evidence to the claim that ZANU (PF) had brought hardships to the 
people, the MDC used two examples illustrating how the skyrocketing inflation 
had negatively affected the voters at the time. In the advertisement WHAT ZANU 
(PF) DID TO $1 0, it was shown that in 1985, $1 0 bought ten loaves of bread but 
the same amount bought only ten thin slices of bread in 200242 . In the other, it 
was shown that in 1985 $100 bought a trolley of groceries but the same amount in 
2002 bought a loaf of bread and one litre of fresh milk.43 To make it worse, 
people were queuing (and are still queuing) for these and other basic commodities 
which were in short supply and very expensive, beyond the reach of most of the 
populace. The MDC used this depictive rhetoric to try and convince the voters 
that the ZANU (PF) presidential candidate was not worth to vote for in the 
election. This negative rhetoric against ZANU (PF) gave the impression that 
40 The Daily News, January 22 2002 
41 The Daily News, February 7 2002 
42 The Daily News, February 13 2002 
43 ibid 
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voting for the MDC presidential candidate was the only sensible thing to do in 
those times of economic hardships. It implied that a change of leadership and 
government was a necessity in order to stop the suffering of people brought about 
by the ZANU (PF) government. 
The inflation issue and Mugabe's age were compared in a satirically 
rhetorical way in one of MDC's negative advertisements that said, THE ONLY 
THING THAT IS AS HIGH AS ZIMBABWE'S INFLATION IS MUGABE'S 
AGE44 • Ironically, this was an insult to all old people who still had the vote. On 
the other hand, ZANU (PF) argued that the suffering was being caused by the 
economic sanctions that had been imposed on the country by most Western 
countries which it claimed supported and sponsored the MDC. Also the ZANU 
(PF) government produced some advertisements that implied that white 
companies that were sympathetic to the MDC were hoarding food-stuffs, thereby 
creating artificial shortages.45 
The MDC rhetoric on the land issue denounced the manner in which 
ZANU (PF) handled the land reform programme. Tsvangirai was on record saying 
that ZANU (PF) was encouraging people to occupy farms haphazardly in order to 
gain political mileage ahead of the election. According to him, people were just 
mushrooming in the farms without order. Tsvangirai was quoted criticising 
Mugabe's land policy saying "Mugabe wants to turn us all into peasants ... "46 This 
was another unwitting insult against the peasants many of whom perhaps felt 
44 The Daily News, January 16 2002. According to THE CHANGING TIMES (March 2-10 2002) the 
hyper-inflation was 116% 
45 The Herald, February 1 2002 
46 ZTV February 4 2002, 8p.m. news bulletin 
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offended and withheld their votes. The MDC further attacked ZANU (PF) by 
suggesting that in the redistribution of land, only relatives and friends of ZANU 
(PF) stalwarts were benefiting47 . This meant that there was no transparency as 
ZANU (PF) cronies benefited more than the majority deserving cases. The MDC 
claimed that there was clear evidence that some of the big ZANU (PF) chefs had 
more than one farm each. The MDC also argued that the land belonged to the 
country as a whole and was not a monopoly of ZANU (PF) and that if the MDC 
had not been formed, land would not have been distributed to the people48 . This 
argument implied that ZANU (PF) no longer had a political agenda to sell to the 
electorate besides the land issue. 
2.4 Synthesis 
The negative advertisements rhetorically analysed in the above sections 
demonstrate that persuasive attack was a strategy that both political parties and 
their candidates used in the election campaign communication in 2002. Negative 
candidate theme advertising was used to present the images of the candidates 
running for the presidency as unfavourable as possible in the minds of the voters. 
Similarly negative issue advertisement attacked the candidates as far as the 
policies of their parties were concerned. The goal of both themes, which are 
inseparable in most cases, was to influence voters to form negative images of the 
candidates in each case and vote accordingly. 
47 The Daily News, January 30 2002 
48 The Daily News, March 8 2002 
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That this election campaign conveyed a sense of drama (De Wet 1991) 
with Mugabe and Tsvangirai as the chief actors cannot be doubted. ZANU (PF) 
campaign rhetoric portrayed Tsvangirai as a traitor and a protege or stooge of 
British imperialists. The rhetoric suggested that if Tsvangirai was voted into 
power, he would give back the land that Mugabe had compulsorily acquired from 
the white commercial farmers back to them. This would be tantamount to 
reversing the gains of the liberation struggle since the land issue was one of the 
major causes of going to war against the British settlers in Zimbabwe. 
By suggesting that Tsvangirai was a traitor or sell-out, ZANU (PF) 
negative rhetoric presented the MDC leader to the voters as being unpatriotic and 
therefore not worth to vote for. This unpatriotism was supported by the assertion 
that Tsvangirai had deserted the liberation struggle in the late 1970s (one that 
Tsvangirai does not deny). We see Tsvangirai's antecedent ethos being used to 
project him as a coward who could not bear the heat of the war. In contrast, 
Mugabe was presented as a true African statesman who stood boldly against local 
and international pressure and forged ahead with his controversial land reform 
programme that witnessed thousands of black families being settled in the farms 
that had hitherto belonged to white commercial farmers. 
The rhetorical effectiveness of the land issue lay in the contrastive 
interpretations it induced in the minds of the voters. The contrast it suggested was 
that, while the patriotic Mugabe was taking the land from the white minority and 
giving it back to the black majority, Tsvangirai, the traitor, was contemplating 
selling it to the white people. A good example is found in the advertisement 
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WHAT WOULD YOU VOTE FOR? PLOTS TO KILL OR PLOTS TO TILL? 
ZANU (PF) even appealed to the voters' sense of humour in one comic 
advertisement which showed Tsvangirai as a "tea-boy" serving the British Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, with tea in the form of the map of Zimbabwe with the word 
LAND inscribed on it. 
The conspiracy story presented Tsvangirai as an evil man, a person who 
did not want to use constitutional means to get to the presidency. Killing a sitting 
president was something sinister and treasonous. This saga was used to 
demoralise Tsvangirai's voters and dampen their spirits. This was because if 
convicted, Tsvangirai faced either a death sentence or a sentence of life 
imprisonment. In order to induce a highly negative view of Tsvangirai, the voters 
were given a daily "dosage" of the Tsvangirai conspiracy story from the state-
controlled electronic and print media. The importance that was attached to this 
case by the state mass media was overwhelming. According to McCombs and 
Shaw ( 1972: 177) "the mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, 
influencing the salience of attitudes toward the political issues."49 
In other words, the continuous reference to Tsvangirai' s treason case in 
these media was designed to make the voters believe that Tsvangirai indeed had 
committed this crime and was therefore not suitable to vote for. The rhetorical 
effect of such an interpretation is supported by Schenck-Hamlin et al. (2000:57) 
who argue that "people apparently do not conduct a systematic and exhaustive 
search for all informational elements relevant to an issue as it is broached." In 
short the voters were to see Tsvangirai as " ... a sick man with dangerous political 




• When Ben Menashe arrived in Zimbabwe to give evidence on the 
alleged plot to assassinate Mugabe, he described Tsvangirai as "a fool" 51 , adding 
that: "[h]e is not presidential material. It is a disgrace to have such a guy. He is a 
puppet but not a smart one because he did not need to come and plan the coup 
himself. "52 Mugabe also negatively described Tsvangirai, calling him 
"stupid ... foolish [and] a goblin ofBritain"53 at one occasion. 
We see the state press buttressing the idea that Tsvangirai was a dangerous 
puppet of the British colonialists whom voters were not supposed to vote for as 
president. It can be concluded that the media handled the whole conspiracy story 
in such a way that would short-circuit the reasoning of the voters. This is mainly 
because the alleged plot to assassinate Mugabe appealed to the emotions of fear 
(as the grainy audio-visual text made Tsvangirai appear threatening), anger and 
hatred for Tsvangirai. 
The negative rhetorical power of ZANU (PF) advertisements was that 
Tsvangirai's ethos was the central focus of their attack without any prevarication. 
Tsvangirai was negatively described as a front for Britain and some western 
countries which wanted to bring a regime change in Zimbabwe. 
The MDC's negative advertisements did not focus on Mugabe's ethos 
with much strength. Where they mentioned Mugabe, they tended to concentrate 
on the alleged ineptitude due to his age. They suggested that Mugabe was too old 
50 The Herald, February 19 2002 
51 The Herald, February 22 2002 
52 
The Herald, February 23 2002 
53 
The Herald, March 2 2002. See also Mary E. Stuckey and Frederick J. Antczak, The Battle of Issues and 
Images (1995). They give a detailed analysis of how George Bush and Bill Clinton attacked each other in 
the 1992 general election campaign. This is similar to how Mugabe was attacking Tsvangirai's character in 
the 2002 election campaign. 
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...., 
to rule the country and therefore should not be voted for. Most advertisements 
personified ZANU (PF) and their persuasive attack was not directed on Mugabe's 
ethos. We begin to see metaphor playing its part in this kind of rhetorical attack. 
ZANU (PF) is used to stand for Mugabe. In other words the MDC's negative 
advertising was indirectly saying Mugabe was responsible for all the problems 
that were negatively affecting the country. On the land issue, the MDC's negative 
advertisements lacked the punch that would convince voters that surely ZANU 
(PF) was doing an evil thing in taking the land from the whites and giving it to the 
landless black people. This is mainly because at the beginning the MDC treated 
Mugabe' s action as an ad hoc issue, a gimmick to buy votes from the electorate. 
While this assertion cannot be completely dismissed, the MDC failed to 
realise that in attacking ZANU (PF)'s land reform programme, they were 
invoking the wrath of the landless people, especially the war veterans and the 
rural people who saw the benefit of this programme. The MDC also failed to 
realise that the land issue was a sensitive issue that needed careful handling. In his 
address to the forty eighth ordinary session of the ZANU (PF) Central Committee 
meeting Mugabe declared that "the land issue remains the central national 
question claiming our energies and attention in order to secure its genuine and 
lasting resolution."54 Although Tsvangirai said that he did not oppose the land 
reform programme, but was against "villagizing the whole country ... killing the 
productive commercial sector that is supposed to produce for the country"55 , this 
did not appeal to voters as it was treated as being against the land reform 
54 Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Inside The Third Chimurenga, The Department of Information and Publicity, 
Office of the President and Cabinet, (2001) p.92. 
55 The Daily News, February 4 2002 
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programme. It appeared to advocate a return to the situation preceding the land 
reform and one that invariably favoured white farmers. Also, the seriousness and 
speed with which Mugabe intensified his land rhetoric and implementation 
weakened the MDC's negative rhetoric on this issue. 
The MDC's negative rhetoric on issues like inflation and unemployment 
was meant to win the hearts of voters as it apportioned the blame for these to the 
alleged inefficiency and corruption in the ZANU (PF) government. Since the 
prices of basic commodities kept on rising literally on a daily basis, there is no 
doubt that this cost the ruling party a considerable numbers of votes. This was in 
the wake of food shortages in the country, shortages which the MDC attributed to 
the government's poor planning. With the rate of unemployment soaring to 70% 
during the campaign period, the MDC's attack on ZANU (PF) on this issue was 
rhetorically powerful as it was designed to appeal to the hundreds of thousands of 
the unemployed and their dependents, especially the youths and the retrenched 
workers who found themselves adrift because of company closures due to 
viability problems. 
2.5 Overall Appraisal 
The analysis of some of the negative advertisements that were used in the 
2002 presidential election campaign in Zimbabwe confirms what scholars in 
rhetoric generally agree, that negative rhetoric is a common strategy that is used 
in election campaign communication. The advertisements focused on both 
candidate theme and issue/policy theme. It has been demonstrated that in most 
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cases the two themes cannot be treated entirely separately as they are interwoven. 
This chapter suggests that ZANU (PF) negative rhetoric on the MDC's leader as 
far as the land issue was concerned had more impact on the voters mainly because 
the MDC did not clearly enunciate its land policy. The other reason was that 
ZANU (PF) had the advantage of using radio and television to attack Tsvangirai 
and the MDC. The MDC leader was not accorded the chance to either enunciate 
his party's policies or to refute the numerous and in most cases false allegations 
that were levelled against him using the state broadcaster. Instead, the "public" 
broadcaster served the interests of ZANU (PF) only, thereby violating one of the 
principles of democracy- that of freedom of expression. In the main, the MDC's 
negative rhetoric successfully created and intensified the anti-government mood 
that induced political cynicism of Mugabe in the voters. 
The huge amount of negative advertising that characterized the 2002 
presidential campaign indicates that both parties were convinced that negative 
advertisements would actually influence voters' minds and their choice of 
candidate. There is no doubt, therefore, that both parties regarded negative 




MUGABE'S GRAVESIDE ORATIONS: COLLECTIVE MEMORY 
AND NOSTALGIA 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of four speeches delivered by President 
Robert Mugabe at the National Heroes' Acre during the burial of four national 
heroes between May and November 2001. The deceased were Border Gezi who 
died in a car accident and was buried on 2 May 2001, Maven Enock Mahachi who 
also died in a car accident and was buried on 29 May 200 1, Chenjerai Hitler 
Hunzvi whose death was due to a "natural cause" and was buried on 8 June 2001 
and Cain Nkala who was laid to rest on 18 November 2001 after he was 
kidnapped from his Bulawayo home and murdered by unknown people, but whom 
ZANU (PF) alleged were members of the opposition party, the MDC. The other 
theory linked to this death by those in the opposition camp was that Nkala was 
abducted and murdered by people from his own political party, ZANU (PF), for 
his moderate approach to ZANU (PF)'s use of political violence. Mystery still 
shrouds Nkala's murder as the MDC activists who were arrested were acquitted 
by the courts after having been found not guilt to the murder charge. 
Although this study claims that Mugabe uses deliberative, judicial and 
epideictic rhetoric in all the four speeches - the three having a triangular 
relationship - it should be noted that they are not used in equal proportions. The 
speeches are largely epideictic as they eulogize the work of the deceased heroes 
the major aim being to inspire the audience to emulate them and thus remain loyal 
to the ruling party and vote for the party in the presidential election. 
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The discussion argues that by mentioning the ornate roles of the heroes in 
the shaping of the Zimbabwean society and by tracing the history of the liberation 
struggle, Mugabe was using collective memory and nostalgia as rhetorical tools to 
enhance and restore his political image ahead of the 2002 presidential election. In 
other words, Mugabe used rhetorical traditions to persuade mourners and the 
electorate in general to vote for him. It can be argued that Mugabe cunningly 
exploited the rhetorical context existing at that moment in such a manner that 
made the audience experience and understand his speeches the way he wanted 
them to do, that is, to sympathize with his political party ahead of the March 2002 
presidential election. 
In these speeches Mugabe uses a number of rhetorical devices which are 
meant to convince his immediate audience and the electorate at large to 
sympathize with the deceased, their families and the party, ZANU (PF). We see 
Mugabe revisiting the liberation struggle in these speeches and reminding people 
of the evils of settler colonialism and how people like the late heroes fought hard 
to improve the lives of the people who had been impoverished by the colonial 
system. By (re)constructing this collective memory and resorting to political 
nostalgia, Mugabe effectively appeals to people's emotions to hate everything 
associated with the former British colonizers and the vibrant opposition party, the 
MDC, which he accused of being sponsored by Britain to undermine Zimbabwe's 
sovereignty. The next section looks at the first speech. 
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3.2 Speech 1: Burial of Border Gezi- 2 My 200156 
3.2.1 Analysis 
The speech comprises seventeen paragraphs most of which are of more or 
less the same length. In the exordium, Mugabe uses his characteristic salutation. 
Here fourteen groups of people are mentioned according to protocol or hierarchy. 
He begins by paying tribute to his two closest lieutenants, Vice Presidents Simon 
Muzenda from the old ZANU (PF) and Joseph Msika from the defunct PF-
ZAPU57. By addressing these two leaders, the speaker is also addressing the two 
major ethnic groups, the Shona (80% ofthe population) represented by Muzenda, 
a Shona and the Ndebele (roughly 20% of the population), ironically represented 
by Msika, a Shona. This is meant to be a balancing act, but only fails to be so in 
reality when the Ndebele sector is represented by a Shona. The speaker moves on 
to the wives of his lieutenants, addressed in Shona as "Amai" (mother), a term 
that shows respect. By mentioning their wives, the speaker is adding honour to his 
two vices. The next powerful figure to be addressed is the Speaker of Parliament, 
Emmerson Munangagwa, strongly seen at that time as Mugabe's apparent 
successor until recently when Mugabe chose a woman Vice President, Joyce 
Teurai Ropa Mujuru. Then comes the Acting Chief Justice, Justice Godfrey 
Chidyausiku who was the Chairman of the botched Constitutional Commission in 
2000. Mugabe rewarded Chidyausiku with this high post after the then Chief 
Justice, Justice Anthony Gubbay was forced to resign before his term ended. 
56 See Appendix I. Copies of all the four speeches were got from the New Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News 
Agency (New Ziana), a government news body falls under the Ministry oflnformation and Publicity. 
57 PF-ZAPU, led by the late Joshua Nkomo, was swallowed by ZANU (PF) in the Unity Accord of 22 
December 1987. 
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The hierarchy, in descending order, moves to Cabinet members, the 
honourable MPs present and the respectable Chiefs. It is important to note here 
that the Chiefs were accorded unprecedented respect in the last few years 
beginning from the year 2000. Mugabe's government had marginalized the Chiefs 
for two decades, but now they had all of a sudden found an important place is his 
campaign rhetoric. At one of his marathon rallies in 2002 Mugabe said: 
We want our chiefs to have good homes. We want chiefs to have 
transport so that they don't wait for lifts when going about their 
business. Government has been able to reward them but not to the 
level we want because with their duties, they deserve a better 
reward. They should have secretaries and clerks to record 
proceedings. After presiding over an issue, it should be recorded. 58 
These improvements on the homes of the chiefs were done in order to 
make them campaign for Mugabe in the election in their areas of jurisdiction. 
During the election period, chiefs and headmen were seen lining with their 
subjects, with notebooks that contained the names of the subjects. It was alleged 
that this was done to intimidate the subjects into voting for ZANU (PF). 
After the chiefs Mugabe addresses Excellencies, Members of the 
Diplomatic Corps, then the bereaved family, members ofthe deceased's religious 
sect, members of the party leadership and Government officials. He concludes the 
exordium by the generic Ladies and Gentlemen and Comrades and Friends. Thus 
the exordium places the audience in its different statuses and roles. Besides this 
function, the exordium has the effect of calling everyone to attention before the 
actual address begins. The President uses this style of introduction in all the 
58 The Herald, 22.02.02 
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speeches analysed in this chapter. There are however slight changes necessitated 
by the changing circumstances or contexts. 
After the introductory remarks the speaker gets into his speech. In 
paragraph 2 Mugabe begins by telling his audience about the deceased's ethos. By 
saying that he " ... did not have to look very far for the new Minister of Youth 
Development, Gender and Employment Creation" when he was forming his 
government in the year 2000, Mugabe implies that Gezi fitted well into the job. 
He justifies his appointment by describing Gezi as "a young man whose drive and 
commitment I had followed with keen interest as he worked alongside his 
colleagues in the Province to bring about political vibrancy, unity and national 
development." By saying that he, the President, the highest authority in land, had 
developed a "keen interest" in the deceased, Mugabe is building a strong case for 
Gezi to win the hearts of the audience. This gives the impression that Gezi must 
have been so outstanding in both character and deeds to attract the keen attention 
of the President. Indirectly, Mugabe is saying the audience should be like Gezi. 
To draw the audience's pathos, Mugabe mentions that Gezi broadened 
development to reach the poor, rural folk who had been neglected by successive 
white governments. To further buttress Gezi's leadership qualities, reference is 
made to him as councillor, Member of Parliament for three constituencies and as 
Governor and Resident Minister of Mashonaland Central province. Gezi is also 
presented here as a fearless fighter who had to fight the negative attitudes the 
whites had in developing rural areas. At this time when there was acrimony 
towards whites because of the land issue, Gezi was presented as a prototypical 
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fighter of the Third Chimurenga and there is no doubt that this endeared him to 
the audience. 
The fuua paragraph rem1orces Geif s )eaaersnip qualities. ThiS time "It was 
in the august house, Parliament, where he was ZANU (PF) Chief Whip and a 
member of a number of Standing Committees. His commitment to the Fast Track 
Land Redistribution Programme was such that he wanted it implemented to the 
letter so that independence would be fully meaningful59. This presents Gezi again 
as a patriotic comrade who was eager to see the majority landless people 
benefiting from the land reform programme. 
In the fourth paragraph Mugabe appeals to the audience's pathos in his 
narratio. He tells the audience that the person they liked so much "is no longer 
with us." To show that Gezi was a man of the people, Mugabe uses Gezi's 
nickname, Madzibaba (an address title for a male follower of the Johanne 
Masowe Apostolic Faith Sect). The use of the Gezi's affectionate nickname is 
rhetorical here. It makes the heavy hearts of the mourners lighter and it draws 
them even closer to him in the light of the present sad circumstance. 
The use of nicknames appears to be an effective strategy in rhetorical 
discourse. Salazar (2002) notes that the South African Constitutional Talk60 team 
in 1996 showed in one of the comic strips (newspaper illustrations) President 
Mandel a's hand signing his affectionate nickname "Madiba" and not "Nelson 
Mandela" on the draft constitution. Salazar argues that the rhetorical move lies in 
59 This was in line with Mugabe's vision as expressed in one of his speeches when he said: " In my 
countless addresses to you, I have emphasized that the national land question enjoys Siamese closeness to 
the question of our National Independence and Sovereignty." (Inside The Third Chimurenga, 2001: 92). 
6° Constitution Talk 11 of 1995. See Philippe-Joseph Salazar, An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping 
of Democracy in South Africa, (2002:70). 
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the use of the President's ethos. The use of the nickname "Madzibaba" is similar 
to the "Madiba" sensation that grips most South Africans at the mention of former 
President Nelson Mandela. 
By carefully using such words as "grief and "sadness" and the phrases 
"dark day" and "harrowing moment", the speaker invites the sympathy of the 
audience. The speaker's choice of diction is excellent here. The audience is led 
logically to come to a conclusion that truly Gezi's young life was cut short in a 
tragic car accident. Further sympathy is solicited from the audience when it is 
reminded by the speaker here that Gezi was an "energetic and dynamic cadre" of 
the land based Third Chimurenga. Again Mugabe uses the deceased's ethos to 
show that "cruel" death has robbed them of their benefactor. 
He supports this in paragraph 5 by explaining Gezi's intended journey to 
Masvingo, that is, to give $1.6m (a huge some of money at that time) to the 
disadvantaged members of the society, what he calls "the flotsam and jetsam of 
our society." We see in this an attempt to further draw sympathy from the crowd 
by describing the poor by the proverbial "flotsam and jetsam". The same strategy 
continues in paragraph 5 when he refers to some of the would-be beneficiaries of 
Gezi's visit to Masvingo present at the funeral saying that "grief fills their hearts, 
overcomes their tongues" and that they are "devastated" and "hapless" because 
Gezi lies in permanent stillness in the coffin. The last sentence in this paragraph is 
powerful as Mugabe blames fate for the death of Gezi: "That bundle of energy 
and dynamism, that booming voice, has now been stilled and silenced by the hand 
of a cruel, ineluctable fate." The language he uses here paints a picture of 
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something very good and desirable being brought to naught by circumstances 
beyond the control ofhuman beings. 
Mugabe's rancour and impatience with fate spills into paragraph 7 when 
he asks the rhetorical question: "Why should fate reserve so cruel a destiny for so 
young and promising a figure?" There is no answer to this question. Its rhetorical 
impact is that it is saying such a young man should not have died. This should be 
the message that goes to the audience. Again the issue of youth is addressed in 
this interrogatio or rogatio, giving the feeling that Gezi's death was premature. 
The rest in this paragraph is more or less a repetition of what has been said in 
paragraph 4. 
In paragraph 8 we see Mugabe employing nostalgia. In tracing Gezi's life 
history, he refers to the unjust system of settler colonialism that neglected areas 
like Gezi's home area, Guruve, which were only remembered when native 
commissioners wanted to collect taxes from people. The settler governments 
never promoted meaningful developments in such areas mainly because they were 
not attractive and had harsh climatic conditions. The white settlers pushed the 
black majority to these areas that were infested with many diseases and other 
vagaries, forcing them to live from hand to mouth in the country of their birth. 
Mugabe argues that the black people were forced from fertile land to live in 
places like Guruve, Binga and Gokwe so that the white farmers, most of who had 
fought in the European wars, could be "pensioned off with our land." The logos in 
this paragraph is meant to show that it was wrong and unjust for the white men to 
take over land with good soils and climatic conditions from the black people, the 
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owners of the land. The argument is meant to make people hate the MDC as it 
was alleged to advance the interests of the white commercial farmers and all the 
whites in general. 
Reference to the liberation struggle in paragraph 9 can be described in 
terms of nostalgia and collective memory. According to Mugabe, despite being 
backward and being denied development in all respects by the successive white 
regimes, "backwaters like Guruve" became the "bedrock of militant politics 
which were later to transform into armed insurrection against settler colonialism". 
He also pays tribute to peasant families and militant youths (such as Gezi) living 
in marginal border areas with Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana for supporting 
the liberation struggle against colonialism. In paragraph 11 Mugabe implicitly 
appeals to the crowd's support of his party by reference to Gezi being loyal and 
dependable as a mujiba61 from a tender age of thirteen. The essence of paragraph 
10 is to appeal to people's pathos. Mugabe talks of Gezi's membership of the 
Johanne Masowe Apostolic Sect and addresses the followers in the crowd directly 
saying: 
To them (the followers of the Johanne Masowe Apostolic Faith 
Sect) I say: We fail to comprehend the tragedy before us; our eyes 
are full of tears; our hearts grieve and weigh heavy; we know no 
sigh, we know no relief. We join you in deep sorrow for you have 
lost one of your own, one so dear. 
He ends by mentioning God, saying that he had made his ruling, implying 
that no one had the power to reverse the "nightmare we endure today." There is 
no doubt that by directly addressing the followers of this Sect, Mugabe was 
61 Male war collaborator. 
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indirectly appealing for their support and votes m the forthcoming election. 
Furthermore, this Sect commands a very large membership in the country; 
therefore, by winning them to his side, Mugabe was sure of boosting his chances 
of winning the election. 
The main point Mugabe brings out in paragraph 12 is that Gezi "turned-
around the wheels of development" after his appointment as Governor and 
Resident Minister of Mashonaland Central province, thereby vindicating the 
President on the choice he had made. He supports this in paragraph 13 by 
describing how Gezi worked hard in the province, sometimes covering "enormous 
distances on foot or on bicycle in a bid to serve the people who had elected him." 
He further cites Gezi's resolute and courageous stance on the land reform 
programme in paragraph 14 by saying that he (Gezi) wanted to see action that 
empowered the black majority and not prevarication and corruption on the land 
issue. Refusing a "gift" of a tractor from a white commercial farmer so that 
government would not take his farm was enough testimony that Gezi was 
incorruptible. Still on the land issue, Mugabe says that Gezi's wish was to see the 
completion of the programme by the middle of the year (2001). By saying "we 
dare not fail him", Mugabe is using Gezi to solicit for support from the audience 
and to justify his presidency. In the same paragraph, Mugabe resorts to 'othering' 
discourse (Bucher 2003) when he says: 
Let all those who have taken it upon themselves to oppose our land 
reform programmes do their worst, led by the Labour Government 
of Britain. Have no goodwill to expect from them. 
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The undertone of "those" and "them" is that there are people who are evil 
and there is an "us" side which is good. Here there is an indirect reference to the 
opposition MDC and its supporters as the "those", the "traitors". The audience is 
made to feel that it does not belong to this bad side, but to the "us" side, the 
ZANU (PF) party. We see the speaker here dichotomizing or polarizing the 
electorate along party lines, ZANU (PF) and the MDC. In the same paragraph, 
Mugabe whips the audience's emotions by saying that it was through the "agony, 
blood and sacrifice" and not by "permission and generosity of colonialism" that 
the country won its freedom independence and sovereignty. A sharp contrast is 
made here of those who lost their lives fighting for the liberation of the country 
and those who thought freedom would come through negotiating with colonial 
masters. 
The same 'othering' discourse continues in the next paragraph (15) with 
Mugabe reminding that land and sovereignty were more important than a job in a 
whiteman's factory and the British penny. The speaker appeals to the audience's 
support and patriotism by using repetitio: "Let those who think, ... think again". 
He achieves this by haranguing people who wanted to compromise the country's 
sovereignty by associating themselves with white men and Britain. Mugabe 
warns traitors that Zimbabwe is not for selling and he ends this paragraph by 
saying, "Cde Gezi knew this [that Zimbabwe in not for selling] perfectly well and, 
wherever he is, he urges and exhorts us on." The speaker derives credibility from 
the audience by mentioning the deceased in this sentence. 
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Towards the end ofthe speech, in paragraphs 16 and 17, Mugabe employs 
the rhetorical device of apostrophe; he addresses the deceased, instead of the 
audience. He says: 
To Cde Gezi I say: You have done your part; you have fought your 
struggle; staunchly defending your heritage, the people's needs and 
interests were always uppermost in your mind. May we take a cue 
from you. 
This has the effect of calling for the attention of the audience to the 
purpose of the gathering. Everyone in the crowd should pay more attention to hear 
what the President is going to say when he says "To Cde Gezi I say ... " In 
paragraph 18 the rhetorical device of apostrophe continues as the speaker says: 
"Rest in peace Comrade, for your cause has not been in vain." He ends the speech 
with a powerful slogan, proclaiming land and power to the people in paragraph 
seventeen. This incantation has a hypnotic effect on the audience as it could be 
seen live on television making a standing ovation. 
In this speech Mugabe uses Gezi as an epitome of a revolutionary hero 
whose loyalty to the party was unquestionable. He describes him as committed, 
energetic, dynamic, courageous, dependable, critical, hardworking and 
incorruptible. Gezi is also described as a promoter of unity (bridge-builder), a true 
revolutionary, a real man of the people, a genuine hero - having a tremendous 
personality and courageous leadership. These and other personal characteristics 
are used to present the deceased as an archetype of a party supporter with the aim 
of encouraging the audience to be like him in every respect. The speech is meant 
to inspire the audience in a particular way, the Gezi way. Any action against the 
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above characteristics will be a betrayal of Gezi, presented here as an embodiment 
of the values of ZANU (PF). In short, this epideictic speech was used to bolster 
Mugabe's campaign and his presidency. 
3.3 Speech 2: Burial of Moven Enock Mahachi- 29 May 200162 
3.3.1 Analysis 
The speech begins with the characteristic exordium in which Mugabe calls 
everyone to attention by saying out their titles and/or names in paragraph 1. 
Without wasting time, the speaker states the theme or the main business of the 
day in paragraph 2, that is, "to bid farewell to yet another gallant and illustrious 
son of Zimbabwe, Moven Enock Mahachi". He describes this moment as "sad and 
heart-rending", similar to the occasion when people gathered again at the national 
shrine earlier to bury another hero, Border Gezi. We see Mugabe appealing to his 
audience's pathos by reminding them of Gezi's death before announcing that of 
Mahachi's at the beginning of the same sentence. The rhetorical impact of the first 
line is on the question of time. Mugabe's mention of "barely a month ago" is 
significant in that it shows that hardly had the people forgotten about Gezi's tragic 
death when they were faced with another equally saddening moment. They had 
now come to lay to rest yet another hero who had died after having been involved 
in a road traffic accident. 
The mention of tender age of 16 when Mahachi joined the "service 
of the people" in paragraph 3 should be viewed under the backdrop of the 
controversial National Youth Service Plan introduced by the Government during 
62 See Appendix 2 
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the campaign period. This plan produced militias which went about the country 
silencing those who did not support the ruling party. The national service 
phenomenon is contextualized and traced back historically and figureheads like 
Mahachi are identified with it so that the people do not view it as a completely 
new practice. Mahachi is presented in the rest of the paragraph as a people-
oriented cadre who started fighting the colonial system that viewed blacks as 
"hewers of wood and drawers ofwater" at an early age. 
The expression "hewers of wood and drawers of water" connotes a lowly 
group of people in constant, eternal and irredeemable shameful position of 
servitude to the White Master who is ruthless and who puts a glass ceiling to 
freedom and uses all the means necessary to keep the black man in this position. 
The speaker here effectively describes the stereotypical view the whites had about 
the blacks in colonial Rhodesia. This is to make the people see the whites in some 
bad light and applaud the role Mahachi played in fighting for the rights of the 
black people at an early age. Furthermore, the proverb, by its nature of being 
known by the people, would invoke memories of the heavy hatred the black man 
should have for the white man's rule which the speaker aptly describes as "brutal" 
and "full-blooded wrath". The major subject in paragraphs 4 and 5 is the land 
issue whose origin is traced here: 
The situation [land ownership imbalance in favour of the white 
minority] was created in colonial times when blacks were forced 
offtheir ancestral lands. The land question was a major cause of 
the guerrilla war which led to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.63 
63 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/593522.stn "Who owns the land?'' ( 8.8.02) 
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According to Meredith (2002), the Land Apportionment Act of 1931 1 
million blacks were allocated 29 million acres of land, 48 000 whites with only 
11 000 on the land were given 48 million acres while an "area of 18 million acres 
of state land, which included forests and national parks, was left unassigned" 
(p.115). The land use imbalance in favour of the white minority is clear in the 
above figures. The same author cites the 1969 Land Tenure Act in which 45 
million acres were allocated to whites and another 45 million acres to blacks with 
6 million for national parks and game reserves. Meredith further observes that in 
this process, 
thousands of Africans continued to be evicted from the white 
farming areas. Most evictions passed unnoticed. But one defiant 
stand taken by a chief in the eastern highlands caught international 
attention {p.116). 
That defiant chief who took the Smith government to court was Chief 
Rekayi Tangwena. The fact that Mahachi fought hard together with the land 
dispossessed Chief Rekayi Tangwena in the 1970s gives him a political clout 
among the audience. The Tangwena people's resistance against their removal 
from "the land of their forefathers" dovetails well with Mugabe's land reform 
programme under the Third Chimurenga. This parallelism is meant to make the 
people see that there was nothing wrong in taking the land from the white people 
and giving it to the black landless majority. Despite the Tangwena people's defeat 
by the white man, the much publicized resistance of these people influenced many 
people to go outside the country to take up arms against colonialism. 
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Another thing to note is that the violent removal of the Tangwena people 
is juxtaposed with the "spirit of their resistance." The use of the word "spirit" is 
significant here as it forms a link with the legendary spirits of Nehanda and 
Kaguvi64, the guiding spirits of the liberation struggle. The rhetorical impact of 
the prophecy of Nehanda in particular is that, if one alludes to it in a speech, the 
audience is literally translocated from its state of mind to a revolutionary one 
where the target of the action is the oppressor and sell-out, in the eyes of this 
speaker and his audience, Britain and Tsvangirai respectively. 
Perhaps Mahachi's greatest contribution to the liberation struggle 
is when he and Chief Tangwena assisted Mugabe and Edgar Tekere (then the 
secretary-general ZANU PF party) in their dramatic escape into Mozambique in 
April 1975. This was after the Central Committee had decided that Mugabe 
should go and lead the liberation struggle after the assassination of Herbert 
Chitepo. The rhetorical impact of this incident lies in the fact that Mahachi 
displayed unequalled courage and sacrifice in his life by assisting Mugabe and 
Tekere to cross the border into Mozambique. The mentioning ofMahachi's arrest 
and consequent imprisonment by the Smith regime "for assisting in the 
64 "Kaguvi and Nehanda used their leadership to spearhead the first war of resistance (First Chimurenga) 
against European domination of the region. They instructed all the regional chiefs to arm and resist this 
domination in whatever way they could. It is during this resistance that some of the great Shona warriors 
emerged. Chief Mashayamombe who lived near Mhondoro, chiefs Gondo and Zhanda were also 
instrumental warriors during this time. They armed and spread around the nation. Regions like Makoni, 
Shangani, Chishawasha and Mazoe where hotbeds of struggle during Zimbabwe first war of liberation. 
Nehanda and Kaguvi where captured, tried and sentenced to death by hanging. They were hung on a hill 
near what is now the city of Harare in Zimbabwe. However, before she was hung, Nehanda promised the 
Europeans that her bones would rise to lead the second struggle against them" (Solomon Murungu and 
Zambuko Projects 2004). 
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recruitment of freedom fighters" buttresses the heroic role he played in the 
liberation struggle. The antithesis "shed . . . tears of joy at the birth of the new 
Zimbabwe" has rhetorical influence in the minds of the people in the sense that it 
evokes both the memories of the days of the struggle and that momentous 
occasion when the black people finally got the opportunity to rule themselves in a 
free Zimbabwe. 
In paragraphs 7 and 8 Mugabe comes back to his election campaign 
theme, the land reform programme. That the Fast Track Land Resettlement (sic) 
Programme had "delivered close to 3 million hectares of land back to its rightful 
owners" makes the audience see that the Government was resolute with the 
controversial programme that attracted a lot of criticism both locally and 
internationally. In paragraph 8 the speaker makes a biblical allusion when he says 
"Cde Mahachi was one you could rely upon to revive the spirits of doubting 
Thomases" when they prevaricated on the land question, doubting whether they 
could go ahead taking the land from the white farmers and giving it to the black 
people. In the Bible the story is told of Thomas who doubted that Jesus was alive 
and had arisen from the dead on the third day after his crucification as he had 
prophesied. Thomas went further to ask Jesus if he could touch the wounds in the 
hands where the nails had gone through. Mugabe uses this biblical allusion to 
mock those who doubted his hard-line stance on the land issue. It can be argued 
that the rhetorical impact of using the proverb "doubting Thomases" lies in that 
the listeners, most of whom are Christians, would not want to be identified with 
the biblical Thomas. In contrast to the "doubting Thomases", Mahachi's image is 
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boosted by the speaker when he is presented as a focused party cadre who "spoke 
passionately, eloquently and relentlessly about a land reform programme." 
He is further described in paragraph 9 as a "conscientious", "trusted", 
"sincere" and " loyal" member of ZANU (PF) making it possible for the President 
to appoint him to various ministerial posts which "he served with diligence and 
distinction" since 1980. 
In paragraph 10 Mugabe uses Mahachi in trying to justify Zimbabwe's 
involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) conflict. This 
involvement was a grey area in the eyes of the voting public who saw no 
immediate gains from entering into such a war while the country was reeling 
under the worst ever economic crisis. Mugabe was largely seen as a father who 
leaves his children crying for food while he went to feed the children who have 
their own father and problems next door. Economic analysts argued that the 
budget spent on the DRC virtually made it an appendage of Zimbabwe65 • There 
were unconfirmed rumours that Mugabe and some government officials were 
benefiting from diamonds from the DRC and this was a smudge on his political 
image ahead of the presidential election. To cleanse himself before the electorate 
Mugabe claims that the international world had 
sought to demonise Zimbabwe and her soldiers for upholding 
internationally recognized principles in defence of the Congo, 
while condoning acts of aggression, genocide and gross looting of 
Congolese resources by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. 
65 It was estimated that Zimbabwe spent about US Imillion dollars per day in the DRC after deploying 
about II 000 soldiers in that country. 
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As Minister of Defence, the deceased is praised here for the role the 
Zimbabwean army played in the "fight for the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity" of the DRC. In paragraph 11 Mugabe makes maximum use of 
Mahachi' s character to portray the ethics guiding ZANU (PF). He says, "we shall 
miss his honesty, his reasoned contributions to debates and his great commitment 
to his country." He also alludes to how people will miss Mahachi's "hearty, 
almost shrill, but joyful laughter". These are general sentiments passed and felt at 
an ordinary funeral setting in the Zimbabwean African setting. Mugabe aptly 
portrays himself as the president of the people by expressing his condolences first 
to the bereaved family, his immediate audience and the nation as a whole. In his 
concluding remarks he addresses the deceased, calling him "son of the soil", a 
catchy phrase which originated in the days of early nationalism and now used to 
means a patriotic Zimbabwean, especially a supporter or sympathizer of ZANU 
(PF). The term "son of the soil" also evokes memories of the land reform 
programme in the minds of the audience. The speaker ends his eulogy by saying 
"go well gallant fighter" and translates this into the two national indigenous 
languages, Shona and Ndebele. 
The essence of this speech is that, just like the previous one, it affords 
Mugabe a chance to look back and use historical events involving the deceased to 
spruce his own image and that of his party, thereby drumming up support ahead 
of the election. By tracing Mahachi's glorious contribution to the struggle for 
liberation and his patriotic service to the nation after independence, Mugabe is 
persuading his audience to rally behind him and his party during the election. The 
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events involving Mahachi are so careful chosen and enunciated by the speaker 
that the audience is most likely to suspend reason and get persuaded to act 
according to the whims of the speaker. In other words, reasoning is short-circuited 
in such circumstances. The rhetorical effect of the speech is that it literally 
hypnotizes the audience in such a way that they begin to idolize the deceased as 
its hero. The powerful manner in which Mugabe delivers his speech, in most 
cases appealing to the emotions of the audience by reference to the evils of 
colonialism - the "callous and barbaric nature of colonialism"- involuntarily 
makes the audience to sympathize with his case. 
3.4. Speech 3: Burial of Chenjerai Hunzvi- 8 June 200166 
3.4.1 Analysis 
This is the longest speech with 22 paragraphs. In this speech Mugabe 
resorts much to the history of the country. This is to be seen as part of nostalgia 
and collective memory being used as rhetorical tools. 
After the characteristic opening of his speech, Mugabe moves on quickly 
to appeal to the pathos of his audience by mentioning that no sooner had they 
buried Mahachi- "barely a week ago"- and Gezi, "four weeks before then", than 
they were back again to bury "yet another Son of the Soil", Hunzvi. The tone set 
in this paragraph grips the hearts of the audience. The speaker further develops 
this sombre mood by lamenting that " fate has been most unkind to us, hitting us 
where it hurts most at a time when our land based Third Chimurenga is at its most 
critical historical juncture." The President pays tribute to the roles played by the 
66 See Appendix 3 
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dead heroes during the controversial land reform programme arguing that the best 
tribute the people could pay for these immediate heroes and others who died 
before them was to "give land back to the people of Zimbabwe." This would be 
the greatest honour for Hunzvi whose whole life, it is claimed, was spent fighting 
for the people of Zimbabwe. Reference to the land reform programme at the 
outset sets the tone of the speech. 
Mugabe then traces Hunzvi's political history beginning with his activism 
in 1965, the year the then Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith made his "illegal 
declaration of independence (UDI)." By going back to the details of Harold 
Wilson's visit just before Smith's UDI in 1965, Mugabe's point is that the British 
Government was not sincere in its efforts to restrain Smith from his evil act and 
"the British people and their Government would never contemplate abandoning 
their white kith and kin in favour of the African cause." Mugabe says that 
similarly today, Prime Minister Tony Blair will not abandon his "white kith and 
kin whose forefathers colonized our country, butchered our people and stole their 
land." He further questions in paragraph 18: "Why then are we expected to send 
our own army to shoot people [occupying white men's farms]?" He vows that 
"we could not, and we will never, set war veterans in the army against fellow war 
veterans and landless peasants peacefully demonstrating for their usurped birth 
rights." Mugabe uses colonial history in his rhetoric and this logically vindicates 
his sanctioning of the war veterans to invade white commercial farms. He fuses 
racist undertones in his speech in such a way that absolves him and his party of 
any wrong doing in taking the land from the white commercial farmers. 
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From paragraph 9 to paragraph 10 Mugabe narrates Hunzvi's 
involvement in the struggle for liberation during which he was arrested and 
detained by the colonial regime at various holding centres in the country. His post 
independence contribution is chronicled in paragraphs 11 and 12 where it is 
claimed he fought hard for the welfare of war veterans, ex-detainees, war 
collaborators and peasants and workers. Hunzvi's biggest role is mentioned in 
paragraph 12 when the speaker says after the rejection of the draft constitution in 
2000, Hunzvi, without instruction from the party of Government, "led the war 
veterans and the landless to demonstrate on white owned commercial farms 
countrywide." Hunzvi's Machiavellian tactics on the land issue were clear, for 
example when he declared publicly that "we are fighting an economic war for the 
liberation of our country"67 and that "no one can stop the revolution we have 
started."68 He is also quoted as having given Zimbabwe's white farmers two 
options regarding their land: "Hand over the land we leave them or stay and see 
what land we leave them."69 This type of rhetoric ignited the fire for the so called 
Third Chimurenga with Hunzvi becoming a hero of the synchronized invasions of 
white farmers' land. 
It becomes apparent from this part ofthe speech that the white commercial 
farmers were paying a prize for actively supporting the "No" vote in the 2000 
referendum that squashed the government's plan to introduce new constitution. 
Mugabe describes the rejection of the new constitution as "the British sponsored 





for funding a land reform programme in Zimbabwe." The speaker goes on to talk 
so passionately about the "land-based Third Chimurenga" using statistics to 
justify that land should be taken from the white farmers, some who boast of 
having "little Englands" and others having vast expanses of land, "almost the size 
of Belgium", all this at the expense ofthe landless majority. The irony of it is that, 
according to the speaker, "80 percent ofthe cotton and over 70 percent of maize is 
produced by these same black farmers." All this is meant to whip up the 
audience's feelings of hatred for the white community and those who oppose the 
ZANU (PF) and the Government ahead of the election. In other words by citing 
these figures the President is saying the black people can do without the 
production from the white commercial farms. His rhetoric justifies his stance on 
the land reform programme. Indirectly he is saying "we can do without the white 
farmers", but time has proved him wrong as vast expanses of land given to the 
black people, most of who are not farmers, lie idle at the time of writing this 
thesis. 
The speaker also condemns the negative coverage of the land reform 
programme by the international media, especially CNN, BBC, Sky TV and SABC 
in which war veterans were described as "axe wielding warriors" against the 
vulnerable white farmers. He castigates the call for the rule of law by the 
international community arguing that "the rule of law is presented as one that 
protects the minority's privileges, which are subsidized from expropriated African 
ancestral land and other resources." 
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The speaker also questions the kind of the spirit of reconciliation which 
favours only the interests of the white people. He also castigates Britain for 
failing to fulfil the pledge it made on the land question at the 1979 Lancaster 
House Conference that paved the way for Zimbabwe's independence. 
By mention figures of "5 million hectares" and 105 000 families on close 
to 3 million hectares of land", Mugabe is giving credence to the Fast Track 
Resettlement Programme among the audience. Here and elsewhere in this chapter 
the speaker uses rhetorical statistics 70 to show that his controversial land reform 
programme is for the benefit of the landless back people. He adds that the greatest 
tribute for the deceased, a pivotal player in land based Third Chimurenga, was 
now "to intensify the [election] campaign which will even make victory more 
certain." 
The speaker adopts his characteristic ending of funeral speeches, that of 
using apostrophe. This sums up the "good" things the deceased has done for the 
party, the country and the people during his lifetime. The usual farewell is used in 
English, Shona and Ndebele. 
One interesting thing to note is that this speech is given against the 
backdrop of Hunzvi's scandalous exigencies involving the looting of the War 
Victims' Compensation Fund71 which were fresh in the minds ofthe audience. As 
a medical assessor of war veterans who would benefit from the fund, Hunzvi had 
falsified many claims, including that of his own father who got an award but had 
70 Philippe-Joseph Salazar (2002: I 04-1 07) uses the term rhetorical statistics when he contrasts the 1996 
census in South Africa and the counting of people in the apartheid era in that country which saw people as 
"discrete units". In contrast, Census 1996 tried to show the nation's "true colours", alluding to the 
metaphorical a "rainbow nation". His argument is that "a nation is not a population". 
71 Martin Meredith, p.l34-5 
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not fought the war. The speaker does not mention Hunzvi's dark side in his 
eulogy, keeping to the Shona proverb, wafa wanaka (the deceased is saintly). This 
is in line with the Shona culture never to say the bad things of the deceased. With 
regard to the looting of the War Veterans' Compensation Fund, many people, 
including prominent government officials are said to falsify claims and benefited 
from the fund illegally. 
3.5 Speech 4: Burial of Cain Nkala- 18 November 200172 
3.5.1 Analysis 
The exordium is similar to the ones used in prior speeches. Here Mugabe 
mentions twelve groups of people, with the exception of "Our respectable Chiefs" 
and "ZANU (PF) Party Leadership". 
Right from paragraph 2 where the main speech begins, we see Mugabe 
appealing to the audience's emotions. He begins by describing Nkala as "a 
dedicated, consistent and patriotic son of the soil" before telling the crowd that he 
was "abducted, tortured and murdered by terrorists." The words "abducted", 
"tortured" and "terrorists" paint a gloomy picture in the minds of the audience. 
The speaker wants the audience to feel the "indescribable pain of losing Nkala" as 
he himself does or purports to do. He achieves this by introducing the term 
"terrorist/terrorists" which features twice in the paragraph. 
This rhetoric of terror continues into paragraph 3 where the speaker 
concludes without presenting concrete evidence that Nkala was "kidnapped, 
tortured and strangled with a shoelace to death by MDC activists and officials." 
72 See Appendix 4 
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The use of a shoelace in the murder has a chilling effect in the audience as they 
imagine how painful it should have been when Nkala was being murdered. The 
use of "brutal death" in this paragraph and "brutal murder" in paragraph 4 invokes 
fear in the audience. This is effective as the audience is bound to fear and hate the 
perpetrators of this cold-blooded murder. Mugabe begins this paragraph by 
telling the audience that Nkala's murder was a result of a well planned bloody 
offensive launched by both internal and external forces. Although there is no 
tangible evidence for the claim of these internal and external forces having 
committed the crime, this illusion is effective as it creates a sense insecurity in the 
audience. 
To support his argument about terrorism, Mugabe concludes that the 
perpetrators of this heinous crime were supported by funds provided by the local 
white commercial farmers, political parties in Britain and the British Government 
of Tony Blair. He further alleges that there are terrorist forces of destruction in the 
MDC who destroy the minds of the youths by giving them "donor trinkets, drink 
and drugs" to fight against ZANU (PF) and "the gains of our hard won 
independence and sovereignty."73 He continues labelling the members of the 
main opposition party as "the MDC terrorists". 
This name-calling is logically supported by the allegation that they are 
sponsored by former Rhodesian whites and the British with the aim destroying 
"our free and united Zimbabwe." He concludes that the killings of Nkala and 
Limukani Lupahla are testimony of the attempt by the MDC and its allies to 
73 Note the antithesis in MDC youths and ZANU (PF) youths as exemplified by Gezi, Mahachi and Hunzvi. 
The MDC youths are presented as violent and unpatriotic as opposed to the ZANU PF cadres who are 
patriotic. 
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reverse the gains of the struggle against colonialism. In this light, Nkala is 
declared a Martyr, a true hero of the people. By describing Nkala as a Martyr, 
Mugabe's purpose is to appeal to the audience's pathos so that they see him as a 
principled party cadre who died because of his belief in the sovereignty of the 
country. Nkala is presented as a sacrificial victim of the audience's cause; 
therefore they must hold him in the highest regard. 
The attack on the MDC intensifies in paragraphs 6 and 7. More sympathy 
IS drawn from the audience by mentioning that another ZANU (PF) youth 
member been murdered in a similar fashion. The speaker refers to unauthenticated 
media reports saying that the MDC had terrorist training camps on some 
commercial farms, outside our borders and even overseas ... " 
In paragraph 7 Mugabe employs antithesis to prove his case that the MDC 
was deceiving the people. He sarcastically says the MDC was clamouring for 
"democracy, the rule of law and human rights during the day as a cover for 
perpetrating political violence during the night." The irony that the antithesis 
invokes in the audience makes the audience see the MDC as a deceitful and 
insincere political party. The speaker begins the paragraph by warning that 
ZANU (PF) and the Government will not tolerate such terrorist provocation and 
violence in the country and ends by saying that the murder had proved to the 
whole world the "brutal circumstances surrounding the death of Cde Nkala." It is 
ironical that at this period, when the Zimbabwean Government's rating on the 
abuse of human rights was at its lowest ebb, the MDC would be described as 
having committed "violence and crimes against humanity." It is apparent 
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therefore that this was smear campaign against the MDC whose members were in 
a majority of cases on the receiving end of the violence sponsored by Mugabe's 
party and government. 
In contrast to the "MDC terrorism", the first two sentences of paragraph 8 
presents the ZANU (PF) Government as a promoter of peace, stability and unity 
in the country. The speaker gives the audience the impression that ZANU (PF) 
fights for their rights while the MDC is a party composed of criminal elements 
and rebels who are being used for reversing the gains of the people by external 
forces. This is an allusion to the allegation that the MDC is a front of Britain and 
its western allies. By referring to the economic rights of the people, Mugabe is 
implicitly referring to the land reform programme. His argument here, which is to 
appeal to his audience, is that by giving them the land, this would be addressing 
their economic rights, hence the empty slogan or campaign theme tag, LAND IS 
THE ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMY IS LAND, which Raftopoulos 
(2004: 17) aptly describes as a "simplistic party slogan which has been translated 
into politics of exclusion, racial essentialism and violence." 
Paragraph 9 mainly concentrates on Nkala's ethos and the various roles he 
played after the attainment of independence in 1980. He is described as being 
committed, patriotic, diligent, consistent, disciplined, honest, humble, 
revolutionary and religious. The superfluous use of adjectives to describe Nkala is 
to present him as a perfect party cadre who is worth emulating. It is also to draw 
the audience's pathos in the sense that they would sympathise with him and 
dislike the opposition party as it was alleged that its members had killed him. 
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The land issue takes centre stage in paragraphs 10 and 11. By 
euphemistically referring to the farm occupations as "land demonstrations", 
Mugabe wants to play down the controversy surrounding his land reform 
programme. He says Nkala played a pivotal role in these land demonstrations. He 
further justifies his land reform programme by describing it as "a people-driven 
cry for social justice". This gives the impression that Nkala's murderers were 
against the wishes of the people because they murdered someone who was 
championing their cause. The speaker again appeals to the audience's emotions 
when he mentions in paragraph 14 that even when Nkala was facing death at the 
hands of his abductors "at that harrowing moment"74, he prayed for them and 
vowed that the land issues "would find a final and just solution" against all odds. 
The speaker is extolling Nkala's courage and heroism displayed at such a difficult 
time when it appeared apparent that he was about to be murdered. Indirectly, the 
speaker is appealing to the audience to show such courage and heroism by 
supporting his party and voting for it in the forthcoming elections. Paragraphs 15 
and 16 address Nkala's widow, children and War Veterans and the Youth. 
Mugabe extends his "heartfelt Condolences" to these groups of people. He ends 
the speech by addressing the deceased, saying in Ndebele (Nkala's native 
language): "hamba kahle qhawe lethu!" (go well our hero). Ndebele is used first 
here to identify with the Ndebele-speaking section of ZANU (PF) supporters. 
74 This term is also used in the first speech, referring to the agonising time the mourners had at the time of 
Border Gezi's death. Here it refers to the traumatic time Nkala had at the hands of his abductors, torturers 
and murders. In both cases it refers to the pain people suffered but it seems to more appropriately describe 
the latter incident. 
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In this speech Mugabe paints a gloomy picture that his Government is 
under threat from really imagined terrorists in the MDC and from external forces. 
The aim is to demonise the MDC by accusing some of its members and officials 
of abducting, torturing and murdering Nkala and referring to it as a terrorist 
organization bent on furthering the interests of foreign western powers. He 
achieves this by using the word "terrorist" interchangeably as a noun and an 
adjective thirteen times as follows: 
• "tortured and murdered by terrorists"; 
• "deplorable terrorist circumstances under which he met his death;" 
• "wider and carefully planned terrorist plot by internal and external 
enemy forces"; 
• "these sponsored terrorist forces of destruction in the MDC"; 
• "cannon fodder in terrorist fights ... against ZANU (PF)"; 
• "target of the MDC terrorists"; 
• "abducted, tortured and murdered ... by the same terrorists"; 
• "MDC terrorist training camps on some commercial farms, outside 
our borders and even overseas"; 
• "kidnapping and assault of ZANU (PF) members by MDC 
terrorists"; 
• "terrorist provocation and build-up of violence;" 
• "in the typical fashion of terrorist groups"; 
• "time for this deceit is now up for the MDC terrorists"; 
• "evil machinations and terrorist actions". 
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The redundant reference to the MDC as a terrorist organisation has a 
rhetorical effect in favour of the speaker. It instils a sense of insecurity75 in the 
audience and thus increases their faith in the speaker who is the Head of State and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces of the country. If the audience wants 
to be protected from the impending terrorism, then it should logically rally behind 
the speaker and his party. The phrase" ... abducted, tortured and murdered ... " in 
paragraphs 2, 6, 7 and 14 collocates with the word "terrorist", and this strengthens 
the rhetorical impact as of the smear campaign against the MDC by the speaker. 
4.5 Overall Appraisal 
Mugabe's funeral speeches that have been analyzed above may be 
described as funeral diplomacy. In other words, the funeral speeches are not mere 
chains of condolences to the bereaved families and the nation. These speeches are 
a type of diplomacy in which Mugabe took advantage of the funeral set-up to 
peddle a political motive, that is, to appeal to the people's support in order to win 
the impending presidential election. The speeches are systematically intertwined 
praises of the deceased and bashing of the main opposition party, the MDC, 
which offered the Mugabe's ruling party the most formidable challenge since 
independence. In other words, the sum rhetoric in these speeches is not simply a 
matter of "inaugurer chrysanthemes - to lay wreaths, verbal wreaths"76 on the 
75 See also Bush's speeches on "war on terrorism" in Brigitte Mral "We are a peacefUl nation"- War 
Rhetoric after September 11. SEMA 2004. 
76 Philippe-Joseph Salazar, An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa, 
2002,p.32 
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deceased comrades, but to use these opportune moments to whip up support for 
his political party ahead of the dicey presidential election. 
By extolling the virtues of his comrades-in-arms and by painting colourful 
pictures of the roles they played during and after the liberation struggle, Mugabe 
intends to win the hearts of the electorate. Mugabe recreates collective memory of 
the liberation struggle in such a way that suits his exploits. In so doing, he selects 
those incidents that glorify his political party and draws the attention of the 
audience to the evils of colonialism and neo-colonialism. In other words, the 
rhetoric in these speeches invokes the memory of the hardships the black people 
experienced during the colonial regimes. The negative image of colonialism is 
clearly enunciated in all the speeches. The speeches are well crafted to suspend 
the reasoning of the listener in such a way that what is left is to hate the white 
man and all that is associated with him, and all the people who forge alliances 
with him, to the maximum. In some cases the speeches were so inflammatory that 
they triggered violence against the "enemies of the state." 
We see Mugabe, himself an astute revolutionary and a firebrand leader of 
the Second Chimurenga, using collective memory and political nostalgia77 to prop 
and enhance his tattered political image in the face of stiff threat and challenge 
from Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition MDC party. In this regard Parry-
Giles and Parry-Giles (2000) come to the conclusion that 
[b ]ecause collective memory is limited in its representation of the 
past, it easily succumbs to presidential manipulation and 
17 Shawn J. Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles provide an interesting analysis of how US President Bill 
Clinton used collective memory and \)Ol\t\ca\ noo:.tal'&ia \n \<}~~ \n t\\e\l: \)a\)et ent\t\eu "Co\\ect\ve Memory, 
Political Nostalgia and the Rhetorical Presidency: Billy Clinton's Commemoration of the March on 
Washington, August 28, 1998", Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol.86, No.4, November 2000, pp 417-447 
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exploitation and is smoothly transformed into political nostalgia. 
Political nostalgia is the limited, distorted narrative of the past-in-
memory that argumentatively resurrects and glorifies bygone times 
and is communicated to achieve an emotional response in the 
service of a political or electoral goaf8 
It is therefore needless to question the existence of these two powerful 
tools in Mugabe's rhetorical repertoire at this crucial moment of his political 
career. In these speeches, Mugabe is the sole interpreter of collective memory 
regarding the liberation struggle. As the powerful chief interpreter of events, there 
is no doubt that the speaker chooses only those memories that are to his advantage 
in the campaign period. There is also a likelihood that he distorts information here 
and there in order to build a positive image of himself in the eyes of the voters. 
Since he holds the monopoly in all the four speeches, he is at liberty to construct 
the past history in a way that presents ZANU (PF) as the only party the electorate 
could vote for in the election. The speaker glorifies the characters and deeds of 
the deceased heroes and exhorts the audience to follow their example. The 
characters and the deeds of the deceased are presented as the yardstick of 
patriotism and any deviation from the values and principles held by these heroes 
should be shunned and considered as a betrayal of the nation, a sin that would 
attract the label of terrorism. The deceased are presented as the "Saints" of the 
liberation struggle and post-independence era despite the fact that some had 
publicly known cases of corruption, for example Hunzvi. One can argue here that 
collective memory and nostalgia as rhetorical tools allow the speaker to present 
half-truths about events since, as the chief interpreter of events, he has the 
78 Ibid, p.420 
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prerogative of choosing which events to focus on and which ones to play down. 
The speaker of course chooses those events that will boost his political image and 
that ofhis political party. 
It can be concluded that the sum ofMugabe's rhetoric is Sophistic rhetoric 
as it exudes or attempts to present wisdom or knowledge of what is wrong and 
right. The four funerals are opportune moments in which the President finds it 
appropriate to seek believability and credence in the electorate in his election 
campaign ahead of a crucial election. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE RHETORIC OF CHANGE 
4.1 Introduction 
The year 1999 will go down the annals of Zimbabwean history as a year in 
which the general populace of Zimbabwe from all walks of life came together to 
form a people's movement whose major aim was to bring a change of government 
in the country. The birth ofthe Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under 
its charismatic leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, gave the people of Zimbabwe high 
hopes for a new democratic government after the country had been (mis)managed 
by ZANU (PF) for the 22 years at the time of the 2002 presidential election. The 
mood of change gripped a society that had been hitherto forced to believe that it 
was only Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) who were mandated to rule the country ad 
infinitum. It is the purpose of this chapter to trace the rhetoric of change and 
attempt to show its impact during the campaign of the 2002 presidential election 
campaign. In other words, the chapter tries to illuminate the persuasive nature of 
the rhetoric of change as presented by the MDC and its presidential candidate, 
Tsvangirai. It is argued that the rhetoric of change centred on the campaign theme 
of change. Voters were persuaded to believe that by voting the MDC candidate to 
the presidency, they were actually "completing the change"79• It is also shown in 
this chapter that Tsvangirai's rhetoric espoused the principles of a democratic 
electoral process and the observance of human rights. 
79 A catchy phrase used in MDC's campaign material. 
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4.2 The Birth of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
Perhaps before going into the gist of this chapter, it is important to give a 
brief explanation of how the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) started. 
The MDC was officially formed in September 1999. The roots ofthe party can be 
traced to its mother labour body, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) which organised an all embracing crucial conference, the National 
Working People's Convention, held in Harare from 26 to 28 February in 1999. 
This high powered convention had strong representatives from all walks of life -
labour leaders, non-governmental organisations, academics, lawyers, church and 
women's organizations drawn from both rural and urban areas. 
It is important to note that all the stakeholders to the Convention agreed 
on the fact that the country needed a strong opposition party. They were all 
convinced that the country needed an alternative voice. It is not surprising 
therefore that when reading the final document produced at the convention, one 
can easily pick the rhetoric of change contained therein. Among other issues, the 
Convention singled out the disempowerment of the people; the breakdown of the 
rule of law mainly due to state-sponsored political violence, the Government's 
inability to manage the economy, resulting in high costs of basic commodities, the 
deterioration of public services, lack of progress in resolving the land hunger in 
rural areas, the absence of a people oriented constitution, widespread corruption 
in Government, regionalism, racism, gender discrimination and the general abuse 
of human rights.80 
80 Movement for Democratic Change, May 1999, www.samara.co.zw/zctu/background.htm . p.l 
(14.03.05) 
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Consequently, the Convention made wide ranging recommendations on 
the way forward in the above areas including the following: health delivery, 
education, housing, media freedom and, above all, multiparty democracy. It was 
also noted that changes in these and other areas that were affecting people's lives 
would not be realised "without a strong, democratic and popularly driven and 
organised movement of the people"81 • Ultimately, that movement came to be 
known as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and its leaders 
confirmed that they were forming a political party in May, the official launching 
of the party coming in September 1999. For the purpose of clarity, it is important 
to cite the MDC's objectives as they were listed at the beginning. The objectives 
of the party thus ran as follows: 
81 ibid, p.3. 
• to unite organizations of working people, as currently set out m the 
Working People's Agenda and Declaration. 
• work to ensure that there is a government which makes decisions on 
national policies that are in the interests of the people who are the source 
of sovereignty. 
• to ensure the conditions for and form the base/foundation upon which a 
political party can be built that is able to contest the 2000 elections. 
• to create, mandate and own the political party formed and to monitor its 
performance in relation to the aims of working people. 
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• to build nation integration so that all Zimbabweans together without 
barriers of race, colour, tribe, ethnicity, status, political or religious 
affiliation. 
• to embark on voter education for change. 
• to democratize all political processes in the country. 
A short comment of these objectives will suffice here. The objectives 
enunciated clearly to the voters that here was a democratic party in which they 
would participate freely and help change the status quo in the leadership of the 
country. The objectives formed the core of what the MDC stood for as a new 
party that was introducing an alternative voice in the political arena that had been 
dominated by the ruling ZANU (PF) party since 1980. 
At the launch, the MDC party adopted the theme "The past we shall 
inherit, the future we shall remake." The promise of hope for a better future was 
carried in the phrase "the future we shall make". The fact that a strong coalition of 
civic groups had united to form a united front in the form of the MDC had a 
rhetorical impact on the voters since it was evident that everyone with progressive 
thinking was rallying behind the new party. It gave a natural feeling of being left 
out of the phenomenon of change if one did not support the new party. 
The rhetoric of change was clearly expressed in the powerful slogan 
Chinja maitiro (Shona) and Guqula izenzo (Ndebele) ("Change the way of doing 
things") that the MDC adopted. The instant popularity that the party's slogan had 
with the people and its applicability in every sphere of life showed that its 
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inventors had done their homework thoroughly. The irresistible rhetoric of calling 
for change was loud and clear in this slogan. It had the direct impact of telling the 
incumbent President and his Government to change their bad ways of ruling the 
country. The MDC was calling for " ... political change so as to ensure that the 
interests of working people, the unemployed and the rural people [were] 
advanced. "82 
The fact that the MDC found enthusiastic reception in the Zimbabwean 
body politic is clear testimony of the impact of the rhetoric of change right from 
the beginning. It was also clear that although there had been some opposition 
political parties before, such as the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) and 
Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD), the MDC was in all intents and purposes, 
a true opposition party, a real people's movement championing the cause of the 
people in their hour of need for a change in governance. A brief look at the MDC 
presidential election manifesto shows that the rhetoric of change was at work 
throughout the campaign period. 
4.3 The 2002 election manifesto 
The 2002 manifesto was presented differently from what most political 
parties would do and appeared like an abridged version of a larger document. The 
policy briefs were set within what the MDC named "Presidential Election 2002 -
Completing the Change: MDC information pack". Included in the pack were 
profiles of the MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, and his vice, Gibson Sibanda. It 
also contained the party's own assessment of the electoral environment up to a 
82 ibid, pJ-4 
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month before the polls were due to be held, examining it visa-vis the Southern 
African Development Committee (SADC) electoral standards and various other 
laws pertaining to the conduct of elections. 
The actual manifesto was a nine-paged section headlined Policy Briefs. 
All of the five policy briefs covering peace, the economy, land, health and 
education, were prefaced by the party's election candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai. 
The two to three lines exordiums summarized each of the party's key policies on 
national issues. The exordiums satisfied the recommended structures of an 
introduction in classical rhetoric. 
4.3.1 Peace and national building 
In his preamble to this section, Tsvangirai said: 
The top priority of an MDC government will be to restore law and 
order, guarantee the peace and safety of all Zimbabweans 
regardless of political affiliation and ensure the beginning of a 
process of national healing that would contribute to economic 
recovery. 83 
The MDC deliberately opened its manifesto with this very sensitive 
subject of the rule of law because at the time scores of people had been wounded 
in attacks or even killed in clashes with pro-government supporters and war 
veterans. While its ultimate goal was change in the economic and political sphere, 
it was saying there was no way people could talk about economic change or 
recovery without law and order. This was after the violent 2000 farm invasions 
combined with electoral campaign that saw violence continue unabated across the 
country 
83 MDC manifesto, 2002, p. 13 
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Accusing the state of sponsoring the violence through the training of 
ruling party youth militias, and the police of encouraging the violence by 
"selective application" of the law, the MDC promised change if it got into power. 
The promise read: 
Upon assumption of office, the MDC commits itself to restoring 
law and order. We will ensure that Zimbabweans from all shreds of 
political opinion can unit and co-exist with each other in an 
environment of peace. This issue has become a top priority of an 
MDC government because it is the basis upon which our economic 
stabilization and recovery plan rests.84 
The use of "all shreds of political opinion" is metaphoric in that it tries to 
appeal to all strata of people regardless of their political orientation or affiliation. 
All the people would be guaranteed involvement in all the change the party was 
advocating for, and that no one would be sidelined. 
As will be noticed in sections to follow, the MDC's manifesto rested 
entirely on the underlying principle and belief of change for the better, especially 
on the economic and political fronts. Even on the sections dealing with peace and 
national healing, the MDC said the issue was its top priority "because it is the 
basis upon which our economic stabilization and recovery plan rests"85 • In an 
environment of hyperinflation, high unemployment and grinding poverty levels, 
MDC's policies sounded attractive and therefore had the possibility of luring 
votes, even in the absence of concrete programmes. 
When the manifesto said the MDC "has no desire to travel the path of 
retribution", it was making use of historical allusion by indirectly making 
reference to the violence experienced since 1999 when the MDC came into play, 
84 ibid, p.13 
85 ibid, p. 13 
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posing the most serious challenge to the ruling ZANU (PF) party. This statement 
assumes that readers of the manifesto were already aware of the political 
problems in the country. The spirit of reconciliation for the sake of developing a 
nation tom apart on party lines was further emphasized in the following 
statement: 
If all of us are to succeed in turning Zimbabwe's economy around, 
it is imperative that our focus is not diverted to side issues, which 
do not assist the starving and jobless masses. Forgiveness and 
national healing is therefore a must for every patriotic 
Zimbabwean. 86 
Reference to the "starving and jobless masses" had the rhetorical impact 
on the voters (most of them jobless and actually starving) who would consider the 
MDC as the party to vote for as it showed that it has concern for them. 
4.3.2 Economic Policy 
As with the other policy issues, the economic policy was pre-ambled by a 
summary from the party's presidential candidate and leader Tsvangirai, but it 
handled this important issue differently from others. It has a section on 
background, then the party's response and is wound by a summary. Even the 
space allocated to the subject shows the importance the party placed on economic 
issues. The preamble reads: 
86 ibid, p.l3 
Job creation and price reduction are at the heart of the MDC's 
economic agenda. We have an economic recovery and stabilization 
plan that has been formulated according to the needs and 
aspirations of ordinary Zimbabweans. It aims to end the vicious 
cycle (sic) of poverty and job insecurity that inflicts a significant 
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proportion of Zimbabweans and ensure that the people of this 
country are never exposed to the threat of mass starvation. 87 
In the manifesto, the MDC accused the government of presiding over the 
decline of the country's economy through mismanagement and incompetence. It 
promised to tum around the economic slump by introducing people centred and 
driven development policies. 
To emphasize the desperate need for change the MDC's manifesto 
highlighted that after two decades of ZANU (PF)' s rule, Zimbabweans are as poor 
as they were some 30 years earlier, adding corruption and economic manipulation 
for "political purposes"88 had taken root. It also painted a gloomy picture by 
saying unemployment had grown five times, with at least more than a quarter of a 
million jobs lost in the preceding year. It stated that industrial production was 
lower than it was towards the end of colonial rule or just before ZANU (PF) came 
into power in 1980. By reminding people that their plight had been worsened by 
Mugabe's government, the rhetoric in the manifesto was that people should dump 
the ZANU (PF) candidate and vote for the change of government in the form of 
the MDC candidate. 
While the common expression 'vicious circle' which means "a continuous 
situation in which one problem or need leads to another and the new problem 
makes the first problem worse"89, the MDC used 'vicious cycle'. Whether the use 
of 'cycle' was a typographical error or was deliberate is not entirely clear. Taking 
87 ibid, p. 14 
88ibid. 
89 Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary, p. 1326 
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a cycle as "a series of events that are regularly repeated in the same order"90, we 
note that the meanings are not completely at variance, except that the former is 
more detailed than the latter. But the rhetorical message remains the same - the 
call for change. The MDC is trying to graphically illustrate that recycling ZANU 
(PF) into power means the people will remain in a vicious circle that will not 
deliver them from their quagmire. They, thus, should take action and vote for the 
MDC. 
The term "mass starvation" is very graphical and it conjures up horrific 
stories and atrocious images of emaciated people dropping dead in the streets or 
skeleton-like children scavenging fly-infested rubbish dumps in search of food. 
This has become a reality in Zimbabwe today. These ghastly images of masses of 
suffering people (caused by the ZANU PF government) are evoked in the 
conscious reader's mind by the hyperbolic language used in the manifesto. This 
kind of language drives the voters to want to seek change through the ballot box. 
The manifesto highlighted the issues that had become common, but made 
comparisons in an attempt to illustrate that people could do better and that change 
was inevitab\e. The page containing unemp\oyment f1gures was juxtaposed with 
the one on MDC's promise to create a million jobs within two years. However, 
the proposed plan did not state how it would fund "the mass housing schemes and 
rural infrastructure projects"91 and how it proposed would create the million jobs. 
Such claims are described by Hugh Rank as basic election claims he summarizes 
90 ibid, p. 290 
91 MDC Manifesto 200, p. 15 
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as follows: "I am competent and trustworthy; from me, you will get more good 
and less bad"92• 
The claims match up to Aristotle's concept of ethos, the desired image of 
the politician as the sincere and benevolent expert. All the promises made in the 
manifesto were attempts to convince the electorate to vote for Tsvangirai. 
It has already been stated that the MDC's rhetoric is that of hopes, dreams 
and improvement. This is well captured in the first line of its summary on the 
economic policy document which reads "Zimbabwe has the potential to become a 
fast growing and more equitable society if it has the right form and practice of 
govemment"93 • 
4.3.3 Land Policy 
While the MDC has been criticized by its opponents of not having a clear 
land policy, it however listed land as its third policy issue for the 2002 election 
campaign, highlighting the need for it to be attended to in a businesslike fashion 
rather than for political mileage. In a preface to the policy document, Tsvangirai 
says: 
Land reform in Zimbabwe is an unfinished national agenda. Our 
goal is to resettle people in a way that the resettled people produce 
lots of food to fight poverty and starvation. 94 
The party pledged to source funds that would adequately assist the newly 
resettled farmers. The MDC government would also give the new farmers title 
deeds which they would use as collateral in securing loans from banks. There was 
Rank, H: Political rhetoric How to analyse election rhetoric, 
webserve.edu/users/ grank/political/ elections%20/images _and _issues .htm 
93 MDC Manifesto 2002, p.16 
94ibid, p.17 
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also need to develop the infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, dams and schools 
in the resettlement areas. These were promises expected by new farmers and the 
MDC hoped to woo votes through the pledges. 
It was careful not to ruffle feathers when it said "those Zimbabweans who 
have been properly allocated land will remain settled on their pieces of land" after 
it was accused by its opponents of planning to evict all resettled blacks and return 
whites to their land. But it qualified the statement by saying those "properly" 
given land. Here the MDC was also trying to not to lose ballots by being seen to 
be threatening newly resettled farmers with eviction. 
The MDC also stressed that land reforms should be directly linked to 
economic development, not to score political mileage. The MDC also tried to 
counter propaganda from their rivals by dropping a line that literally means their 
opponents were lying about their achievements: 
Although the government claims that hundreds of thousands of 
families have been resettled under the fast track land policy, we 
have found evidence of 30,000 families having been resettled in 
conditions ofheightened poverty.95 
Describing conditions of resettled farmers as "heightened poverty", 
suggests that the government programme was not improving the living standards 
of its people, and therefore was not worthy to vote for. Again the aim was to 
discredit the government by belittling the efforts of the land reform programme. 
4.3.4. Education policy 
95 ibid, p. 18 
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The MDC education policy, while appearing to be skeletal, touched on the 
most basic of issues ranging from standards of education at all levels to reviewing 
the status of the teaching profession and conditions of service for teachers. The 
education policy summary below promised better access to quality education from 
nursery school to tertiary institutions than what is on the ground. 
At the heart of our vision for education is the need to ensure that 
every Zimbabwean has access to high quality education. The MDC 
will ensure a future for every child by reforming and investing 
substantial funds and resources into the education system. 96 
Promising improved standards of education, was a positive move that was 
meant to attract support especially in an environment where standards of 
education had been falling due to under-funding and lack of resources. 
4.3.5 Health policy 
The people of Zimbabwe deserve a fully staffed and adequately 
funded health service that can support and deliver the health needs 
of all Zimbabweans.97 
The above opening statement by Tsvangirai was again building a self-
image that he could do better for the average person, for the poor that have been 
neglected in terms of their health needs. If people "deserve" better, it follows that 
what they are getting is a raw deal and they are capable of doing something about 
it. "The people of Zimbabwe deserve" is a rhetorically very effective use of 
language to get people to seek change for better, in this case by voting the MDC 
into power. The statement suggests that it is the people's right to get better health 
services and not a privilege. In the wake ofthe total collapse of the health delivery 
96 ibid, p. 19 
97 ibid, p. 21 
101 
system in the country, anyone who promised improvement in this regard was sure 
to get support from the suffering people. 
While the policy is generally addressing the health sector, it starts 
off with a section of HIV/AIDS, a pandemic that has affected literally every 
family in Zimbabwe. The MDC promised to "commit substantial investment to 
policy solutions aimed at tackling this pandemic"98• Giving HIV/AIDS a priority 
is a clever technique aimed at capturing voters' empathy. Many families had been 
drained of all their resources in a bid to look after the HIV/AIDS affected and 
infected. So anyone who promised to fund for the AIDS treatment and care, and 
support for the orphans, would obviously win the hearts of the majority of people. 
Other health policies are separately treated in the manifesto, showing that 
HIV/AIDS was prioritised for obvious change-seeking reasons. 
4.4 Brief Profile of Morgan Tsvangirai: MDC President99 
Morgan Tsvangirai was born in 1952 in Gutu communal lands, in 
Masvingo province. He is the first in a family of nine children. His father was a 
bricklayer. Morgan attended Munyira Primary School and went to Silveira and 
Gokomere for secondary education. 
In order to help his parents to support the family, he had to look for 
employment immediately after completing his "0" level of education. 
Consequently, he found himselfworking at Mutare Clothing firm at the age of20. 
It was here that he was initiated into trade unionism just as an ordinary member of 
98 ibid, 21 
99 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/startcontent: 15.10.04. See also "Tsvangirai- 'a skilled and charismatic 
administrator' by Lance Guma, an article in The Zimbabwean newspaper, 18.03.05, p.22. 
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the local textile union. He later moved to Bindura where he had got a job as a 
plant operator at Trojan Nickel Mine. He later rose to the position of a plant 
foreman. While working at Trojan Nickel Mine, Tsvangirai was elected the 
branch chairman of the Associated Mine Workers' Union. His vision and 
commitment to the well being of the worker saw him being propelled to the 
executive ofthe National Mine Workers Union. 
In 1988 Tsvangirai became Secretary General of the Zimbabwe Congress 
of Trade Unions (ZCTU). Little did he know that a decade later, this workers' 
union would collaborate with other organizations yearning for democracy and 
form a formidable opposition party he was going to lead. Because of Tsvangirai 's 
humble background and the basic education he possesses, he has been often 
haughtily described by Mugabe as an ignoramus. Mugabe boasts of a chain of 
degrees, both earned and honorary. The highest qualification Tsvangirai possesses 
is an Executive Leaders In Development Diploma which he obtained from 
Harvard University's John F Kennedy School of Government in June 2001. This 
prestigious diploma for executive global leaders covers such topics as leadership, 
managing political and economic reforms, managing transition, economic 
development, financial management and globalisation. 
However, Tsvangirai's role in mobilizing the people against the 
government shows that although he may lack the high education that Mugabe has, 
he possesses good leadership qualities. This is in light of the role he played in 
steering the ZCTU more and more on a political course in the 1990s as the 
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economy of the country declined and workers' living standards hit the bottom 
level. 
In particular, Tsvangirai organized successful nationwide strikes that 
brought the whole country to a standstill. At one time Mugabe's government 
attempted to raise funds to pay the pensions of war veterans by raising income 
tax, a move that proved unpopular with the people and the ZCTU. The ZCTU-
organised nationwide strike forced the government to stop implementing the 
income tax. As a result of this ZCTU's success in making the government reverse 
its decision, Tsvangirai was attacked by allegedly angry war veterans who 
attempted to throw him out the window of his office in the 1Oth floor. His 
attackers used a metal bar and only left when his secretary screamed. The success 
of this strike led to stayaways in December 1997 and early 1998. The government 
was forced to cancel the implementation oftwo taxes. 
As already noted in the preceding section, the ZCTU assisted in the 
formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999 
with Tsvangirai taking the post of President and his former boss, Gibson Sibanda 
becoming his deputy. It is therefore correct to conclude that the catalyst for 
Tsvangirai's transformation into a powerful politician was his career in the trade 
unions. 
In February 2000, a few months after the formation of the MDC, the 
young party campaigned vigorously against the government-sponsored 
referendum on constitutional reform, which among other things, sought to take 
the white men's farms without compensation. The "Yes" vote supported by the 
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government lost. Mugabe's and his government viewed this loss as the biggest 
political set-back since independence. 
The favourable results of the referendum gave buoyancy to the MDC. It 
was evident that the new party was an acceptable phenomenon in the politics of 
Zimbabwe. Tsvangirai became the people's beacon of hope, a hope for true 
democracy and an end to a de facto one party state rule and tyranny. 
Using the campaign theme of change, the MDC nearly squared up with the 
ruling party in the June 2000 parliamentary elections when it garnered 57 seats 
against ZANU (PF)'s 62 seats. No opposition party had made such a remarkable 
showing in Zimbabwe since independence - what more in the wake of horrendous 
acts of violence that left more than 100 MDC supporters dead. Some analysts 
have contended that if the Zimbabwean political field was level, the MDC could 
have easily won the 2000 parliamentary election with a wide margin. This view is 
credible taking into account that the MDC challenged 37 seats that were won by 
ZANU (PF) in court. 
It was a clear case that all the disparate groups that were strongly opposed 
to Mugabe and the ZANU (PF) government were now rallying behind Tsvangirai 
who appeared to be their saviour in the time of need. Tsvangirai's popularity 
continued to grow despite the fact that the state propaganda machinery 
relentlessly attacked him as a puppet of Britain, a sell-out who had never taken 
part in the liberation struggle against the British settlers. The pro-government 
public media took advantage of the fact the white farmers openly supported, 
campaigned for and financed the MDC. 
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Tsvangirai has not travelled a smooth road to the political powerhouse that 
he is today. In 1989 Mugabe's government imprisoned him for six weeks on 
trumped up charges of being an apartheid-ruled South Africa's spy. In 2000 he 
was charged with treason for saying at a rally in September that year that if 
Mugabe did not go peacefully, the MDC would remove him violently. This 
charge was later dropped by the government as the courts found it 
unconstitutional. In defence Tsvangirai said he never meant removing Mugabe by 
physical violence but that he meant Mugabe would be removed by popular 
discontent. In 2002 Tsvangirai was charged with high treason for allegedly having 
sought the services of a Canadian political consultancy company, Madison and 
Dickens to assassinate Mugabe ahead of the 2002 presidential election. He was 
found not guilty by the High Court on 15 October 2004. Despite all this and other 
forms of harassment from the government, Tsvangirai has remained steadfast and 
principled in his call for democratic change of government in Zimbabwe: 
We remain committed and focused to completing the change we 
set on to achieve some three years ago. This change should speed 
up economic recovery for the good of us all. It should also witness 
the birth of a new era where basic liberties are recognized and the 
dignity inherent in every human being is upheld and respected. 100 
Probably the most apt summary of Tsvangirai's character was given by 
David Coltart101 , MDC Member of Parliament for Bulawayo South, as a new 
year's message at the beginning of 2002. The message was published in a number 
of independent papers in Zimbabwe. Coltart described Tsvangirai as the coup de 
grace in the 2002 presidential election. The use of the phrase coup de grace 







provides an impression that Tsvangirai was the best candidate in the election, one 
who was ready to make an easy, final stroke as the victor in the elections. This 
description is followed by three sentences that give a vivid and positive picture of 
Tsvangirai: 
Getting to know him has been a sheer pleasure. He is a man of 
great intellect, integrity, courage, compassion and humour. In fact I 
firmly believe that in Mr Tsvangirai we have truly a great leader 
who will become a statesman of world renown. I have consistently 
impressed by (sic.) his wisdom in tackling issues and by his 
commitment to a vision of a non-racist, non-sexist, democratic 
Zimbabwe102• 
Coltart goes on to give some reasons why he has so much admiration for 
his leader. Tsvangirai phoned to convey a congratulatory message to Coltart at the 
birth of their child, a clear testimony that "[h ]e does not have an ounce of racist 
blood in his veins"103 . Coltart says that Tsvangirai restored his courage and 
determination when he (Coltart) received death threats because of his political 
activities. Tsvangirai is said to have resolutely and fairly dealt with an issue of 
indiscipline involving some younger members of the MDC whose squabbles were 
bringing the party into disrepute. Even when Tsvangirai "was ambushed twice last 
year, he remained absolutely calm and focused" 104• By saying that Tsvangirai "is 
truly a great leader and Zimbabwe will be blessed to have him as President"105, 
Coltart was appealing to the electorate to vote for Tsvangirai. He paints an 
attractive picture of Tsvangirai that the electorate was most likely going to be 
persuaded to vote for him. 
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Through observation and talking to people from all walks of life, the 
researcher found that MP Coltart's comments about MDC President were shared 
by many people, both in the rural and urban areas. Tsvanirai was the darling of 
the electorate mainly because of the change rhetoric that characterized him and 
his party. 
In conclusion, it can be noted here that it was trade umomsm than 
anything else that catapulted Morgan Tsvangirai to the high position of a 
formidable and effectual opposition leader Zimbabwe has ever seen since 1980. 
Tsvangirai's entry onto the Zimbabwean political scene has been traced to social 
movements such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) of which 
he was Secretary General and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) of 
which he was the founding chairperson. Besides being a self-made person, 
Tsvangirai can also be described as a solid administrator, competent thinker, 
charismatic leader, democratic team player, a social democratic and an eloquent 
speaker. At 52 years old in 2002, Tsvangirai stood a better chance in the eyes of 
the people as he was comparatively much younger than his nemesis, Mugabe, 
who was 78 years old. Thus the 'age rhetoric' favoured him more than it did 
Mugabe. His charismatic character transcended over ethnic and racial groups and 
people felt he would be a better President than Mugabe. 
4.5 Overview Tsvangirai's speeches at rallies 
Tsvangirai held about nine presidential campaign rallies, but because he 
spoke off-the-cuff, the researcher did not find records of his speeches. The only 
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available source of portions of his speeches, are stories carried by the media. And 
even these did not carry the nine speeches because not all of his rallies were 
accessible to the media due to the hostile political environment at the time which 
confined most scribes to urban areas. Thus, because of the non-availability of the 
parts of the speeches verbatim, the analysis will mainly be limited to the subjects 
raised, and where they are available, to the direct discourse used to propound the 
issues. 
According to an international newspaper report, Tsvangirai's kick-started 
his 2002 presidential campaign at Sakubva Stadium in Zimbabwe's eastern border 
town of Mutare. In his wide-ranging address, Tsvangirai told prospective voters 
that "the country would be making a choice between a bleak future and bright 
prospects when it goes to the polls on March 9-10"106 
Asking would-be voters to choose between a bleak future and bright 
prospects is what Hugh Rank describes as "progressive rhetoric". Rank describes 
progressive rhetoric as the rhetoric of 
reformers, liberals who want to change or fix up parts of the 
existing system .... and replace it with a better one. Progressive 
Rhetoric is the rhetoric of the Have-nots who seek to change the 
'bad' (relief) and to get the 'good' (acquisition) 107 
In the case of the 2002 presidential election campaign in Zimbabwe, 
Tsvangirai fits the above description perfectly. His rhetoric fits this description 
well too. He enters the political arena as a redeemer, as someone who has to 
106 Nampa-Reuters in a story in the Namibian headlined Zimbabwe's Tsvangirai says Mugabe must be 
ousted, Feb 4, 2002 
107http://webserve.govst.edu/users/grank/politicai/Eiections%20/progressive.htm 
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correct a big wrong doing. His rhetoric seems to contain the panacea to the 
problems that bedevilled and still haunt Zimbabwe. Coming back to his maiden 
campaign speech in Mutare, Tsvangirai told his supporters and the electorate at 
large: 
We are in a mess because of Mugabe. The economy has been 
crippled; we have no friends internationally because Mugabe has 
chosen policies to isolate us from the rest of the world. 108 
The above citation confirms Rank's description of progressive rhetoric, 
that is, "the rhetoric of the opposition, the protesters and the pickets, the people 
who are not in power". 109 
Tsvangirai's campaign rhetoric can also be described rhetoric of 
"dissatisfaction, discontent, and anger for not having the 'good', but it is also the 
rhetoric of hopes, dreams, change, progress and improvement" 110• On progressive 
rhetoric Rank further notes that: 
[t]argeted to their own supporters, progressive rhetoric often 
suggests fears of stasis (of being stopped, stalled, thwarted), either 
suddenly (banned, controlled) or slowly (exhausted, burned out). 111 
This comes out clearly in Tsvangirai's speech when, making reference to 
the political violence in which the MDC claims more than 100 of its supporters 
were killed at the hands of furling party supporters. He says: 
108 Nampa-Reuters in a story in the Namibian headlined Zimbabwe's Tsvangirai says Mugabe must be 
ousted, Feb 4, 2002 





I know there are those among us clamouring for revenge. I want to 
tell you that we cannot afford that. When we come to power we 
will pursue a policy of reconciliation because that is the only way 
to build a country. Our present programme is to get rid of ZANU 
(PF) and after that we form a government of national unity. We ask 
you to brave ZANU (PF)'s campaign ofviolence. 112 
By asking his supporters to brave the ZANU (PF) campaign of violence in 
itself indicates fears for its efforts to rebuild the country being thwarted by 
reaction from the incumbent if at all the MDC wins the elections. It is at the 
Mutare rally that Tsvangirai tells the electorate to tum out in large numbers to 
dislodge the ZANU (PF) Government on election days. He says: 
[t]he election is going to be won or lost on the basis ofturnout. We 
must all go and vote, because at the end of the day, let not the 
future generations accuse us of being negligent and allowing a 
d. d h . c. 113 Ictator to estroy t e country m our taces. 
By openly calling Mugabe a "dictator" at a rally, Tsvangirai is endearing 
himself with his supporters as no one would dare call Mugabe by that term 
without fear of arrest or reprisal. This presents him as a dauntless fighter for the 
general people's cause. 
Referring to threats by the military that it would not accept an opposition 
victory government, Tsvangirai tries to separate the military from politics and 
indirectly alluding to them as professionals, saying: 
[ w ]e have no doubt that the army has professional inte~rity to 
respect the constitution and to respect the will ofthe people 14• 
112 Nampa-Reuters in a story in the Namibian headlined 'Zimbabwe's Tsvangirai says Mugabe must be 
ousted, Feb 4, 2002. www.namibian.co,.na/2002/February/africa/023F6A43E.htm 
113 Thousands rally to support Tsvangirai, The Times (UK), 4 February 2002 
114Nampa-Reuters in a story in the Namibian headlined 'Zimbabwe's Tsvangirai says Mugabe must be 
ousted, Feb 4, 2002. www.namibian.co,.na/2002/February/africa/023F6A43E.htm 
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Indeed this is diplomatic way of telling the military that they will be 
expected to honour the outcome of the polls. It is a pragmatic technique that 
attempts to solicit cooperation from to the military. 
But at another rally in Harare, Tsvangirai openly tells the security agents 
to draw a line between ZANU (PF) and government business. He says: 
[t]he police and other security agents ... should know that they are 
working for the country not for Mugabe. They have nothing to be 
afraid of if they are part of national institutions, but we do not need 
those who believe they work for ZANU (PF). We will deal with 
you in the most effective way. If you cannot salute your 
commander-in-chief, you will have made yourself redundant. Ko 
tingazviite sei? {There is nothing we can do). 115 
Here Tsvangirai issues a dangerous and confrontational warning, in sharp 
contrast to his earlier diplomatic handling of the issue of defence chiefs who had 
openly announced that they would not recognize a President without liberation 
war credentials. Perhaps sometimes it was necessary for him to call a spade a 
spade by showing his decisiveness as a strong leader. The argument is that he 
needed to flex his muscles and show the military that there were rules to follow 
which were laid down in the constitution. One can say that he was trying to shade 
off intimidation by the military. 
On the topical land question, Tsvangirai stresses in his speeches that the 
land reform programme has been chaotically executed. His argument was that 
there was need for "a land reform programme that benefits the whole country, that 
recognizes that farming is a commercial venture and not just about pieces of land 
115 '50,000 attend Tsvangirai rally'- Daily News March 4, 2002 
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for peasants" 116• This is an implicit, if not hyperbolic suggestion that the land 
programme has all been to do with parcelling of portions of small land for 
subsistence farming only. 
Following his manifesto Tsvangirai, at his campaign rallies, promised not 
only to deal with the economic malaise affecting the country, but also compensate 
victims of political violence since the 2000 election campaign. 
At a rally in Bulawayo Tsvangirai pledged to compensate victims of 
political violence from 2000 onwards117. The Daily News reported that Tsvangirai 
had said an MDC government would establish a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to deal with issues arising from political violence that had left over 
100 opposition supporters dead and that Tsvangirai "pledged to compensate all 
victims of political violence if elected into power."118 The Financial Gazette 
echoed the same promise later in that week when it reported that "Tsvangirai ... 
said his government would pay reparations to those who lost relatives and 
properties because of state-sanctioned violence."119 
On this subject Tsvangirai capitalizes on the sensitive emotions of people, 
picking on the historical aspect of political violence. He is pointing at the 
government's wrongs and at the same time trying to build a self-image of the 
defender of the rights of the poor, the weak and the downtrodden. 
116 Nampa-Reuters in a story in the Namibian headlined 'Zimbabwe's Tsvangirai says Mugabe must be 
ousted, Feb 4, 2002. www.namibian.co,.na/2002/February/africa/023F6A43E.htm 
117 See also David Harold-Barry, Zimbabwe: The Future is the Past, 2004 p.212-223.and Ragnar Waldahl, 
Politics and Persuation: Media coverage of Zimbabwe's 2000 election, 2004, p.87-104 
118 'MDC pledge to compensate victims of violence' Daily News March 3, 2002 
119 'Tsvangirai to compensate victims of violence' Financial Gazette, March 7,2002 
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At the same rally at White City Stadium, according The Sunday Mail, 
Tsvangirai pledged to address the land reform exercise, but castigated the way his 
opponent had handled it. He is quoted by The Sunday Mail as having said: 
I want to assure you, we believe in land reforms. There is need for 
communal land re-organisation . . . but look at what ZANU (PF) has 
done. 120 
Tsvangirai reiterated his position on the land issue at another rally a day 
after. The Daily News quoted him saying: 
[ w ]e will deal with land redistribution in a transparent, lawful and 
equitable manner, not just dumping people like ZANU (PF) is 
doing. We need jobs through the opening up of new industries 
among other issues. 121 
He is basically echoing his party's manifesto which says land reforms 
should ensure production of adequate food to fight poverty and starvation. 
Poverty, hunger and unemployment were the collocates at the time especially 
after the shortages of food that were squarely blamed by critics on the Mugabe's 
fast-track land redistribution programme. The three are still affecting millions of 
Zimbabweans today. 
With the food shortages at hand, Tsvangirai took the opportunity of his 
campaign rallies to openly criticize some of Mugabe's policies, in particular his 
turning to the Libyans for aid after the West shunned him over his Government's 
human rights record and other disagreements with the Bretton Woods institutions. 
"Ko vanhu vanodya mafuta here?(Do people eat fuel?) You cannot feed 
the people on fuel. That is impossible"122, sarcastically commented Tsvangirai on 
120 'Tsvangirai makes U-tum'- Sunday Mail, March 3, 2002 
121 '50,000 attend Tsvangirai rally' -The Daily News March 4, 2002 
122 'Tsvangirai makes U-tum'- The Sunday Mail March 3, 2002 
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a deal Mugabe struck with Libya to supply fuel. Fuel shortages had almost 
brought the country on its knees at that time. These and other shortages continue 
to dog the country as I write this thesis. 
But politics of the stomach and that of mobility cannot be separated. The 
opposition leader on that statement can be described to have resorted to cheap 
propaganda just to appease the huge crowds around him, yet it was not a 
necessary comparison. Both food and fuel are necessary for any modem country 
to run. What the opposition leader should have probably said was how his 
government would change the status quo to ensure that fuel supplies would never 
be disrupted in future. He also made use of a rhetorical question when he posed a 
question in the Shona language whether people were going to feed on fuel. In one 
of his main speeches, delivered at Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfield the weekend 
before polling, Tsvangirai used various forms of tactics to persuade the audience 
by using what is informally known as 'pep talk'. This has the aim of stirring up 
discontent with and resentment against the authorities in power. 
We are meeting today not because of Mugabe's generosity, but 
because our people want change. We are going into the elections 
under protest because the electoral process is not free and fair. If 
Mugabe tries to rig the election he will be an illegitimate president 
because our people know that change is now irreversible. I urge all 
of you to go out in large numbers and vote to avoid rigging, to 
determine the country's future. So many people have been killed, 
houses burnt and we should not betray them by voting for ZANU 
(PF). We have to end this lawlessness in the country in order to 
create jobs, open up new industries and fight against HIV I AIDS as 
a nation. 123 
He energized his support base by making the supporters aware of the fact 
that they were going into elections not because Mugabe wanted to be seen to be 
123 '50,000 attend Tsvangirai rally'- Daily News March 4, 2002 
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practicing democracy, but because "people want change". By stating that he was 
running for the election even if the conditions were not very conducive, he was 
trying to emphasize the need for change. Tsvangirai was also appealing to the 
people's emotions by saying the election was not going to be free and fair. He 
therefore urged for a sense of responsibility by calling for a collective action, 
urging "all of you to go out in large numbers and vote . . . to determine the 
country's future". Here he impressed on the voters that winning the lection was a 
question of numbers. They had to tum up in large numbers in order to deter 
ZANU (PF) from rigging the elections. 
By making reference again to victims of political violence, Tsvangirai was 
intensifying the issue through repetition. He knew it was an emotional issue that 
would appeal even to those not directly affected especially when he said: "so 
many people have been killed, houses burnt and we should not betray them by 
voting for ZANU (PF). We have to end this lawlessness in the country". Feelings 
of anger against the establishment could easily be stimulated among some 
receptive listeners. Employment creation, resuscitation of the economy and the 
battle against HIV I AIDS remained the focus of his speeches and were repeated 
over and over. 
Following on his reference to political violence and his pledge to set a 
truth and reconciliation body to compensate victims of politically motivated 
violence, Tsvangirai promised to deal with the perpetrators of the violence. The 
language used appears to be contradictory to the purposes of setting up a 
reconciliation commission, alluded to earlier on. He was quoted saying: 
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[w]e will deal with these militias who assault people old enough to 
be their parents in the name of ZANU (PF). Mugabe should 
disband those militias. The people of Zimbabwe liberated 
themselves and Mugabe should stop misrepresenting history. 124 
This kind of language would appeal to the people who had been affected 
by political violence that characterized the campaign period and was partly 
blamed on ZANU (PF)'s militias125• The ZANU (PF)'s militias, infamously called 
"Green Bombers", a name deriving from their dark green uniform, were 
unleashed on the electorate to harass or even kill people who were opposed to 
ZANU (PF). So when Tsvangirai openly condemned the evil deeds of the militias 
and said "Mugabe should disband those militias", this had a rhetorical impact on 
the voters as he presented himself as having the welfare of the people at heart. 
The people would view him as a peace loving leader unlike Mugabe who set the 
notorious militias on them, to "assault people old enough to be their fathers in the 
name of ZANU (PF)." In the African culture, it is a taboo for a son to assault his 
father. Tsvangirai made use of this cultural symbolism in his speech so that the 
audience would view Mugabe as going against the norms and values of society by 
using young men (militias) to beat up and harass the people, including hapless old 
men and women. Tsvangirai also plays down the big role Mugabe played in 
liberating the country when he says "[t]he people of Zimbabwe liberated 
themselves and Mugabe should stop misrepresenting history.' 
4.6 Overall Appraisal 
124 50,000 attend Tsvangirai rally, Daily News, March 4, 2002 
125 These were ZANU (PF)'s National Youth Service graduates that were involved in acts of violence 
against known and perceived supporters of the MDC. 
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When now viewed in retrospect, it is not difficult to trace the "surfacing" 
(Trent and Friedenberg 2000) of Tsvangirai as a strong contender of the 2002 
presidential election, widely viewed as "an unfair contest" (Feltoe 2002). While it 
is logical to say that as soon as Tsvangirai became the President of the MDC, he 
was obviously going to be its presidential candidate in the presidential election, 
his vision for change and a better life for the people of Zimbabwe can be traced 
earlier to his trade unionism days, especially when he was the Secretary General 
of the ZCTU. It can therefore be argued that Tsvangira's rhetoric of change did 
not just start instantaneously, but that it was a cumulative process that was only 
intensified during the campaign period under study. This is why this chapter has 
gone into some brief background of Tsvangirai life and his rhetoric of change. 
Trent and Friedenberg (2000:25 say that although it is difficult to trace the first 
stage, "surfacing begins with candidates' initial efforts to create an interest and 
image themselves as candidates and extends through a variety of public rhetorical 
transactions" before the actual campaign. This chapter has traced how Tsvangirai 
positioned himself in the leadership position of the MDC. With his party adopting 
the slogan Chinja Maitiro (Change your ways of doing things), we can see the 
rhetoric of change, that Tsvangirai together with his colleagues had began, being 
buttressed and taken to a higher level. 
Although the state machinery and ZANU (PF) militias declared rural areas 
no-go-areas for the Tsvangirai, he took the campaign theme of change to major 
cities, altogether addressing a paltry nine rallies compared to Mugabe's thirty-
seven. Despite all the constraints the MDC leader faced to reach his avalanche of 
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supporters both in the rural and urban areas, the rhetoric of change spread to these 
areas like a bushfire. There was nothing appealing as the MDC's thematic slogan 
Chinja Maitiro (Change your ways of doing things). The slogan offered a 
"cognitive shortcut" (Shea 1996) to the voters that when voting time came, they 
were going to vote for a change of government. Tsvangirai's speeches were 
persuasive in the sense that they promised the voters a new democratic 
dispensation if he got to power. In the eyes ofthe people, he was a beacon of new 
hope, their hopes and patience having been trampled upon by the ZANU (PF) 
government for 22 years. Such messages like "As President I Will Respect You", 
"As President I Will Listen to You" and "As President I Will Protect You", which 
accompanied most of Tsavangirai' s campaign adverts, had a positive rhetorical 
impact on the voters. The voters were also given responsibility to "Help Bring 
About a Better Life" by voting Tsvangirai to the presidency. 
It can be thus concluded that Tsvangirai used the challenger's strategies as 
suggested by Trent and Friedenberg (2000) in his campaign for the presidency. 
The rhetorical impact these strategies had on the voters was great judging by the 
popularity he commanded and still commands among the voters. 
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core ofthe incumbent's campaign style (Trent and Friedenberg 2000). Top on the 
achievements the Manifesto highlighted were land to the people, peace and 
stability, education, health, mining, tourism, justice, legal and parliamentary 
affairs, local government, and economic liberalization. 
The thematic tag LAND FOR ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT ran 
through the Manifesto, giving the persuasive appeal that by getting land from the 
white commercial farmers, the economy of the country would improve. It is 
important to note that the Manifesto played down the fact that at the country was 
and is still reeling under the worst economic slump by describing the economic 
hardships as "temporary but pressing setbacks of our economy" 126• To date, some 
five years later as I write, the economy continues to nosedive; the "temporary 
setbacks" have become permanent, so to speak, with no signs of changing for the 
better in sight. 
The Manifesto treated voting for ZANU (PF)'s candidate as a collective 
responsibility in order to defend the country's sovereignty which, in Mugabe's 
rhetoric, was in danger from the British who wanted to recolonise it, hence his 
vow that Zimbabwe will never be a colony again. Right from the onset, the 
ZANU (PF) Manifesto 2002 makes use of the rhetorical strategy of collective 
responsibility so that voters would identify with the party. The following phrases 
rhetorically implied that the voters had a responsibility of ensuring that the 
country belonged to them collectively and they should guard against its 
sovereignty: "our party", "our gallant sons and daughters", "our economy", "our 
126 ZAUN (PF) Manifesto 2002, p.2. 
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nation", "our country", "our independence", "our sovereignty", "our 22nd 
anniversary of independence", "22 years of our liberation" and "our national 
independence". Also "together with you" is used at the beginning to give the 
impression that whatever ZANU (PF) did and stood for, it was the will of the 
people. This had the rhetorical impact of giving the voters a duty to vote for 
ZANU (PF) which was presented as caring and responsible. In order to entice 
more voters to vote for ZANU (PF), the Manifesto gave reasons why the majority 
would vote for the party. Among these reasons included the claims that it was 
only ZANU (PF) that understood that "Land is the Economy" and that the 
"Economy is Land" and that it was only ZANU (PF) that could formulate a policy 
from this into something practical and real. Saying that it was only ZANU (PF) 
that understood that the "Economy is the Land" was not only in itself confusing 
but meaningless. Such cryptic rhetoric would make the message obscure, leaving 
many questions unanswered. 
The Manifesto also claimed that there was no alternative to ZANU (PF) 
implying that the other parties, including the MDC were of no consequence. The 
emphasis on the liberation struggle was also appealing as it suggested that it 
suggested that it was only ZANU (PF) that had liberated the country. There were 
also promises for economic growth, social justice through redistribution of wealth 
and equity, democracy, peace, stability and rule of law and national autonomy in 
the domestic and foreign policy. The Manifesto exhorted people to vote for 
ZANU (PF) because: 
• ... the wishes of the people are sovereign. 
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• ... the people died for the land. 
• ... the economic power of the people is based on the land. 
• ... the Third Chimurenga is about giving land back to the people. Land is 
our heritage. 
• ... ours is a Government of the people by the people for the people. 
(p.69) 
5.1 Analysis 
Mugabe's campaign strategy mainly targeted the rural electorate which 
constitutes the greater percentage of the country's population. The rural 
population has also been the stronghold of the ruling party support for the past 
years. However, there seemed to be some manipulation of some kind when it 
came to the presidential election campaign. Mugabe has been acclaimed as one of 
the most eloquent and best president orators in Africa. Some analysts have 
described him as a shrewd manipulator of rhetoric. To some Mugabe has become 
a legend and a hero of all time. His speeches were a plethora of veiled threats, 
promises and assurances to look into the wrongs of the past especially for the 
Matebeleland electorate in the wake of the Mate bel eland massacres of the 1980s 
as well as allegations of deliberate forestalled regional development. Some folks 
in other rural areas, especially in Midlands, Masvingo, Manicaland and 
Mashonaland provinces, were indoctrinated with a myth that Mugabe was their 
super hero and a saviour from hunger and starvation. Accused by their urban 
counterparts of being gullible, the rural folk undoubtedly fell prey to Mugabe's 
powerful manipulation of words, intimidation and violence allegedly perpetrated 
by the militias and the war veterans. 
The 2000 parliamentary elections helped Mugabe to foresee the possible 
outcome of the presidential results. Judging by the results of this parliamentary 
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election there was need for the ruling party president to concentrate on massive 
campaign in the rural areas where most of his support was. 
Mugabe criss-crossed the country in a private helicopter and addressed a 
total of 37 rallies. On the land reform programme Mugabe told voters the there 
was no backtracking. He supported his controversial land reform programme by 
attacking the white commercial farmers who owned huge tracts of land. Of 
notable importance were the Oppenheimer's estates especially in Matebeland. He 
supported the farm occupations by the war veterans when he said, "War veterans 
were saying white farmers have no right to that land. We can show them where 
Britain is. Blair can take them." 127 More farms had to be taken from white 
farmers and given to the people. By saying, "if there are some who have not been 
allocated farms, we will acquire more farms and resettle them" 128, Mugabe was 
building high hopes in the people. This appealed to the rural folk who were 
dispossessed of their ancestral land by the British settlers. He reiterated his attack 
on the MDC saying that if people voted Tsvangirai into the presidency, 
Tsvangirai would return all the land to the whites. 
Contrastively, Mugabe presented himself as a fighter for the common 
good of the people by declaring that he would not go back on the land reform 
programme. At another rally he said: 
127 The Herald, 20.02.02 
128 The Herald, 22.02.02 
129 ibid 
The British say Mugabe is a madman, they say I am grabbing their 
land and the whites are supposed to be saints. That's laughable. 
Blair can do anything and go anywhere and say what he wants but 
I will die clinging on to my land. This is what we fought for. 129 
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Mugabe blamed the problems between Zimbabwe and Britain on the 
failure of Blair's labour government to honour the country's colonial obligations 
as contained in the 1978 Lancaster House Agreement that paved the way for the 
independence of Zimbabwe. He further argued that the British Government was 
reneging on the land question in order to keep its descendants on the land that was 
not theirs in the first place, reasoning that how could a minority own huge tracts 
of land at the expense of its rightful owners, the black majority. 
Mugabe also told voters that he was prepared to withstand EU sanctions. 
He asked them a rhetorical question "What will we be wanting in Europe?" 130, 
and contemptuously described Britain as an "obnoxious island". The implication 
of this is that Zimbabwe was self sufficient and that there was no need to worry 
about the sanctions imposed by the EU. He gave the impression that sanctions 
were therefore meaningless. This was mere rhetoric as the country continued to 
plunge into the worst economic crisis mainly as a result of being isolated by the 
international community. It is interesting to note that at another rally Mugabe 
seemed to feel the effects of sanctions when he said: "Sanctions will only harden 
our stance [on the land]. They only serve to show that the white man is evil."131 
My argument is that, if sanctions were meaningless, as Mugabe alluded to earlier, 
why then would they (sanctions) make him and his government harden their 
stance, presumably on the land question? If sanctions are meaningless, why the 
look East rhetoric now? 
130 The Herald 22.02.02 
131 The Herald, 20.02.02 
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Mugabe promised to give enough food to voters saying that no one would 
die because of the drought that had affected most areas. Contrary to this promise 
on food distribution the MDC and NGOs alleged that food aid was used by 
Mugabe to gain political mileage during the campaigns. Only people holding 
ZANU (PF) cards were reported to be eligible for the allocation of food. The 
researcher witnessed a similar case in Ratcliffe township in Harare where only 
people carrying ZANU (PF) cards were allowed to buy maize meal from a shop 
whose owner was a well known ZANU (PF) supporter. It was also common that 
maize and mealie-meal were distributed at most ZANU (PF) rallies, a practice 
that was condemned as vote buying by the opposition. 
Another technique Mugabe used in his campaign was to lure traditional 
chiefs to support ZANU (PF). In his rhetoric he promised to improve the welfare 
of traditional chiefs. The Government was going to electrify their homes and 
provide them with vehicles, clerks and secretaries to make their work easier. Their 
salaries and perks were increased to at Z$18 000 per month, a lot of money at that 
time. It was said this was to restore the dignity of the chiefs which had been 
eroded by the colonial regimes and yet in actual fact chiefs were to pay back by 
literally ensuring that all their subjects would vote for Mugabe in the election. For 
sure the chiefs lined voters according to their villages with the village head 
ensuring that everyone voted for Mugabe. Mugabe castigated Tsvangirai in his 
addresses alleging that he and the MDC were bent on reversing the gains of the 
country's revolution. People should not therefore vote for Tsvangirai. 
126 
Employing his sense of humour Mugabe attacked Tsvangirai's 
personality. At one rally Mugabe joked about his age (78) saying that he was 
capable of physically knocking down Tsvangirai ( 49) if they were given a boxing 
ring. He said, "This fist is 78 years old and has 78 horsepower that could send Mr 
Tsvangirai to the ground if we were to get the ring." By injecting humour into his 
speech Mugabe's purpose was to retain his audience's interest and to appear 
credible as a contender in this election. By making the crowd laugh, he was 
increasing their attentiveness to his speech, hopefully to remain so until the end of 
his speech. 
Mugabe also gave the impression that Tsvangirai was not a patriotic and 
committed leader. Mugabe sarcastically reasoned at one rally: 
I will be surprised if you voted for Tsvangison, someone who ran 
away from school, only to run away from war in Mozambique, 
how do you know he will not run away from the presidency?132 
The humour that is logically presented in this statement is compelling. 
Mugabe's analysis of Tsvangirai's character instilled a sense of insecurity in the 
voters should they vote for Tsvangirai. They were also made to feel more secure 
with the incumbent who seemed to imply that they were sensible people who 
would not vote for Tsvangirai. By saying, "I will be surprised if you voted for 
Tsvangirai", Mugabe was foregrounding credit to the people before he told them 
Tsvangirai's weakness of always abandoning tasks unaccomplished. Mugabe was 
indirectly telling the people that they were wise choosers or voters who would not 
vote for a deserter like Tsvangirai. The voters were likely to feel honoured that 
132 The Herald, 14 .. 02.02 
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the speaker regarded them as reasonable people who would not vote for some 
who had the alleged weakness of leaving tasks not completed. Mugabe used his 
good sense of humour in most of his attacks against Tsvangirai and British Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair. 
Mugabe also added in his addresses that Tsavangirai was a puppet of the 
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. At another rally in Matebeland North 
questioned what the MDC really stood for: 
Look at MDC. Who are they? What is it they want to do with the 
country? Who is Tsvangirai? He is the white man's puppet. He is 
not himself. He has lost his African essence, his humanity. He has 
turned himself into a tool of the British. 133 
Note the effective use of questions and the repetition of the pronoun "he" 
in the answers to the question "Who is Tsvangirai?" All this is meant to paint 
Tsvangirai as a stooge of the British. The researcher found that Mugabe's rhetoric 
about Tsvangirai wanting to give back land to the white people was so effective 
mostly in rural areas that even today the rural folk do not trust people from urban 
areas, the strongholds of the MDC. 
Mugabe's attack of Tsvangirai by describing him in Shona as 
chimbwasungata chemunhu134 (a true puppet of the British) was meant to make 
him appear to be a real enemy of the people, a person who was selling his country 
to the British. A few days before the election Mugabe intensified his 
demonisation of the MDC when he referred to the MDC as a party of crooks and 
criminals: 
133 The Herald, 21.02.02 
134 The Herald, 14.02.02 
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We want to see if the Movement of Dead Crooks and Criminals 
[MDC] will rise from the dead. If their spirit has the capacity to 
rise, we will deal with them as well. After the election, we will not 
write 'Rest in Peace but Rest in Gehena (hell) 135 • 
Mugabe was calling to the people to condemn the MDC to hell by voting 
him into the presidency. At the same rally, Mugabe's wife Grace added to her 
husband vitriolic attack on the MDC by telling the people that "You cannot vote 
for the MDC because you will be ruled by dogs and cats." 136 The rhetorical 
impact of the phrase "dogs and cats" lies in the metaphorical sense in which it is 
used, having been formed from the letters "D" and "C" of the acronym MDC. 
This follows after Mugabe had said the MDC was the "Movement of Dead 
Crooks", vowing that they would never rule Zimbabwe. Mugabe was consistent 
with his recurrent rhetoric, in which he was quoted during one of his addresses 
saymg: 
Let the MDC side with the Europeans and the British, but we will 
conquer them together. I am firmly asserting to you that there will 
never come a day when the MDC will rule this country. Never, 
ever137• 
Mugabe's utterance is often compared with Ian Smith's "The Africans will 
never rule this country. Not in a thousand years. Never, ever."138 This 
comparison is always viewed in bad taste taking into account that one day 
Mugabe shall leave office and if the electoral field is level, the MDC will 
certainly rule the country. 
135 Media Under Siege, MMPZ, p.l28 
136 ibid, p.l29 
137 Dieter, B. Scholz, 2004 "Robert Mugabe: revolutionary or rebel?" in Harold-Barry, D. (ed.) (2004). 
Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future: Harare: Weaver Press. p.29 
138 Ibid. Ian Smith is the former prime Minister of Rhodesia. In 1965 he declared what became infamously 
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In Matebeleland Mugabe's campaign rhetoric centred on the Unity Accord 
that the late Dr Joshua Nkomo and he signed in 1987 which brought the major 
antagonistic parties under the umbrella ZANU (PF). He reiterated the importance 
of unity in nation building by proclaiming: 
Unity, unity and more unity. That's the way we build the party and 
nation. That's the way we have known each other and that's the 
way it would be. We will all say Zimbabwe first. We say sisonke. 
(We are together) 139• 
He reminded people in Matebeland that Dr Joshua Nkomo stood for unity 
and the sovereignty of the country. The people were therefore to vote for ZANU 
(PF) for it was championing the principles of Dr Nkomo and other fallen heroes. 
Mugabe took a swipe at the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bulawayo, 
Pius Ncube for allegedly "frustrating Government efforts to upgrade Lupane 
Mission Hospital"140• Archbishop Ncube, who recently won the 2005 Buns 
Humanitarian Award 141 , Scotland's equivalent of the Nobel Peace Prize, has 
consistently criticized Mugabe's policies and squarely blamed him for the 
suffering that Zimbabweans are experiencing. 
Mugabe threatened to ban the ZCTU alleging that it had failed to 
champion the cause of the workers by aligning itself with the MDC. He promised 
workers that the government would assist them to take over the companies that 
had closed down due to what he termed sabotage. In reality most of the 
companies were closing due to viability problems in a hyper-inflation 
environment. He threatened all whites who did not support him by declaring that 
139 The Herald, 21.02.02 
140 The Herald 22.02.02 
141 The Zimbabwean, 20-26 May 2005 
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"his government would expel all whites whose conduct reflected a reluctance to 
live under black rule after March [2002)" 142 and urged "farm workers to report 
any farmer who mistreated them or whose behaviour belittled his 
administration."143 This was meant to instil fear and a sense of insecurity in the 
white people and to appeal to the farm workers' vote. 
On the question of violence during the campaign, Mugabe insisted that the 
MDC was responsible for the unrest. Carefully choosing his words, Mugabe told 
his supporters at a rally: 
We don't condone violence, but I'm not saying you should fold 
your hands if you are provoked. We want peaceful elections, 
but...you cannot be attacked in your own homes ... You must defend 
yourselves and your families, but we should not go around 
assaulting people."144 
Reading between the lines, we can see that Mugabe did not completely 
condemn violence. In fact it has been concluded that his party sponsored violence 
and this can been supported by the amount of violent rhetoric that characterized 
the ZANU (PF) Congress held in Victoria Falls in December 2001. Elliot 
Manyika, the national political commissar was quoted by The Sunday Mail 
saying: "Our machinery is sharp. MDC, here we come. We are going to crush 
you," 145 and Mugabe did not mince his words, describing the 2002 campaign as 
war:"Hazvisiri zvekutamba izvi. Yava nguva yehondo"146 (There is no kidding 
now. It's time for war). Such kind of language, used in some metaphorical sense, 
142 Financial Gazettee, 21.02.02. Still on the question of violence, G. Feltoe (2004:198) quotes Mugabe 
saying: "There have been very few cases of violence, but if the [white] farmers start to be angry and start to 
be violent, the of course they will get that medicine delivered to them. And it will be very, very, very 
severe.' 
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was dangerous as party supporters later took it literally and went about assaulting 
and even killing supporters and sympathizers of the opposition MDC. The war 
rhetoric that Mugabe used was reckless as Zimbabwe was not in a war situation. 
Neither was the country in a state of emergency. The war rhetoric fanned violence 
that was perpetrated by Mugabe's supporters. The perpetrators of this orgy of 
violence saw nothing wrong in intimidating and even killing the supporters and 
sympathizers of the MDC since Mugabe had declared war against those who 
opposed him and his party. On the same issue Feltoe (2001 :82) notes: 
ZANU (PF) has used massive intimidation all around to try to 
force people to vote for President Mugabe. People have been 
rounded up and forced to attend indoctrination sessions at which 
suspected MDC members are denounced and beaten. 
5.3 Overall Appraisal 
This chapter has shown that Mugabe set the tone for his election campaign 
by attacking the MDC, Britain and minority white people in the country. 
Mugabe's rhetoric presented the MDC leader, his main rivalry in the election, as 
having no agenda of his own but of furthering Tony Blair's agenda of reversing 
the gains of the liberation struggle. Mugabe made it abundantly clear in his 
speeches that the country was in a state of war with the British over the land issue 
and vowed that he would continue giving back the land to its rightful owners. It 
can be said that Mugabe's land rhetoric had a lot of impact on the voters as he 
used land issue shrewdly in an emotive way. To the land hungry black voters, 
Mugabe was their Black Moses as he said everyone who wanted land was going 
to get it. People never questioned the feasibility of this mammoth task as they saw 
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other people invading white commercial farms at will without being stopped by 
government. The violence rhetoric that came from ZANU (PF) party leaders 
incited more violence as people, mostly ZANU (PF) supporters, took the law into 
their hands. The white farmers were threatened with expulsion as they opposed 
the land reform programme, calling it the "land grab" programme. 
We see Mugabe entering the campaign with the anti-British card which he 
plays tactfully by painting a picture in the minds of the voters that Britain wanted 
to take back the country through the MDC leader, Tsvangirai. With the memories 
of the suffering experienced by the people during the years of the liberation 
struggle being fresh, especially in the minds of the elderly in the rural areas where 
the war was largely fought, Mugabe's war rhetoric fell on fertile ears. 
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CHAPTER6 
ELECTION RESULTS: TRIUMPH OVER IMPERIALISM OR 
DAYLIGHT ROBBERY? 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the voting days and the announcement 
of election results. It also briefly analyses Tsvangirai's rejection of the results and 
Mugabe's speech on the occasion of his inauguration as the President of the 
Republish of Zimbabwe. The inauguration speech is the only major speech 
Mugabe gave after the announcement of the results of the election. It is important 
to note that while ZANU (PF) and its supporters hailed the results of the election 
as a triumph over imperialism, the MDC leader described them as daylight 
robbery. 
6.2 Voting days 
March 9 and 10 were the initial voting days but the period was extended 
by one day due to hundreds of thousands of voters who had not cast their vote by 
7 p.m. on the last day of voting. Even with the extension of the voting period to 
11 March, hundreds of thousands of voters were disenfranchised in most urban 
areas, the strongholds of the MDC. The hullabaloo associated with the election 
campaign seemingly came to an end during the voting days. It was relatively 
peaceful without major reports of violence as had been the order of the day during 
the campaign period. 
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The extension of the voting period to the afternoon of 11 March came as a 
result of what has been described as a strategy that ZANU (PF) used to rig this 
election. There were fewer polling stations in urban areas, the strongholds of the 
MDC whereas there were more stations in the rural areas, the strongholds of 
ZANU (PF). In Harare for instance there was tripartite voting, voting for the 
president, the mayor and councillors. This meant the voter spent more time in the 
booth. Voters had also to vote in their constituencies and these had been changed 
during delimitation and most voters had no knowledge of this. 
The end result was that hundreds of thousands urban dwellers people were 
not able to cast their vote in this crucial election. I was only able to vote after 
queuing for ten painful hours while it took me about ten minutes to vote in the 
2005 parliamentary elections, just about the same time I spent in the 2000 
election. Some people I interviewed in Harare took between two and three days to 
cast their precious votes while others completely failed to do so. Voting days were 
characterized by anger and frustration among the voters in urban areas as it 
became clearer and clearer that the voting process had been designed to deny 
them their right to vote for the president of their choice. 
6.3 Announcement of Results 
The announcement of results was done constituency by constituency. In a 
lead story Mugabe leads in poll, The Herald (11.04.02) said of the 5.6 million 
voters, 3.4 million were rural voters while 2.2 million were urban voters. The 
paper's prediction of the poll results was: 
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Zanu (PF) has more support in the rural areas while the MDC has 
its stronghold in urban areas and going by the figures released 
yesterday, indications are that the ruling party will retain the 
presidency. 147 
The final results confirmed the above prediction. Mugabe got 1 685 212 
votes (56.2%) while Tsvangirai had 1 262 401 votes (42%). Therefore Mugabe 
had won another sixth year term as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe. The 
immediate reaction was that ZANU (PF) readily accepted the results describing 
Mugabe's win as a triumph over imperialism. The ZANU (PF) Information and 
Publicity Secretary, Dr Nathan Shamuyarira commented: 
The results of the Zimbabwe presidential election that have been 
announced are a personal triumph and a historic victory for the 
President and first secretary of ZANU (PF) and for the nation as a 
whole148• 
On the other hand, the MDC rejected the results saying the election had 
not been free and fair, and therefore did not reflect the will of the people of 
Zimbabwe. This view was supported by a number of independent observers 
including the Commonwealth Observer Group which concluded that " ... the 
conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for an expression of the will by 
the elector"149, adding that ''the violence and intimidation created a climate of fear 
and suspicion150." 
6.4 Election results "daylight robbery" -Tsvangirai 
147 The Herald, 11.03.02 
148 People have triumphed over imperialism, The Herald, March 14, 2002 
149 Commonwealth, UN blast as not free and fair, The Daily News, 15 March 2002 
150 ibid 
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Tsvangirai rejected the outcome of the 2002 polls immediately after the 
results were announced. At a news conference Tsvangirai, in a brooding mood, 
declared that: 
[t]he MDC is firmly of the view that the results for the Zimbabwe 
presidential election results . . . do not reflect the true will of the 
people of Zimbabwe and are consequently illegitimate in the eyes 
of the people. We therefore do not accept them. 151 
Tsvangirai condemned the whole electoral process saying: "We foresaw 
electoral fraud but not daylight robbery because that is what it is." 152 In this 
statement, Tsvangirai used what in rhetoric is referred to as kairos, the "art of 
using the right word [or words] at the right time" (Mral 2005). In other words 
Tsvangirai's argument was that the election had been "stolen" by ZANU (PF). 
The MDC leader further argued that the election result was a political issue and 
not a legal issue. This had come after realizing that continuing going to court 
would actually give Mugabe legitimacy. But it was surprising to see Tsvangirai 
going to court to challenge Mugabe's election victory. Henceforth, Tsvangirai's 
rhetoric attacked Mugabe as an illegitimate President. 
Tsvangirai's statements reflect bitterness expected of a defeated person 
particularly where one was confident of victory. The use of "robbery" and "the 
biggest electoral fraud in history" suggest criminal offences probably requiring 
legal recourse. He described Mugabe as a thief, a robber of votes, of democracy. 
Thieves and robbers should eventually meet their fate which is conviction and 
sentencing. This shows that even in defeat, Tsvangirai was still hopeful and 
suggesting that change would come and that Mugabe will one day leave office. 
151 Tsvangirai rejects Mugabe victory: Financial Gazette, 
152 Electoral results illegitimate, The Herald, March 14, 2002 
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The hope and defiance is amply demonstrated in Tsvangirai's speech, 
delivered some two weeks after the elections results were officially published, 
where he still held hope for change. Tsvangirai said before the polls were held he 
was concerned "that if the elections were not handled properly, there would be a 
serious fall-out in the country and throughout southern Africa". The tone of a 
"wounded lion" is clear in the following paragraph: 
Despite the shadows of war and terrorism, I called for a fair and 
free election. Zimbabwe's people did not get one. Instead they got 
terrorism ... ZANU (PF)'s terrorism was conducted by rogue 
elements among the veterans of Zimbabwe's war of independence 
two decades ago as well as by government militiamen and youths, 
all of whom were actively aided by the police. 153 
While the term "terrorism" simply refers to the systematic use of violence 
and intimidation to achieve some goal, to the layperson it sounds quite strong and 
synonymous with international terrorists of the likes of Osama bin Laden. 
Tsvangirai made effective use of the term to paint Mugabe and his supporters as 
responsible for the suffering of the people of Zimbabwe, especially those who 
held different views from the ruling party's. After the images of the September 
11, 2001 in the US, no peace loving Zimbabweans would think twice about 
having a terrorist for a head of state. Tsvangirai also talked about war, yet 
Zimbabwe was not in a state of war. The term political violence could have been 
used to describe the situation that prevailed in Zimbabwe at that time. 
Tsvangirai went on to vindicate his party's position that the presidential 
election was not free and fair by saying: 
This intimidation and violence meant that my party, the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC), could not reach the electorate in 
153 Project Syndicate, March 2002 < http://100megsfree4.com/zimcountdown/morgan.html 
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large parts of the countryside. In addition, the government of 
President Mugabe effectively disenfranchised hundreds of 
thousands of urban voters, particularly in the capital Harare and in 
the city of Chitungwiza. Because of an inadequate number of 
polling stations, I believe that in Harare and Chitungwiza alone 
more than 360,000 people stood in a queue to vote but never got 
the opportunity to cast their ballot. 154 
In the paragraph above, Tsvangirai was trying to explain to his supporters 
and sympathisers why he failed to make it. He did not say how he reached the 
estimate of 360,000 people denied the chance to vote in Harare and Chitungwiza, 
but the figure is quite close to 400,000, the number of votes by which he lost to 
Mugabe in the election. Here he was still stressing that change was possible and 
was quite near. What this did to the electorate was to boost their determination 
that one day change would be achieved; the impression was that change was not 
too far after all. But his analysis of the alleged vote rigging painted a gloomy 
picture of the way the presidential campaign and election were conducted. This is 
clear in the following paragraph: 
My concerns about the legitimacy of the election results are further 
raised by interference by Mugabe's militia, whose members 
prevented the MDC from posting polling agents in 52 polling 
stations. By the end of the voting, the MDC had no observers at six 
out of 10 rural stations. This effectively meant that Mugabe's 
supporters could have their way at these stations. We are 
compiling a comprehensive list of the polling stations where 
ZANU-PF supporters had solitary control. In our investigations so 
far, a pattern has emerged even at this stage- these polling stations 
recorded the highest numbers of voters for Mugabe. 155 
Tsvangirai supported his allegations of vote robbery and persuaded his 
supporters and sympathizers to believe that had the voting field been plain, they 
would have easily won the election. He therefore reasons that 
155 Project Syndicate, March 2002 < http://100megsfree4.com/zimcountdown/morgan.html 
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[i]n light of all the evidence, I cannot accept the presidential 
election results in which Mugabe, the sitting president, was 
declared a winner this month with 56 percent of the three million 
votes tallied. The official results do not reflect the true will of the 
people of Zimbabwe and are illegitimate in the eyes of the people. 
Zimbabwe's people have been cheated of their right to freely and 
democratically elect a president of their choice .. .I am saddened 
because Mugabe's regime remains intent on defying the people's 
will. I 56 
Stressing to people that they had been "cheated of their right" 
strengthened their resolve to seek change. So Tsvangirai rejected the poll results 
telling the electorate to wake up and realize that the leader in power was not 
legitimate. This created mistrust between the elected president and the people. 
We see Tsvangirai centring on the question of illegitimacy of Mugabe's 
presidency. 
Tsvangirai then went onto an image seeking campaign, portraying himself 
as the "loyal servant" who was being victimized through arrests on treason 
allegations and who may even face death. By feeling pity for himself that he 
might be killed for seeking democratic change, Tsvangirai presented himself as a 
Martyr. To buttress the concept of martyrdom, he urged his supporters to keep up 
the spirit of fighting for change should he become a sacrificial victim. He declared 
that change was inevitable. The passage below shows that Tsvangirai used pathos 
mainly in order to draw sympathy from the electorate and also from the 
international community: 
Whatever may happen, I as the people's loyal servant, am with 
them all the way. The government may want to arrest me. Indeed I 
was arrested for treason even before elections. At worst they may 
even wish to kill me. But the government will never destroy the 
spirit of the people to reclaim their rights and power. The power to 
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achieve democratic change is in our hands. We may fear in the 
days ahead, but we must never let despair overwhelm us. The tide 
of political change is irreversible but we must be prepared to pay a 
high price for our freedom. 157 
He reiterated the sense of martyrdom but changed the strategy to give 
prominence to the electorate, referred to as "heroes" in the next part of his 
address. In the pragmatics principle of politeness, when one plays down his role 
and gives prominence to the other, it is termed minimizing praise of self and 
maximizing praise of others. Doing so has the rhetorical impact of winning the 
hearts of the other who feels honoured enough by the speaker. Tsvangirai, 
consciously or unconsciously, used the rhetorical strategy of delectare, that is, 
"capturing the public's attention by pleasing them and building a rapport" (Mral 
2005) between them and him. 
In this section of Tsvangirai's address he called himself "the messenger" 
so as to appeal to the sympathy of both "Mugabe and his cronies", the electorate 
and the international community. The message to the Government seems to be "I 
am only a messenger, don't do me any harm" and to the electorate and the 
international community, it appears to be "Please do something to protect the 
people's innocent messenger." Having briefly referred to himself, he went on to 
extol the virtues of the "heroes who waited hours and hours to vote, heroes who 
refused to be turned way" 158 during the flawed election. He said these were the 
voiceless ordinary Zimbabweans whose voices must have been heard. They had 
together with him travelled an arduous road to try and achieve democratic change 
in the country. 





Tsvangirai also referred to the enthusiasm of his supporters despite their 
suffering by saying "[r]arely in the history of mankind have a people faced such 
brutality while retaining such gracious exuberance" 159• He said he was confident 
that no matter what happened to him, the people would carry on the struggle for 
democratic change until it was victorious. Tsvangirai seemed not to be deterred 
by the loss, but tried to encourage his supporters and sympathizers to soldier on as 
democratic change was inevitable. In his mind he had no doubt that 
[t]he people of Zimbabwe want constitutional change, legal 
change, legitimate change, and they are going to obtain it in spite 
of all these obstacles. 160 
As if to find solace for his loss, Tsvangirai referred to the misconduct of 
elections in many African states where there have been gross irregularities, fraud 
and cheating. He bemoaned the lack of transparency and sincerity in the manner 
in which elections were concerned and vowed that "Zimbabwe's struggle is not 
over. My people are in their hour of greatest need. I pledge not to abandon 
them." 161 
Here, Tsvangirai tried to draw consolation from the fact that electoral 
fraud was not only typical of Zimbabwe, but is commonplace in Africa. Despite 
the trend, Tsvangirai was saying the struggle continues. He wound up his speech 
with a promise not to abandon his people. 
He built his image around issues claiming such virtues about himself as 
trustworthy and being available for the struggle to unseat Mugabe and his 
government. 
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Tsvangirai was persuading the electorate to try him for change by 
intensifying the threats that Mugabe and his party posed to the people through 
name-calling such as terrorists and electoral fraudsters. He then tried to create a 
bond with the threatened electorate by pledging his loyalty and emphasizing to the 
voters that change was in their hands and that he was their messenger and was 
prepared to be their Martyr. Throughout the speech, Tsvangirai was pinning on 
the pathos of his immediate supporters and the outside world. He presents himself 
as the sacrificial lamb, ready to die for the people but at the same time the 
undertone of appealing to the people's sympathy for him could be detected. 
6.5 Elections a triumph over imperialism: Mugabe 
On 17 March 2002 Mugabe was sworn in as President at State House. In 
his speech he touched on a wide range of issues. After saluting his guests by 
calling out their designations in paragraph 1, in paragraph 2 Mugabe said that the 
nation and he were in a moment and mood of pride and joy respectively because 
the nation had produced this day by voting him into power. Mugabe said that the 
national joy and personal pride were "tempered with a sense of humility." He also 
thanked those people who voted for him and those who voted for Tsvangirai, 
saying, "both dimensions [lent] their weight to a true democratic process" 
(paragraph 2). The phrase "democratic process" was used three times, 
"democratic practice" once and "democratic society" also once. There was a 
deliberate choice of these phrases in order to give credit to the election that was 
heavily criticized as being flawed and the whole electoral process undemocratic. 
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By thanking both groups of voters, those who voted for him and those 
who voted for his opponent, the speaker was attempting to tone down his vicious 
rhetoric against the opposition leader and his supporters, the people he had 
castigated in the election campaign for allegedly furthering imperialism. It is 
therefore ironical that in paragraph 3 Mugabe embraced all Zimbabweans, 
regardless of their political affiliations by saying, "Well done Zimbabweans! 
Makorokoto! 162 Amhlope! 163 We have done a blow to imperialism!" He sounded 
reconciliatory. To him and his party, the election victory was a triumph over 
imperialism. In the next paragraph (4), he attempted to play down his victory by 
saying both the ruling party and the opposition "have . . . something to rejoice 
about as well as something to mourn about." The ruling party was celebrating 
winning the presidential election but it was mourning losing the mayoral and 
council elections in Harare. Similarly, the opposition had won the mayoral and 
council elections in Harare and lost the presidential election. 
Mugabe begged for unity by reminding his audience of the National 
Anthem and the "multi-coloured flag". These are the two symbols of nationhood 
and by referring to them at this moment in his speech, he seemed to be saying his 
new government accepted every Zimbabwean, regardless of their colour, creed or 
political affiliations. 
He further reasoned that "our energies and capabilities are surely better 
spent on constructive people-oriented tasks and programmes rather than plotting 
the downfall of each other." However, the harassment of the officials of the MDC 
162 Shona word for "Congratulations!" 
163 Ndebele word for "Congratulations!" 
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that followed after Mugabe inauguration proved that he was not sincere talking 
about love, national unity and the spirit of brotherhood. This speech can be 
described as a public relations exercise in front of national and international 
guests. Still, talking about "excitement", "jubilation" and "exhilaration" gave the 
impression that the election results were accepted by all and sundry, which was 
not the case. 
In paragraph 6 Mugabe said the land reform programme was to "proceed 
with great speed and strength." This must be viewed as a promise of reward to the 
people who had supported him and voted for him in the election. He also talked 
about the need to address problems in the manufacturing, mining and 
infrastructure sectors, adding that all the details of the strategies for economic 
growth were contained in the Millennium Economic Recovery programme. The 
much talked about economic programme has completely failed to deliver, leaving 
commentators concluding that it was mere rhetoric. Towards the end of the 
s9eec.h. M\llbabe ~\d th.~ t~a~l\\\\ tl\\t "L\m~a~'«" \\t M\\~~~"·~~~1.\\\\~' ~') ~\\\\\\\\ 
and its allies was "our land reform initiative and its impact on the affairs of the 
white community" (paragraph 13). 
He also emphasized that his winning the election was a triumph over 
imperialism as he alleged that "Britain and its white allies have blatantly sought to 
ensure that this last presidential election be won by their protege and not by me 
and ZANU (PF)" (paragraph 14). He therefore paid tribute to the people of 
Zimbabwe for saying loudly "No! No! Never! Never again shall Zimbabwe be a 
colony. I thank them (voters) for their resolute anti-imperialist stand!" (paragraph 
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14). The speaker also thanked African and non African countries for their support 
and solidarity and appealed to "their support in the future as imperialist 
manoeuvres against Zimbabwe persist." It is my argument that Mugabe attempted 
to use this speech as a redemption tool in the presence of his fellow countrymen 
and international guests after an election that he knew was strongly criticized as 
not being free and fair. 
6.6 Overall Appraisal 
Tsvangirai's refusal speech seems to contain credible reasons why he 
described the outcome of the presidential results as daylight robbery and 
illegitimate. He acquitted himself honourably in attempting to convince his 
supporters and sympathizers that the election was not free and fair. For sure there 
had been many serious irregularities in the whole electoral process, irregularities 
that favoured the incumbency. In this regard the leader of the Commonwealth 
Observer Group, former Nigerian military leader, General Abdulsalam Abubakar 
noted that: 
It is our view that the ruling party used its incumbency to exploit 
State resources for the benefit of its electoral campaign. This was 
compounded by the government's near monopoly of the broadcast 
media."164 
The rhetoric in Tsvangirai's speech solicited for sympathy from the people 
of Zimbabwe and the international community. Indirectly, Tsvangirai's rhetoric 
appealed for action to be taken on Mugabe whom he said had been illegitimately 
declared the victor of the presidential election. The arguments provided in this 
164 Commonwealth, UN blast election as not free and fair, The Daily News March 15, 2002. 
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study do to large extent support Tsvangirai's stance that the results of the election 
were illegitimate. 
On the other hand, Mugabe hailed the election results as a victory over 
imperialism. His argument was that Britain and its allies had wanted their puppet, 
Tsvangirai, to win the election so that their interests, especially the land, would be 
safeguarded. Like in almost all of his campaign speeches, he strongly made it 
clear that it was his land reform programme that had caused the standoff between 
Zimbabwe and Britain and its allies. 
In answering the question which is the heading of this chapter, from a 
rhetorical point of view, the 2002 presidential election was not free and fair. We 
cannot talk of a democratic process having taken place in a campaign period in 
which there was no freedom of expression in the opposition camp. We cannot talk 
of a democratic process in an environment where there was a general breakdown 
of the rule of law and a repression of dissenting voices. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SYNOPSIS OF DISCUSSIONS 
This study sets out to analyse the rhetorical strategies that Mugabe and 
Tsvangirai and their parties used to persuade the voters to vote for them in the 
fiercely contested 2002 presidential election. The running hypothesis has been: 
" ... the business of politics is to convince others, and to this end rhetoric is 
called."165 
The two candidates entered the race knowing that it was a do-or-die 
election considering that ZANU (PF) and the MDC had almost come out neck and 
neck in the 2000 parliamentary election, despite the allegations of massive rigging 
by the government. Worse still for Mugabe, he had suffered a stunning defeat 
when the government sponsored referendum on the change of the constitution had 
lost before the 2000 election in February the same year. Since every signpost 
indicated a clean win for Tsvangirai in the presidential election, it was imperative 
for Mugabe and his party to mount the strongest and dirtiest campaign ever to 
stop the winds of change in order for Mugabe to retain the presidency. Similarly, 
Tsvangirai and the MDC needed to vigorously campaign in order to maintain the 
successes they had scored and to keep the spirit of change burning in the hearts of 
the voters until they completed the change by winning the presidency. Thus the 
election campaign period was dramaturgical with Mugabe and Tsvangirai as the 
165Philippe-Joseph Salazar, The Joint Sitting of Parliament, 15 April 2003. A Rhetorical View of the 
Reparations Debate in E . Doxtader.and C.Vicencio. (eds.) (2004) To Repair the Irreparable: Reparation 
and Reconstruction in South Africa, p.45 
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main characters and the voters as the audience who had to be persuaded to support 
either of the two actors. 
Consistently throughout his campaign, Mugabe attacked Tsavangirai as a 
puppet of Britain and its allies. Having embarked on a chaotic land reform 
programme that benefited the black voters, Mugabe's campaign rhetoric had 
impact on the people, as the programme was practical. The land reform 
programme was not "mere rhetoric or empty content" (Mral 2005), but a reality to 
the people, a dream come true to the land hungry black people. So when Mugabe 
told people that Tsvangirai wanted to return the land back to the white farmers 
after winning the election, this had a negative impact on Tsvangirai's image as a 
suitable presidential candidate. Tsvangirai was presented as a presidential 
candidate who wanted to further the interests of the minority white people in 
Zimbabwe, a leader who did not care about his fellow black people who had been 
oppressed by the same white people before independence. The fact that the white 
people in Zimbabwe openly supported Tsvangirai and the MDC gave credit to 
Mugabe's thesis that Tsvangirai was a puppet of Britain and the whites in 
Zimbabwe. 
Tsvangirai was therefore branded a sell-out, a "Judas Iscariot", who even 
had plotted to assassinate Mugabe before the presidential election. He was 
presented as a murderer and the MDC as a terrorist organization. The 
documentary "Killing Mugabe-The Tsvangirai Conspiracy" was used by 
Mugabe's propaganda machinery to prove to the electorate that Tsvangirai was a 
terrorist. Mugabe advanced the terrorism theory in his funeral speech at the burial 
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of ZANU (PF) war veteran leader Nkala who had been kidnapped from his home 
and murdered. As it turned out later, the MDC supporters who had been arrested 
were found to have nothing to do with the murder of Nkala, but the damage had 
already been done on the reputation ofthe party. The MDC was directly attacked 
in Mugabe's rhetoric as a terrorist organization. Mugabe insinuated in his 
speeches that the people and the country were in danger of the MDC terrorists and 
that they needed to vote him into power in order not to lose their country. 
Mugabe's funeral speeches have been described as funeral diplomacy in 
which he extolled the values and characters of the dead in order to appeal to the 
pathos of the voters. The rhetoric in these speeches brought back the memories of 
the suffering of the black people during the colonial regimes. Using collective 
memory and nostalgia as rhetorical tools, and himself as the chief interpreter of 
past events, it can reasonably be argued that Mugabe chose those events that gave 
his party and him a sense of heroism in the liberation struggle. This had the 
impact of presenting himself and ZANU (PF) in a positive manner to the voters. 
Mugabe presented himself as the liberator of the country and as the defender of 
the sovereignty of the country. The maxim "Zimbabwe will never be a colony 
again" encapsulates Mugabe's sovereignty rhetoric. 
He also presented himself throughout his campaign rallies as a champion 
ofthe black majority as he had taken the land from the white minority and given it 
back to its rightful owners. The war veterans of the liberation and the militias 
were used to bolster Mugabe's land and patriotism rhetoric and in most cases their 
activities went into excesses. 
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While it has been generally acknowledged that most of the prime land in 
Zimbabwe had been in the hands of the minority white people, and that there was 
definitely need to redress the situation in favour of the black majority, the 
methods used by Mugabe's government in doing so have been heavily criticized. 
But Mugabe maintained that he was at war with Britain which he accused of 
sponsoring the MDC to effect a regime change in Zimbabwe. War has far 
reaching consequences and mentioning that the country was at war again gave the 
nation a sense of insecurity. People look to strong leaders who make decisive 
decisions in times of war. Voters might have been influenced by the war rhetoric 
to vote for Mugabe thinking that voting him into power would prevent Britain 
from taking over the country through Tsvangirai. Many people who were 
interviewed in my rural home area said they actually voted for Mugabe because 
they did not want Britain to recolonise them. This is why Mugabe described his 
winning the election as a triumph over imperialism. Mugabe so eloquently 
enunciated his recurring rhetorical themes of land reform, neo-colonialism and 
war against Britain and terrorism that most people, especially in the rural areas, 
believed that surely he was the only one who could defend them from impending 
danger. Talking about war, the horrors of the war of liberation were still fresh in 
the minds of the voters, especially the elderly ones. Instinctively, and quite 
reasonably so, they would not want a repeat of war like the one that had ravaged 
them and the country in the mid to late 1970s. 
Tsvangirai and the MDC's campaign rhetoric centred on Mugabe's age, 
political violence, the land issue, the mismanagement of the economy, corruption, 
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inflation and the general suffering of the voters. The MDC's campaign adverts 
appealed to the voters to vote for new ideas instead of old thinking, arguing that 
voting for someone who was 78 years old was unwise. Tsvangirai said the country 
was in mess because ofMugabe. Mugabe's government had crippled the economy 
and the country had been isolated internationally because of Mugabe's bad 
policies. He accused Mugabe and his government of the high levels of 
unemployment. 
He also attacked Mugabe and ZANU (PF) for unleashing the militias on 
the people. The politically motivated violence had left more that 100 of the MDC 
supporters dead, killed in cold blood by ZANU (PF) supporters. The situation was 
so bad that Tsvangirai could not hold campaign rallies in areas that had been 
declared no-go areas by ZANU (PF) militias and supporters who went about 
beating and torturing supporters of the MDC. 
On the land question Tsvangirai said he was never against people being 
given the land, but said this had to be done according to the law and in an orderly 
fashion so as not to cripple production. He was against the idea of people taking 
the law into their hands and just "sprout everywhere like mushrooms". 
Tsvangirai's argument was that the way Mugabe had handled the land reform 
programme was wrong as it assumed that everyone was a good farmer. His fears 
have been proven true in recent years as production from the farms that were 
given to the so-called new farmers has failed to meet the demands of the nation. 
Most of these 'farmers' have neither the means nor the equipment to use in 
making those farms productive. As I write this thesis tracts of lands that used to 
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be green with summer and winter crops are lying ideal because the white farmers 
who used to use the land productively were chased from those farms. However, 
the MDC did not seem to have a clear land reform policy that would be as 
attractive to the people as the ZANU (PF)' s. Tsvangirai was often at task to 
clearly state his party's land policy amidst reports that one of his officials 
appeared on BBC saying if the MDC won the election, the land that had been 
taken from the white people would be given back to them. It has been amply 
demonstrated in this study that Tsvangirai's recurring theme throughout the 





The analysis of the political discourse in the 2002 presidential election 
campaign in Zimbabwe has shown that rhetoric was an indispensable tool that 
both Mugabe and Tsvangirai used in order to persuade the electorate to vote for 
them. The importance that both candidates and their parties placed on this election 
resulted in the serious polarisation of the electorate on party lines. The linguistic 
attires the presidential candidates dressed themselves in were meant to convince 
the voters about their suitability for their candidatures to the presidency. 
Mugabe's campaign rhetoric focused on attacking Tsvangirai as a puppet 
of Britain, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair for what Mugabe called meddling 
in the political affairs of his country and the white minority in Zimbabwe for 
openly supporting the MDC. At one point at a summit is South Africa, Mugabe 
told Blair in the face he should keep his Britain while he kept his Zimbabwe. 
Mugabe's propaganda machinery painted a picture that the MDC was a 
terrorist organisation bent on destabilising the country. It has also been shown that 
Mugabe's rhetoric painted a picture that he was at war with Britain over the land 
controversial reform programme. The land rhetoric appealed to the landless black 
people who saw a chance of empowering themselves by supporting Mugabe and 
get a piece of land free of charge. By saying that he was at war with Britain and 
by branding Tsvangirai as a murderer in his rhetoric Mugabe aimed to instil fear 
and confusion in the voters and to portray himself as the only leader who would 
154 
defend them and the country. His emotive appeal for patriotism and the 
safeguarding of the country's sovereignty made him a hero. Mugabe bolstered this 
by recounting the role liberation war heroes had played in the liberation struggle. 
The war rhetoric therefore appealed to the rural people and Mugabe appeared the 
leader who could deliver them from such a situation, just as he had done in 1980. 
In short, Mugabe's rhetoric presented Tsvangirai as a villain to the electorate. In 
contrast Mugabe presented himself as a hero of the people and a defender of their 
rights, especially their right to land, their "birthright". 
On the other hand, Tsvangirai rode on the wave of the need for change and 
democracy in his campaign. People needed a change of government generally 
after having been disappointed by ZANU (PF) government for 22 years. The 
people had partially "tasted" the change in the referendum and the parliamentary 
elections of 2000. Tsvangirai attacked Mugabe's policies and held him and his 
government responsible for the suffering the people were experiencing. His 
rhetoric of change of government through the ballot box was so persuasive that, 
had there been fair play, Tsvangirai could have won the presidential election by a 
wide margin. It is generally believed Tsvangirai won the election, but the electoral 
process was heavily manipulated to give advantage to Mugabe. This thesis is 
supported by the fact that hundreds of thousands of voters were disenfranchised in 
major towns and cities, the strongholds of MDC by reducing the number of 
polling stations in these areas and increasing polling stations in the rural areas 
where ZANU (PF) has its strongest following. Also Tsvangirai and his party 
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officials could not campaign in the rural areas and other towns because of ZANU 
(PF) militants who declared the areas no-go areas for the MDC. 
This study concludes that the conditions for a free and fair electioneering 
were non-existent; hence the election itself was not free and fair. The violent 
campaign against supporters and officials of the MDC during the campaign period 
is another factor that makes this study conclude that the electoral process was in 
favour of the incumbent President. Voters were therefore not free to express their 
electoral choices for fear of victimization by the ruling party which had all the 
state machinery at its disposal. Tsvangirai's public sphere and that of his officials 
and supporters kept on shrinking as the ruling party used state apparatus to curtail 
the free expression of opinions as far as the election was concerned. Mugabe's use 
of rhetorical dictatorship impinged on the individual rights of assembly and 
freedom of speech of the supporters and would-be supporters of the MDC. 
Mugabe's rhetoric fanned intolerance and coercion. On the contrary Tsvangirai's 
rhetoric espoused pluralism and with it democracy, freedom of expression, respect 
for human rights, social justice, sound economic policies, peace and equality for 
all Zimbabweans. It can also be concluded that Mugabe's rhetoric largely echoed 
the old politics ofthe war of liberation while Tsvangirai's rhetoric epitomised the 




Three elections have been held in Zimbabwe over a period of five years 
and these elections have had their controversies. If one was writing a movie script 
on these elections, one might have simply used these titles: Election Zimbabwe 
2000: Part 1, Election Zimbabwe 2002: Part 2 and Election Zimbabwe 2005: Part 
3. The scriptwriter would be justified to add either the word 'circus' or 'farce' in 
the titles as they elections were a mockery of the principles and practice of 
democracy. 
Although the aim of this study was to concentrate only on the rhetoric of 
the 2002 presidential election campaign, it necessary to make brief remarks on the 
rhetoric of the 2005 parliamentary election campaign in Zimbabwe. The rhetoric 
that ZANU (PF) and the MDC used throughout the campaign period was 
characteristic of that of the 2002 presidential election campaign. ZANU (PF) 
dubbed the 2005 parliamentary election an "Anti-Blair Election" while the MDC 
still had hope of changing the government with "A New Zimbabwe - A New 
Beginning " campaign theme. It was not surprising therefore that both ZANU 
(PF) and the MDC were revitalizing and invigorating their campaign themes of 
2002, with some adjustments here and there of course. While ZANU (PF) rhetoric 
emphasized the alleged political interference from Britain and the United States of 
America in Zimbabwe's politics and the 'success' ofthe land reform programme, 
the MDC's rallying call was still on change and good governance, with specific 
policies and issues as discussed in previous chapters. 
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The rhetorical situation of the 2005 parliamentary election was slightly 
different from that of the 2002 presidential election as it allowed the opposition 
MDC some reasonable public sphere. This was because the Zimbabwean 
government was forced to abide by the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. 
Unlike in the previous elections, for example, the MDC got access to the state-
controlled media although its leaders complained that this was not adequate, an 
observation made in the preliminary statement of the SADC Observer Mission 
(SOEM) led by South Africa's Deputy President (then an MP), Phumuzile 
Mlambo-Ngcuka. It can be said that the government allowed cosmetic changes so 
that it would appear as if it was complying with the SADC Principles and 
Guidelines for Democratic Elections. 
In addition to the "Anti-Blair Election" rhetoric, ZANU (PF) introduced 
another issue that was very appealing to women voters - that of introducing a 
woman Vice President in the name of former liberation struggle fighter, Joyce 
Teurai Ropa Mujuru. Mujuru, herself an eloquent speaker, gave ZANU (PF) a 
refreshing outlook to the voters who had been overdosed with the ideas ofthe old 
guard. Thus gender rhetoric spread throughout the country with some people 
commenting, regai vakadzi vambotongawo (Let women also rule the country). It 
is not an understatement to say that the elevation of Mujuru to the Presidium in 
December 2004 earned ZANU (PF) votes in this election. This was despite the 
divisions Mujuru's appointment caused within ZANU (PF) itself. 
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Another observation is that although the level of political violence in the 
2005 election campaign dropped significantly as compared with the violence in 
the 2000 and 2002 elections, the electoral process did not guarantee a free and fair 
election. The implementation of a democratic process was again abortive as there 
were still many fundamentals of democracy that were not upheld. ZANU (PF) 
won 78 seats, the MDC 41 seats and one seat went to an independent, Professor 
Jonathan Moyo who had fallen from grace from ZANU (PF). ZANU (PF) hailed 
these results, but the MDC cried foul again, pointing out the massive electoral 
fraud by the government. The MDC and the progressive world accused the 
government of using food as a political tool, inflating the voters roll, manipulating 
the actual counting of votes and of not generally complying with the SADC 
Guidelines. There had also been some gerrymandering of constituencies that had 
given ZANU (PF) unfair advantage over the MDC. 
In conclusion, although the campaign themes of both ZANU (PF) and the 
MDC of the three elections remained more or less the same in the 2005 election 
as they were in previous elections, there is need to study the recent campaign in 
depth. Such a research would concentrate more on gender rhetoric, an element 
which was not the main focus of this study. There is a lot of interesting material 
on gender rhetoric in Zimbabwe's political discourse that can be exploited by 
scholars in rhetoric. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SPEECH 1: ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT R. G. 
MUGABE ON THE OCCASION OF THE BURIAL OF THE LATE CDE 
BORDER GEZI: NATIONAL HEROES' ACRE- 2 MAY 2001 
Vice Presidents Simon V. Muzenda and Joseph Musika 
Amai Muzenda and Amai Msika; 
Speaker of Parliament, Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa; 
Acting Chief Judge, Justice Godfery Chidyausiku; 
Honourable Ministers; 
Honourable Members of Parliament here present; 
Our Respectable Chiefs; 
Excellencies Members of the Diplomatic Corps; 
The Bereaved Gezi Family; 
Representatives of the Johanne Masowe Apostolic Movement; 
Zanu (PF) Party leadership here present; 
Government officials; 
Ladies and Gentlemen; 
Comrades and Friends. 
When after our general election in June last year [2000], I set about 
composing my Government through ministerial appointments, I did not have to 
look very far for my new Minister of Youth Development, Gender and 
Employment Creation. I very easily settled on a burly and bearded young man 
from Mashonaland Central, a young man whose drive and commitment I had 
followed with keen interest as he worked alongside his colleagues in the Province 
to bring about political vibrancy, unity and national development. He had served 
as a councillor for Mvurwi where he had come face to face with white racial 
obduracy, as he tried to embrace rural areas neglected by successive colonial 
governments in spite of the fact that this is where the majority of the people lived. 
He had served as Member of Parliament for Centenary, Muzarabani and lately 
Bindura, and had risen to become the Governor and Resident Minister of 
Mashonaland Central Province. 
At national level in Parliament, he had been appointed Chief Whip and 
had served on various Standing Committees of the august House. When we 
embarked on an accelerated land reform programme, he had proved dependable 
and critical to its implementation. Often, he would get overcome with emotion 
and castigate Ministers he saw as developing cold feet over the land issue. For 
him this was a fundamental question which had to be resolved once and for all, in 
order to give content to our hard-won Independence. 
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It is with extreme grief and sadness that I rise this dark day to announce 
that this young man, ever energetic and dynamic cadre, affectionately known as 
Madzibaba, is no longer with us, having been cut down in a tragic accident last 
Saturday morning, while on his way to Masvingo on a national assignment. This 
is a harrowing moment for me personally and for most Zimbabweans who today 
mourn the loss of one so committed, a true revolutionary, a real man of the 
people, indeed a genuine hero of our land-based Third Chimurenga. 
Cde Border Gezi set out early Saturday morning from Bindura to catch a 
fixture in Masvingo where he was scheduled to disburse $1 ,6m to a number of 
deserving beneficiaries of the self-help projects in that Province. This would have 
been another of the numerous trips which in sum, had taken him to every comer 
of the country; had brought him in close contact with the flotsam and jetsam of 
our society, and had kindled so much hope and self-belief in hitherto depressed 
communities as they struggled to overcome unemployment through community-
based self-help initiatives. Not surprisingly, Mucheke Hall, his scheduled 
rendezvous with this stratum of our society, was abuzz with excitement, full of 
anticipation, knowing that hope was surely coming their way that very morning in 
the person of their beloved Minister, Cde Border Gezi. 
Sadly, as fate would have it, he would not make it to Mucheke. He would 
not meet, in fact never meet again, at least on this side of earth, with those he 
hoped to help and who eagerly awaited his arrival. Some of these we have with us 
here and the grief fills their hearts, overcomes their tongues. They are devastated, 
and haplessly do no more than watch the coffin encasing Cde Border in 
permanent stillness. That bundle of energy and dynamism, that booming voice, 
has now been stilled and silenced by the hand of a cruel, ineluctable fate. 
Some 200km along the Harare - Masvingo road, near Mvuma, his vehicle 
went into that dramatic accident the details of which have been provided by the 
police. He and his driver were the victims, but fortunately his aide was the 
survivor. 
Why should fate reserve so cruel a destiny for so young and promising a 
figure? He was only 37, the only surviving child, father of six, and in the tenth 
month as Minister of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation. He was full of 
ideas, most of them at various stages of implementation, ideas set to change our 
countryside, and with it, the lives of many of our rural people currently faced with 
acute unemployment. All that is now a dream which only partially came true. 
We have lost a great life lived simply; a life and figure of vigour and 
compelling affection. Hailing from a very humble background and averagely 
educated, he represented a generation of rural youths, born in the early sixties 
under conditions of settler colonialism; a generation that grew up exposed to a 
brutal conflict inflicted on the black majority of this country by white settlers. 
Guruve, where Cde Border Gezi was born the only child survivor in his family, in 
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many ways typified the objective conditions for communal Africans under settler 
colonialism. Situated in the Muzarabani area, on the margins of what then was 
called Rhodesia, Guruve was thought cursed by the gods, given its very harsh 
climate and a landscape which offered no readily known riches or attractions to 
settlers. It fell outside the attractive wealthy heartland; outside the settler scheme 
of things, and only periodically remembered by successive native commissioners 
on tax collection chores. Occasionally and alongside Binga and Gokwe, it would 
present itself as dumping ground for Rhodesia's black supernumeraries who 
would have been forcibly uprooted from heartland areas and displaced to make 
way for privileged white farmers, many of them veterans of European wars 
coming here to be pensioned off with our land. Like most marginal areas, Guruve 
had no real roads, very few poor schools, very few clinics, no safe water points 
and was yearly afflicted by all sorts of maladies, including malaria, typhoid and 
dysentery. The African families and their cattle stood between the tsetse fly and 
European farmer. The sun scorched and the rains were erratic, making harvests 
both meagre and uncertain. Survival for our people, Cde Gezi's family included, 
was from hand to mouth. 
Ironically, it was in the backwaters like Guruve where nothing was 
supposed to happen, that the great germ of the struggle for liberation took deep 
root, sprouted and matured. Their contiguity to independent African states like 
Mozambique and Zambia, coupled with swelling community bitterness to colonial 
neglect, made places like Guruve the bedrock of militant politics which were later 
to transform into armed insurrection against settler colonialism. These 
marginalized places along our border with Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana 
gave us the first generation of fighters of the armed liberation struggle, a militant 
youth movement and loyal peasant families on whose strength, support and 
commitment settler colonialism would be defeated. 
To understand and to pay tribute to the late departed is to recognize the 
social situation that yielded a personality of his calibre and courage. Cde Gezi 
emerged from such an environment which threw him into the fray and cauldron of 
the struggle. By 1977, at the tender age of 13, he was already in struggle 
distinguishing himself as a loyal and dependable militant, a mujiba amongst 
mujibas and chimbwidos. 
His spiritual calling also prompted him to become a youthful member of 
the Johanne Masowe Apostolic Sect. Many of his fellow worshippers are with us 
today to bid him farewell. To them I say: We fail to comprehend the tragedy 
before us; our eyes are full of tears, our hearts grieve and weigh heavy; we know 
no sigh, we know no relief. We join you in deep sorrow for you have lost one of 
your own, one so dear. On our part, we have lost a leader you raised, and so 
generously gave and offered to us in the political leadership. We readily 
welcomed him, seeing in his youthful age and tremendous personality enormous 
energies and qualities to propel our revolution through many years of leadership 
ahead which his youthful life promised. We certainly hoped to work with him 
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much longer, and never at any moment were we prepared for the nightmare we 
endure today. But God's will has had it otherwise. 
I have already alluded to the fact that Mashonaland Central was among 
those of our provinces with very depressed areas. It faced many developmental 
challenges at Independence, made worse by its leading role in the liberation 
struggle which left it scarred by the war. When in 1996 I decided to appoint Cde 
Gezi as Governor and Resident Minister of Mashonaland Central, I looked to a 
quick tum-around of the development of the Province. I indeed soon felt 
vindicated for in a matter of months, the wheels of development turned fast, 
pushed by a united Province now focused on agreed targets of development. This 
was no mean achievement for a province which only a few years back had been 
riven by serious dissention as its leadership wrangled. Gezi was a bridge-builder 
and promoter of unity on the strength ofwhich he mobilized for development. 
He used his elevation to the Central Committee at the 1989 People's 
Congress, his subsequent election to Parliament as MP for Centenary in the 1990 
general election, and his elevation to the Provincial Chairman of the Party, to 
deepen the roots of unity in order to bring about broad based development in the 
Province. Often, he would cover enormous distances on foot or on bicycle in a bid 
to serve the people who had elected him. He made sure civil servants he 
coordinated at the provincial level gave a day's honest work. A new breed of a 
hardworking and grassroots-based politician had arrived and the politics of the 
country would never be the same again. He steeped his politics and leadership in 
self-help projects through community action and empowerment, politics that 
made membership to the Party synonymous with gainful self-employment and 
participatory development. Significantly, Cde Gezi has lost his life trying to 
further such an initiative on a national basis! 
Perhaps the one area in which Cde Gezi showed the most courageous 
leadership was our land reform programme. Often, we were hard put to restrain 
him in Central Committee meetings as he accused some members of equivocating 
on agrarian reforms. For instance, he could not understand certain delisting 
decisions taken by lead ministries in the face of rampant landlessness. White 
commercial farmers, he would charge, were compromising ministers and civil 
servants. Indeed, he was the man most appropriate to make such a charge, having 
himself been unsuccessfully tempted with a tractor by a white commercial farmer 
who hoped such a "gift' would save his farm. 
His wish was to see the land reform programme through the middle of this 
year. We dare not fail him. Our temporarily resettled people are close to finishing 
this year's harvest and our machinery should speedily move in to put them on 
newly opened permanent resettlement areas so that they can start preparations for 
the next season immediately. Let all those who have taken it upon themselves to 
oppose our land reform programmes do their worst, led by the Labour 
Government of Britain. Have no goodwill to expect from them. But let them 
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please leave us alone! Neither our history nor that of any colonized people 
provides any salutary lessons from imperialism. We have come this far in our 
struggle for freedom, independence and sovereignty not by permission or 
generosity of colonialism, but through agony, blood and sacrifice. 
Let those who think a job in the whiteman's factory is worth the price of 
the landlessness of the vast majority of our people please, think again! Let those 
who think the British penny is worthier than our sovereignty, think again! This 
country is not for selling and traitors are bound to fail and perish as the people's 
will inevitably triumph (sic). Cde Border Gezi knew this perfectly well and, 
wherever he is, he urges and exhorts us on. 
To Cde Gezi I say: You have done your part; you have fought for your 
struggle; staunchly defending your right and heritage. The people's needs and 
interests were always uppermost in your mind. May we all take a cue from you. 
Rest in perfect peace Comrade, for your cause has not been in vain. 
Land to the People! 
Power to the People! 
Long live free and independent sovereign Zimbabwe! 
Aluta Continua. 
I thank you. 
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APPENDIX2 
SPEECH 2: ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT R. G. 
MUGABE ON THE OCCASION OF THE BURIAL OF THE LATE CDE 
MOYEN ENOCK MAHACHI NATIONAL: HEROES' ACRE- 29 MAY 
2001 
Vice Presidents Simon V. Muzenda and Joseph Msika, 
Amai Muzenda and Amai Msika 
Speaker of Parliament. Cde Emmerson Munangagwa, 
Acting Chief Judge, Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku, 
Honourable Ministers, 
Honourable Members of Parliament here present, 
Our respectable Chiefs, 
Excellencies Members of the Diplomatic Corps, 
Members of the Mahachi family, 
ZANU (PF) Party Leadership here present, 
War Veterans, 
Government officials, Ladies and friends. 
Barely a month after we congregated here to lay to rest Cde Border Gezi, 
we meet again under similarly sad and heart-rending circumstances to bid 
farewell to yet another gallant and illustrious son of Zimbabwe, Moven Enock 
Mahachi. As we all now know, three days ago, Cde Mahachi died on his way to 
hospital after a road traffic accident in Nyanga. It was at the tender age of 16 that 
Cde Mahachi first showed a readiness and an ability to be in the service of his 
people. Starting at Cold Comfort Farm where, together with Cde Didymus 
Mutasa, he preached and practiced the ideals of self-reliance and unity of purpose 
through co-operative farming, Cde Mahachi was over the years to prove his 
mettle as a selfless, dedicated and unwavering cadre. At Cold Comfort Farm, 
where he rose to the position of vice chairman, he came into contact with the 
beginnings of the desire by blacks to reassert themselves, in seeking their political 
rights and resisting their economic disempowerment. In many ways, therefore, 
Cold Comfort Farm became synonymous with the embryonic but unstoppable 
yearning to fight the colonial exploitative stereotype that saw blacks as purely 
'hewers of wood and drawers of water'. 
In the 1970s, and with the experience of the power of united action, Cde 
Mahachi found himself at the helm ofthe Nyafaro Development Company, which 
fought against the forced removal of the Tangwena people from the land of their 
birth to the rocky and barren areas. Together with the late ChiefRekayi Tangwena 
and Cde Didymus Mutasa, Moven became the new frontier of resisting the callous 
and barbaric nature of colonialism. Although the Tangwena people were 
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eventually overcome and violently removed from the Gaeresi Ranch, the land of 
their forefathers, the spirit of their resistance and the strength and sincerity of their 
cause was to prove inspirational to the entire liberation struggle. Indeed, it was the 
flame and anvil which shaped and gave courage to many other young cadres who 
were leaving the country for the liberation struggle. 
Fired up by the increasingly brutal character of the Smith regime, Cde 
Mahachi together with Chief Tangwena became trusted couriers and bridges for 
many young cadres who had decided to cross into Mozambique, take up arms and 
pay the ultimate price for the liberation of their land. For Cde Mahachi, then as 
now, the fight for the land, our dear land, was the most consuming. There could 
be no greater sacrifice. Indeed, it was through Mahachi's and Tangwena's brave 
and courageous support that I and Edgar Tekere were assisted in crossing into 
Mozambique in April 1975, after the Zanu Central Committee had decided that I 
should go and lead the liberation struggle, following the sad death of Cde Herbert 
Chitepo. 
Later in the same year, 1975, Cde Mahachi was to meet the full-blooded 
wrath of the Smith regime, which sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment for 
assisting in the recruitment of the freedom fighters. His release in 1979 came at 
the dawn of a new Zimbabwe. The release enabled him to attend the Lancaster 
House Constitutional Conference. A few months later, he was to shed, together 
with many of us, tears of joy at the birth ofthe new Zimbabwe. 
In June last year, Government began to fulfil its longstanding promises on 
the land through the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme which has, so far, 
delivered close to 3 million hectares of land back to its rightful owners. The 
programme has succeeded in the face of innumerable and often hostile obstacles, 
personified in the main by unwarranted British sponsored campaign. Cde 
Mahachi was heartened by the resoluteness shown by the Party and Government 
in addressing this longstanding colonial problem. Sadly, he has not been able to 
see the conclusion of his exercise, which we all know was so dear to his heart. 
Often times, when others prevaricated and seemed unsure of the meaning 
of our land reform programme, Cde Mahachi was one you could rely upon to 
revive the spirits of the doubting Thomases. He spoke passionately, eloquently 
and relentlessly about the land reform programme that would prove, once and for 
all, to the whole world, the capacity of black Zimbabweans to make full 
productive use of their land. 
At the Party level, Cde Mahachi was a conscientious, trusted and sincere 
worker. He served the Party loyally in a number of portfolios including, more 
notable as Secretary for the Commissariat and most recently as Secretary for 
Transport and Welfare. It was during his tenure as the National Commissar that 
the Party became seized with the restructuring exercise meant to enable ZANU 
(PF) to respond more vigorously to present-day challenges. In his new role, he 
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had begun to organize the Party's transport system in preparation for work leading 
up to the presidential election. Nothing could illustrate his being close to the 
people better than his successive re-election as Member of Parliament. It is 
instructive that he met his fate when he was coming from a provincial co-
ordinating meeting in Mutare. Because of his exceptional qualities, I was able to 
appoint him to various ministerial positions over the twenty-one years of our 
Independence, and in every case he served with diligence and distinction. 
In his last assignment as Minister of Defence, Cde Mahachi was able also 
to make a mark on the international front through his gallant work in our fight for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
following its invasion by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Under his guidance, the 
Zimbabwe Defence Forces, in combination with Allied Forces, successfully 
resisted the aggression visited upon the Congo and thus gallantly upheld the 
dignity of that country as a sovereign nation. Together with his counterparts in 
Namibia, Angola and the DRC he was instrumental in the realization and 
implementation of the Lusaka Peace Agreement. Over the last two years he also 
witnessed the duplicity of the international world, which has sought to demonise 
Zimbabwe and her soldiers for upholding internationally recognized principles in 
defence of the Congo, while condoning acts of aggression, genocide and gross 
looting of the Congolese resources by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. 
With Moven's sad departure, ZANU (PF) has lost a very constant guiding 
and stabilizing hand; while in Government we shall miss his honesty, his reasoned 
contributions to debates and his great commitment to his country. Many times 
over, we shall also certainly miss that hearty, almost shrill, but jovial laughter. 
The full impact of our loss is perhaps underlined by the sad fact that none of us 
can ever be Comrade Moven Enock Mahachi. While we vainly try to come to 
terms with this tragic and enervating loss, our spirits can at least find solace and 
comfort in the happy knowledge that we were able to serve with one so tried and 
tested, a truly rare revolutionary nationalist right up to the end. 
To his family, to the many people gathered here today and many others in 
various parts of our country, I wish, once again, to express heartfelt condolences 
over this cruel and irreparable loss that even time cannot heal. 
Moven, it is with a heavy heart that we now say to you go well son of the 
soil; go well gallant fighter. 
Famba zvakanaka gamba redu. 
Hamba Kahle qhawe lethu! 
I thank you. 
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APPENDIX3 
SPEECH 3: ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT R. G. 
MUGABE ON THE OCCASION OF THE BURIAL OF THE LATE CDE 
CHENJERAI HUNZVI: NATIONAL HEROES' ACRE- 8 JUNE 2001 
Vice Presidents, Simon Muzenda and Joseph Msika 
Amai Muzenda and Amai Msika, 
Speaker of Parliament, Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa, 
Acting Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku' 
Honourable Ministers, 
Honourable Members of Parliament here present 
Our respectable Chiefs, 
Excellencies Members of the Diplomatic Corps, 
The Bereaved Hunzvi Family, 
ZANU (PF) Party Leadership here present, 
Government officials 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
Comrades and Friends. 
Barely a week ago, we gathered in heart rending circumstances to bid 
farewell to our dear departed Comrade Moven Mahachi. Four weeks before then, 
the cruel hand of fate had brought us here to pay our last respects to another 
gallant son of Zimbabwe, Cde Border Gezi. Today we are once again congregated 
in equally sad circumstances to bid farewell to yet another Son of the Soil, Cde 
Chenjerai Hunzvi, who died on Monday this week at Parirenyatwa Hospital of 
malaria. 
Fate has been most unkind to us, hitting us where it hurts the most at the 
time when our land-based Third Chimurenga is at its most critical historical 
juncture. And yet these harsh reversals should never deter us but should, instead, 
propel us to fight even harder to intensify the campaign and ensure that the 
sacrifices of our fallen heroes are not in vain. These heroes lived a life dedicated 
to ensuring that Zimbabweans regain their ownership of their land as an 
undisputed matter of social justice. They died in the middle of the Third 
Chimurenga, which we must see to the victorious finish. Our greatest tribute to 
them and many others who died before them some of who lie here and many 
others who lie in unmarked graves within and outside our borders, would be to 
give land back to the people of Zimbabwe. 
We are today bidding farewell to Chenjerai Hunzvi, a man who spent his 
entire life fighting to ensure that the people of Zimbabwe regain their political and 
economic birth rights. 
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At an early age of 19 years, Cde Hunzvi experienced the racist brutality of 
the Smith regime when he was arrested in October 1965, just before the illegal 
unilateral declaration of independence, for leading demonstrations against then 
British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, during his visit to Rhodesia. 
Wilson had come to Rhodesia ostensibly to give political pressure on Ian 
Smith not to declare UDI. A group of nationalist leaders, including myself and the 
late Vice president Cde Nkomo were police-led from detention camps to meet this 
man, who had been projected as one so interested in our cause for equal rights and 
so as one who was to tell Smith that if he proceeded to declare UDI, his regime 
would encounter the wrath of the Queen's imperial might. 
We were to discover that it was a monumental charade, an ill-fated public 
relations exercise, devoid of any real care for the plight of the black majority in 
this country. Harold Wilson made it clear to us then that, as the unfolding of 
history has testified, the British people and their Government would never 
contemplate abandoning their white kith and kin in favour of the African cause. 
These statements, coming from none other than a British Labour Prime 
Minister were all that Smith and his ilk needed to hear in order to know that they 
could unilaterally declare a manifestly unconstitutional independence without fear 
of any consequences from the Queen's government. As if history is repeating 
itself, today another British Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has made it clear 
in many ways reminiscent of Harold Wilson's assurance that the Queen's 
Government will not abandon its white kith and kin whose forefathers colonized 
our country, butchered our people and stole their land. 
The young Hunzvi realised in 1965, as he did in 2000, that it would take 
None But Ourselves to liberate our country from the colonial settler regime and 
its consequences. 
Cde Hunzvi's nationalistic involvement in the liberation struggle saw him 
incarcerated, detained and restricted at various infamous holding centres around 
Zimbabwe such as Gonakudzingwa, Wha Wha, Enkeldorn Police Station and 
Salisbury Police Station. Yet the harassment by the Smith regime could not deter 
him as he rose to become ZAPU's chief representative in Poland during the 
liberation struggle. 
In post independent Zimbabwe, Cde Hunzvi could have been comfortable 
with the affluence that often goes with the professional status of medical doctors, 
but his selfless commitment and dedication to seeing Zimbabweans regain 
ownership of their land led him to toil and suffer together with fellow war 
veterans in their quest for total liberation. He fought tirelessly for the welfare of 
war veterans, ex-detainees and war collaborators in as much he did for the 
peasants and workers deserted and abandoned by an opportunistic would-be trade 
union leadership now in bed with employers. His inspiring leadership of the war 
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veterans came at a time when some people were beginning to waver, perceiving 
war veterans as objects of contempt and ridicule as they relegated the land from 
the top of national priorities. 
Following the British sponsored rejection of the democratic draft 
constitution which held the British government responsible for funding a land 
reform programme in Zimbabwe, Cde Hunzvi, without a cue from the leadership 
of the Party, ZANU (PF), or Government, courageously led war veterans and the 
landless to demonstrate on white owned commercial farms countrywide. Their 
simple message was that the ultimate purpose of the liberation struggle must be 
fulfilled and that the ownership of land must be returned to its rightful owners. 
This act of unparalleled and principled heroism saw the beginnings of the Third 
Chimurenga. 
It is this land-based Third Chimurenga that has become the target of a 
vicious British-sponsored local and international media and diplomatic campaign 
that seeks to preserve the immoral and inequitable land system in Zimbabwe 
where a mere one percent of the population owns over 70 percent of the best land 
in the country. Worse still, of the land owned by the white farmers, only 30% is 
utilized with the rest lying idle or used for cosmetic purposes. Indeed, there are 
many cases of white commercial farmers boasting of little En glands in Zimbabwe 
and some having farms almost the size of Belgium. 
Instead of seeing Cde Hunzvi, war veterans and the landless majority as 
victims of and indeed solutions to the land problem, some sections of the 
international community, led by Britain, portray them as invaders of the white 
man's land, squatters, land grabbers, marauding thugs and rapists whose only 
interest is to loot the white man's property with no regard to the rule of law. No 
wonder why the most common images on CNN, BBC, Sky TV and even SABC 
portray war veterans as axe wielding warriors ready to strike at "vulnerable God-
fearing white families living peacefully on their farms." Invariably, the white 
farmer is projected as the paragon of justice and the one responsible for the 
country's success story in agriculture and the survival of our economy. The fact 
that 80 percent of the cotton and over 70 percent of maize is produced by these 
same black farmers, is conveniently forgotten as is the fact that these black 
farmers can do more and better for the economy if given access to fertile land 
currently lying idle in the hands of an extreme selfish racial minority. 
Through various British mouthpieces, Government has been explicitly 
directed to remove the war veterans from commercial farms or consequently face 
British hostility, isolation and sanctions. We have been repeatedly informed that if 
we do not to oblige, worse things would be done as we would have failed to 
uphold the rule oflaw and preserve the sanctity of the white man's property. 
Reconciliation is now supposed to mean final acceptance, by the African, 
of the social, class and economic structures and property relations put in place by 
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illegal colonial regimes, in the most scandalous robbery in history. The hand of 
reconciliation is now understood to be the five finger hand salute of the policeman 
who stops you at the gate of the property stolen from your ancestors, and asks you 
to tum round and go back to the arid patch where the colonial predator threw our 
clan. The only variation is when the same hand becomes a slap in the face of the 
African labourer who must till his own land for the benefit of robbers from across 
the seas. 
The rule of law is presented as one that protects the minority privileges, 
which are subsidized from the expropriated African ancestral land and other 
resources. 
Law abiding Africans are those who will not challenge the immorality and 
illegality of their deprivation, but will happily retreat to their arid patch of land 
after their useful life, in the judgement of enterprising settler, expires. Our 
response to these British-sponsored machinations is very clear and unequivocal. 
We have reminded the British, not only of their failure to honour their pledge at 
the Lancaster House Conference but also ofHarold Wilson's open testimony to us 
that the British would never set their army on their Rhodesian kith and kin, a 
testimony that is now being repeated by Tony Blair as he resists the land 
acquisition and reform programme in protection of his kith and kin. Why then are 
we expected to send our own army to shoot our own people? We could not, and 
we will never, set war veterans in the army against fellow war veterans and 
landless peasants peacefully demonstrating for their usurped birth rights. 
While we have made it clear that we would not shoot our own people 
demonstrating on the farms, we nevertheless have indicated that under the fast 
track resettlement programme Government would acquire at least 5 million 
hectares on which to resettle landless Zimbabweans and we would, as we are 
doing, acquire this land in terms of our Constitution, laws and policies all of 
which are very clear, notwithstanding endless attempts to misrepresent and 
misinterpret our rule of law. War veterans on ungazzetted farms would be 
removed on to acquired farms. The Fast Track Resettlement Programme, which 
began in July last year, is now at an advanced and irreversible stage having settled 
105 000 families, on close to 3 million hectares of land. More families are set to 
be resettled before the onset of the rains. Cde Hunzvi was a pivotal player in our 
realizing these targets. 
Regrettably, his death came at a time when victory of the on going land-
based Third Chimurenga was now in sight. There can be no greater tribute and 
honour to pay him today than that to intensify the campaign which will make 
victory even more certain. His untimely departure should never be an opportunity 
for those who want to see division within the ranks of the war veterans to proceed 
with their machinations. Nor should it be an opportunity for those who want to 
intimidate our people or to render them despondent by defiling our culture and 
celebrating untimely death of our heroes. Instead, the war veterans and indeed all 
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of us, must emerge from this tragedy more united and resolute in ensuring that 
Cde Hunzvi's cause is fulfilled and that the noble values of our liberation struggle 
are upheld. 
To you Cde Hunzvi I say: You have done your part, you have fought your 
struggle and fought it gallantly; staunchly defending your birth right and your 
revolutionary heritage. The people's needs and interests were always uppermost 
in your mind. You indeed deserve the halo of a national hero. 
Go well gallant son-of-the soil! 
Famba zvakanaka Gamba redu! 
Hamba kahle qhawe lethu! 
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APPENDIX4 
SPEECH 4: ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT R. G. 
MUGABE ON THE OCCASION OF THE BURIAL OF THE LATE CDE 
CAIN NKALA: NATIONAL HEROES' ACRE- 18 NOVEMBER 2001 
Honourable Vice Presidents, Comrades Simon Muzenda and Joseph 
Msika 
Amai Muzenda and Amai Msika, 
Speaker of House, Comrade Emmerson Mnangagwa, 
Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku' 
Honourable Ministers, Members of the Nkala family, 
The Acting Chairman of the War Veterans' Association, Comrade Patrick 
Nyaruwata, 
War Veterans, Former Detainees and Restrictees, 
Members ofthe Diplomatic Corps, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
Comrades and Friends. 
We are gathered here today to pay our last respects to and bury yet another 
dedicated, consistent and patriotic son of the soil, Cde Cain Nkala, who was 
abducted, tortured and murdered by terrorists on November 5, 2001. The 
indescribable pain of losing Cain, just four days before he was to tum forty-three 
years old, is accentuated and heightened by the deplorable terrorist circumstances 
under which he met his death. 
While the commendable Police investigations are still in progress, what 
has already emerged, beyond any shadow of doubt, is that Cde Nkala's brutal 
death was not a simple criminal case of abduction and murder. Yes, he was 
kidnapped, tortured and strangled with a shoelace by MDC activists and officials. 
But there was more to it than this. 
Comrade Nkala's brutal murder was a bloody outcome of an orchestrated, 
much wider and carefully planned terrorist plot by internal and external enemy 
forces. With plenty of funding from some commercial farmers and organizations 
like the Westminster Foundation, which gets its dirty money from the British 
Labour Party, the Conservative and Liberal Parties and the Government of Tony 
Blair, these sponsored terrorist forces of destruction in the MDC are corrupting 
and ruining the youth at colleges and elsewhere by showering them with donor 
trinkets, drink and drugs in order to use them as cannon fodder in terrorist fights 
not just against ZANU (PF), but principally against the gains of our hard won 
independence and sovereignty. Make no mistake about it, the target of the MDC 
terrorists and their Rhodesian and British sponsors was, and still is, our free and 
united Zimbabwe. These are the circumstances in which Cain Nkala, Limukani 
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Lupahla, and other victims have died. It is in this special national and heroic sense 
that Cde Nkala is indeed a Martyr, a true hero of the people. 
Let it be remembered that Cde Nkala was abducted, tortured and murdered 
o~ ~ovem~er 5, 2001 by the same terrorists who, on October 29, 2001 in Lupane, 
similarly kidnapped, tortured, killed and burnt the body of Limukani Lupahla, a 
youth. me~b~r of ZANU (PF). Apart from widespread media reports of MDC 
terronst trammg camps on some commercial farms, outside our borders and even 
o~ersea~, there have been numerous and growing cases across the country of 
kidnappmg and assault of ZANU (PF) members by MDC terrorists some of 
whom want to be counted among legislators. ' 
Against this backdrop let nobody entertain the foolish notion that ZANU 
(~F) and ?overnment will brook this kind of terrorist provocation and build-up of 
vio~ence m ou~ country. The MDC perpetrators of political violence and crimes 
agamst humanity and their international sponsors should know that their days are 
numberen. ~'Je!'j\t\~~ \\~~ \\\~~~ ~~\,\\\ ~t \~~\~~ \\~\\\~ \\\ \t\\\)\\~\ ~\)~~~~ 
the MDC invokes democracy, the rule of law and human rights during the day as 
a cover for perpetrating political violence, kidnapping, torture and murder during 
the night. The time for this deceit is now up, for the MDC terrorists as the whole 
world has been given a rude awakening by the brutal circumstances surrounding 
the death of Cde Nkala. 
The ZANU (PF) Government prides itself on its endeavours to achieve 
peace, stability, and the unity of our country. We are particularly proud of the 
unity of purpose that has bound our people together and strengthened them to 
press for their economic rights. In this regard, the ZANU (PF) Government will 
not allow rebels and MDC criminal elements who have neither minds nor policies 
of their own, and who are clearly willing agents of some external forces fighting 
to ruin the gains of the people of Zimbabwe. 
After Independence, Comrade Nkala joined the Zimbabwe National Army, 
where his keen sense of national service and commitment to patriotic duty served 
him well until the time of his demobilization in 1983. Four years later, Cain was 
among the comrades who established the Bulawayo chapter of the War Veterans' 
Association. Once again, his diligence and consistency saw him rise through the 
ranks to the position of Bulawayo Provincial Chairman of the War Veterans 
Association in 1998. In all his assignments, Cain showed discipline, honesty, 
humility and a disarming revolutionary disposition. His religious instruction and 
beliefs completed the fine specimen of the patriot that he was. 
It is not surprising, therefore, to note that above everything else, Cde 
Nkala was motivated by a twin sense of duty and fairness. As Chairman of the 
Bulawayo War Veterans' Province, he played an exemplary and pivotal 
leadership role when the land demonstrations of the Third Chimurenga gathered 
momentum in the Matebelalnd North and South provinces. Cde Nkala did not 
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require persuasion to realize that the land demonstrations were a people-driven 
cry for social justice that needed urgent action from the Party and the 
Government. He clearly understood and preached the one message that ZANU 
(PF) has always preached - that the source of livelihood in Zimbabwe is the land 
and that, without it, our people are doomed to vagaries of permanent squalor and 
injustice. 
Because of the limited availability of land for resettlement around 
Bulawayo, Cain looked to Matabeleland North and South where he sought to 
ensure that the Government's successful Fast Track Land Acquisition and 
Resettlement programme assumed the appropriate level of urgency for Bulawayo 
residents. 
Further evidence of Cde Nkala' s devotion is the tremendous development 
that has taken place at the Bulawayo Provincial Heroes' Acre, the provincial War 
Veterans office and the formation of the War Veterans Widows Association for 
Bulawayo Province that he spearheaded. 
It is in recognition of this short but rich life given to national service, 
along with the circumstances of his death, that Cde Nkala has been declared a 
national hero and a true Martyr ofthe people's struggle for full sovereignty. 
It is not instructive that even as he was about to meet his fate, Cde Nkala 
could still pray for his torturers and murderers, and that even at that harrowing 
moment, he could fearlessly and heroically declare that the land question would 
find a final and just resolution, whatever the evil machinations and terrorist 
actions his abductors and tormentors were resorting to. 
As we lay Cde Nkala to rest, I wish, once again, on behalf of the 
Government, ruling Party, ZANU (PF), and in my capacity as Patron of the 
Zimbabwe National War Veterans' Association, to extend my heartfelt 
condolences to Cain's dear wife, Sikhumbuzo, his five children, the entire Nkala 
family, the War Veterans and the Youth. 
I would like to assure the Nkala family that we deeply share their sad loss 
and that we will never forget that Cain paid the ultimate price because of his total 
commitment to the realization of the Land Reform Programme and the unity of 
the people of Zimbabwe. The War Veterans and the Youth of our country must 
derive greater strength and inspiration from Cain's relentless and unyielding 
service to the country. 
I say to Cain, hamba kahle qhawe lethu! We who remain behind will carry 
on the challenge you, our Martyr, have left for us. 
I thank you. 
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APPENDIX5: 
A NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE FROM DAVID COLTART MP 
(ZIMBABWE), MDC (MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE) 
LEGAL AFFAIRS 
THE CANDIDATE 
The people being ready is one thing; having a decent candidate to vote for is 
another thing entirely. Which leads me to the coup de grace in the form of Morgan 
Tsvangirai. Whilst I have known MDC President Tsvangirai since 1992 I have only 
got to know him well since being invited by him to join the MDC in 1999. Getting to 
know him has been a sheer pleasure. He is a man of great intellect, integrity, 
courage, compassion and humour. In fact I firmly believe that in Mr. Tsvangirai we 
have a truly great leader who will become a statesman of world renown. I have 
consistently been impressed by his wisdom in tackling tricky issues and by his 
commitment to a vision of a non-racist, non-sexist, democratic Zimbabwe. 
It is hard to convey why I have so much admiration for Tsvangirai. A few 
random examples of his character may help. When our child Bethany was born in 
September Tsvangirai took time off his hectic schedule to phone me to say 
"makorokoto" (Shona for congratulations). When I was concerned in November by 
the death threats I had received a meeting with him restored my equilibrium. When 
some of our younger members went over the top in campaigning for positions last 
year in Harare, bringing the MDC into disrepute, Tsvangirai dealt with the issue 
quickly, resolutely but fairly and put the party back on track. When he was 
ambushed twice last year he remained absolutely calm and focused. He does not 
have an ounce of racist blood in veins. He is truly a great leader and Zimbabwe will 
be blessed to have him as President. 
Some sceptics may argue that my own experience is all very well but 
Tsvangirai is not known by the Zimbabwean people and we may well end up like the 
Zambians, lumped with a President very few people want. After all the people of 
Zambia were also ready for change. Over 80% of those eligible to vote turned out to 
vote in the recently held Parliamentary and presidential elections. Over 70% of those 
who voted, voted against the so-called ruling party candidate, Levy Mwanawasa. 
The will of the people was denied however because, despite all the opposition's 
claims of rigging, even on the Zambian government's own figures Mwanawasa won 
with only 28,7% of the vote. The dreaded "Kenya syndrome", namely the inability of 
the opposition to coalesce around a single candidate, did in the Zambian people. The 
"Kenya syndrome" is more likely to occur in countries where ethnicity is a major 
factor or where the opposition is unable to produce a single candidate who stands 
head and shoulders above the rest of the opposition candidates. The latter problem is 
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exacerbated when a good opposition candidate does not have the backing of a strong 
party behind him or her. 
Fortunately Zimbabwe does not suffer from any of these blights. Ethnicity 
will not be a factor in our elections as far as the MDC is concerned. The MDC team 
of President Tsvangirai and Vice President Sibanda attracts support countrywide and 
in both urban and rural settings. Ndebele people have thronged President 
Tsvangirai's meetings in Matabeleland in 2001 and Shona people have done the 
same for Vice President Sibanda in meetings held recently in, for example, Zaka in 
Masvingo. If anyone will have a problem attracting support from specific ethnic 
groups it will be Mugabe whose chickens are coming home to roost. Mugabe will 
battle to attract support in regions he has alienated such as Matabeleland, Masvingo 
and Manicaland. Indeed Mugabe was the MDC best candidate ZANU (PF) could 
have offered because he is so intensely disliked by various ethnic groups throughout 
the country. We were absolutely delighted that the ZANU (PF) Congress decided to 
stick with the soon-to-be-78 year old Mugabe. The problem for ZANU (PF) is 
compounded in Matabeleland in that his only possible Ndebele Vice President 
running mates, Msika or John Nkomo, did not even dare to contest seats in 
Matabeleland in the 2000 elections cognisant of their inability to win. Both are 
deeply unpopular in Matabeleland in stark contrast to Vice President Gibson Sibanda 
who won his seat with a majority of over 80%. 
What then of the prospect of multiple candidates from other parties as 
happened in Zambia? In the 2000 elections ZANU (PF) secured 48% ofthe vote, the 
MDC 46% and the balance went to a variety of small opposition parties, the main 
one being ZANU Ndonga which secured the only other opposition seat of Chipinge 
South. There are only three other political parties of any consequence namely, the 
UANC led by Bishop Muzorewa, ZAPU and the Liberty Party (both regional parties 
based in Bulawayo ). All three attracted minimal votes and many of their candidates 
lost their deposits in the 2000 elections. ZANU (PF) has been desperately trying to 
promote candidates from these parties and it has been intriguing to see how, for 
example, the government controlled Chronicle newspaper in Bulawayo has been 
promoting the fortunes of Paul Siwela, the Secretary General of ZAPU who appears 
to have desires to contest the Presidential election. His plans to contest were dealt a 
bit of a blow when the ZAPU Central Committee recently decided that it would not 
field a candidate in the election. Since that decision was taken the Chronicle has 
done its utmost to discredit Agrippa Madlela, the ZAPU President who, one would 
have thought, would be ZAPU's logical candidate, but who believes that ZAPU 
should not contest the election. 
The same tactic is being employed, with similar lack of success, to get 
Wilson Khumbula MP to stand as ZANU Ndonga' s Presidential candidate. 
Khumbula until recently was the President of ZANU Ndonga. He has been 
suspended from the party and there are strong indications that ZANU Ndonga will 
not want to field a candidate. So despite ZANU (PF)'s best efforts to split the 
opposition vote by assisting the campaigns of a multiplicity of opposition candidates 
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they will not succeed. If anything President Tsvangirai will pick up votes from the 
supporters of these small parties, especially from the largest of them all, ZANU 
Ndonga. In sum this will in essence be a two horse race. In any event our electoral 
laws are different to Zambia in that in Zimbabwe the winning candidate has to win a 
majority of votes cast and if a majority is not achieved in the first ballot then the two 
top candidates have to contest a second ballot against each other. So at the end of the 
day this will be a straight contest between Tsvangirai and Mugabe. 
Another important reason why the opposition vote will not be split 
sufficiently to usher Mugabe back into power by default is because in MDC 
President Tsvangirai Zimbabwe has got a charismatic candidate the opposition and 
civil society can coalesce around. Having been a highly successful Secretary General 
of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) prior to his election as 
President of the MDC, Tsvangirai has a very high and positive profile that transcends 
the ethnic, class, racial and gender divide. My personal experience of Tsvangirai is 
shared by hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans countrywide. In a word he is 
Presidential and it is not hard for Zimbabweans to conceive that he would be a good 
President. Even if other opposition candidates do stand none will have the presence 
or profile ofTsvangirai. 
But it is the backing of an effective party that is the most compelling reason 
why our election will be different to the Zambian election. The MDC since its 
formation in September 1999 has been subjected to a literal baptism of fire at the 
hands of ZANU (PF) and its surrogate police force and CIO. We have now had over 
90 of our supporters murdered by ZANU (PF) thugs; virtually every single MDC MP 
has been either detained, or assaulted, or had his or her house searched, or received 
death threats. The MDC has been subjected to the most bizarre selective application 
of the law. Charges have been fabricated against MDC leaders and prosecuted 
vigorously whereas ZANU (PF) leaders who openly advocate murder are not even 
arrested. The electronic media is brazenly the mouthpiece of ZANU (PF). And so it 
goes on. But the reality is that, despite all of this harassment (in fact perhaps because 
of the harassment) the MDC is now stronger than it was in June 2000. Not only do 
we now have elected structures countrywide but also we now have the capacity and 
ability to govern. 
Unlike ZANU (PF) which is trapped in its one-track mind of its disastrous 
"fast track land programme" the MDC has developed comprehensive policies to tum 
Zimbabwe around. President Tsvangirai has spent the last six months progressively 
unveiling the MDC's economic, health, education and labour policies (to mention a 
few). All these policies have been formulated in consultation with experts from the 
relevant sectors of Zimbabwean society and have been hailed by serious 
commentators within Zimbabwe. The MDC has unveiled a three-year recovery plan 
that President Tsvangirai will start to implement as soon as he has been inaugurated 
in April. 
But the MDC is more than just a body with good structures and policies -
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most importantly it has spirit! I have just had the pleasure of attending the MDC's 
Annual Conference that was held in Gweru on the 22nd December. I have three 
words to describe the Conference: joyous, hilarious and constructive! There was 
absolute (and heartfelt) agreement that Morgan Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda shall 
comprise our Presidential team unlike the deep divisions within the ZANU (PF) 
camp regarding Mugabe's candidacy. Most ofthe meeting was devoted to debating 
and agreeing on key policy issues such as tackling the economy, dealing effectively 
with the Aids pandemic and restoring the rule of law unlike the ZANU (PF) 
Congress which only seemed to discuss Mugabe's declaration of war on the 
Zimbabwean people. In stark contrast to the tone of the ZANU (PF) meeting prayer 
and a recommitment to the principle of non-violence marked the MDC Conference. 
As a white Zimbabwean I felt profoundly privileged to be part of the proceedings of 
a movement that is non-racist and has a vision for not only a new democratic 
Zimbabwe but also a new beginning for Africa. I feel excited about the prospect of 
serving under Morgan Tsvangirai's Presidency. 
The views expressed in this letter (are attributed to David Col tart - MDC 
Legal Affairs, Zimbabwe, and) do not necessarily reflect the views of the MDC 
(Movement for Democratic Change). 
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APPENDIX6 
TSV ANGIRAI'S SPEECH ON THE 2002 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
RESULTS 
Before Zimbabwe's presidential election earlier this month, I believed that 
if the elections were not handled properly, there would be a serious fallout in the 
country and throughout southern Africa. Despite the shadows of war and 
terrorism, I called for a fair and free election. Zimbabwe's people did not get one. 
Instead, they got terrorism. 
In the two years that led up to the presidential vote the people of 
Zimbabwe were subjected to severe intimidation, harassment and fear, all of 
which was carried out as part of a broader programme of state-sponsored 
terrorism by Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-
PatrioticFront(ZANUPF). 
ZAN1) "P"F~ s 'terrot):sm ~-a~ ,,~0\\\\~'-\~\\ ~~ ~~~\l~ ~\~ments among the 
veterans of Zimbabwe's war of independence two decades ago as well as by 
government militiamen and youths, all of whom were actively aided by the police. 
This intimidation and violence meant that my party, the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC), could not reach the electorate in large parts of the 
countryside. In addition, the government of President Mugabe effectively 
disenfranchised hundreds of thousands of urban voters, particularly in the capital 
Harare and in the city of Chitungwiza. Because of an inadequate number of 
polling stations, I believe that in Harare and Chitungwiza alone more than 360 
000 people stood in a queue to vote but never got the opportunity to cast their 
ballot. 
My concerns about the legitimacy of the election results are further raised by 
interference by Mugabe's militia, whose members prevented the MDC from 
posting polling agents in 52 percent of rural polling stations. By the end of the 
voting, the MDC had no observers at six out of I 0 rural stations. This effectively 
meant that Mugabe' s supporters could have their way at these stations. We are 
compiling a comprehensive list of the polling stations where ZANU PF supporters 
had solitary control. 
In our investigations so far, a pattern has emerged even at this early stage -these 
polling stations recorded the highest number of voters for Mugabe. In light of all 
the evidence, I cannot accept the presidential election results in which Mugabe, 
the sitting president, was declared a winner this month with 56 percent of the 
three million votes tallied. The official results do not reflect the true will of the 
people of Zimbabwe and are illegitimate in the eyes of the people. 
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Zimbabwe's people have been cheated of their right to freely and democratically 
elect a president of their choice. The contest over the election results is a political 
issue that must be resolved politically. Food and fuel are in short supply, jobs are 
vanishing and inflation is running at more than l 00 percent. The people of 
Zimbabwe deserve a celebration for their courage and determination. We may yet 
get one. 
As I write, I am saddened because Mugabe' s regime remains intent on defying the 
people's will. Whatever may happen, I as the people's loyal servant am with them 
all the way. The government may want to arrest me. Indeed, I was arrested for 
treason even before the election. At worst, they may even wish to kill me. But the 
government will never destroy the spirit of the people to reclaim their rights and 
power. The power to achieve democratic change is in our hands. We may have 
moments of fear in the days ahead, but we must never let despair overwhelm us. 
The tide of political change is irreversible but we must be prepared to pay a high 
price for our freedom. 
Mugabe and his cronies are afraid of the people and we have heard they may do 
anything to kill the messenger. If they do, I only ask that the people of Zimbabwe 
remain strong and carry on the work that we began together. Among ordinary 
Zimbabweans walk heroes - heroes who waited hours and hours to vote, heroes 
who refused to be turned away. These are the heroes of the new Zimbabwe whose 
voices must be heard around the world. Together, we travelled a very harsh road 
to achieve democratic change in my country. Rarely in the history of humankind 
have a people faced such brutality while retaining such gracious exuberance. 
I realise that the people of Zimbabwe are impatient. I understand why. But they 
must wait peacefully for the political process to unfold. They will not let this 
election stand but neither will they succumb to Mugabe's provocative traps and 
resort to violence. 
The people of Zimbabwe want constitutional change, legal change, 
legitimate change, and they are going to obtain it in spite of all the obstacles. In 
this, we know we are not alone. We know that throughout Africa, the will of the 
electorate has been thwarted. It appears that in the majority of African states, 
whenever you have elections, you have irregularities, fraud, cheating. There is 
always a crisis of elections in Africa. There is, sad to say, a lack of sincerity on 
the part of governments across this continent when the time comes to give people 
the right to choose. 
But those who wish otherwise can take hope. Zimbabwe's struggle is not over. 
We have time to tally the lessons of our experience for Africa, and the world. My 
people are in their hour of greatest need. I pledge not to abandon them. 
Credit to Project Syndicate, March 2002 
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APPENDIX7 
SPEECH BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT, COMRADE R. G. 
MUGABE, ON THE OCCASION OF THE INAUGURATION OF THE 
PRESIDENT, STATE HOUSE, HARARE, SUNDAY, 17™ MARCH, 2002. 
Master of ceremonies, Your Excellencies Heads of State here present, 
Honourable Vice Presidents of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Comrades Simon 
Mzenda and Joseph Msika, Mai Mzenda na Mai Msika, Mama Mafuyana, Former 
Heads of State, The Speaker of Parliament, Comrade Emmerson Munangagwa, 
The Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, Honourable Godfrey Chidyausiku and Amai 
Chidyausiku, and members of the Judiciary, distinguished Representatives of 
Heads of State and Government from fraternal countries within our region and 
beyond, Traditional Chiefs, Honourable Ministers and Members of Parliament, 
Service Chiefs, Heads of Religious Denominations present here today, 
Representatives of Sectoral Organisations and Professionals, Your Excellencies 
Members of the Diplomatic Corps, All Distinguished Guests, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, Comrades and Friends. 
I come before you in a moment and mood of national pride and personal 
joy tempered with a sense of humility. It is a moment of national pride because 
the nation, through those registered and able to vote, has made its unfettered 
decision that in tum has produced this day. Personal joy, yes, because in a closely 
fought campaign, a large majority of our people has returned my party and me 
into the leadership of our free and sovereign country. 
With humility, I wish to thank all those who voted for me and my Party as 
well as those others who decided to exercise their voting in a different way, both 
dimensions indeed lending their weight to a truly democratic process. In their 
different political affiliations and espousing their preferences, our people turned 
out in their thousands, indeed millions, braving the elements of weather as they 
stood patiently awaiting their tum to cast their votes. Such was the evidence, if 
anywhere needed, of the maturity of our democratic practice and level of 
discipline prevailing in our society. 
How can anyone feel restrained, least of all the winner of this day, in 
chanting with an exuberant voice, "Well done, Zimbabweans! Makorokoto! 
Amhlope! We have dealt a blow to imperialism!" 
This is indeed a moment for all of winners, losers and us to celebrate the 
multi-faceted phenomenon of the victory of our democratic process. Where the 
ruling Party won the Presidential election, it became a loser to the Mayoral and 
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Council elections, in all Harare. On the other hand, where the opposition won the 
Mayoral and Council elections, it became a loser of the Presidential election. Both 
sides have something to rejoice about as well as something to mourn about. But 
these mingled joys and aches aside, the greatest winner, you will agree, was our 
democratic process. 
As Zimbabweans, this moment of national pride is one that bids us further 
to come together, and as in unison we chant our National Anthem and raise high 
our multi-coloured flag of glory, work jointly and collectively to reconstruct our 
economy in order to transform our society. Our energies and capabilities are 
surely spent on constructive people oriented tasks and programmes than on 
planning and plotting the downfall of each other. The serious espousal of the ideal 
of national unity and the spirit of brotherhood will inject correct doses of love and 
fervour into our relationships hitherto sounded by hostility and anguish. 
The current and urgent demand of our country is for a renewed faith and 
vigour, faith in ourselves and vigour in our efforts. Our country beckons us to join 
hands in a formidable unity of purpose as we vigorously engage in our various 
national endeavours. 
The excitement, jubilation and exhilaration, as well as the anxieties of the 
last several weeks will soon recede into history, and yet our tasks will continue in 
their various shapes and focuses to address the current and future economic 
problems that persistently confront our nation. We have no choice but to strive to 
sustain and enhance the lives of our people in order to give meaning to the shape 
and content of our democratic society. Indeed, the general review of our socio-
economic programmes has now to receive immediate attention. 
The Land Reform programme must proceed with greater speed and 
strength, so the losses and drawbacks of the current drought-ridden season can be 
overcome and replaced by rich harvests and farmers' earnings in the coming 
agricultural season, given better weather patterns than at present. In the process 
deliberate emphasis will have to be given to the production of critical crops such 
as maize, tobacco, cotton, soya beans, sugar and others, at both peasant and large 
scale levels. For now, however, Government will continue to exert maximum 
efforts into securing adequate maize supplies, to ensure the adequacy of food for 
the people. 
The manufacturing sector has to be immediately addressed in order to 
revive all those factories, which have shut down or are on the verge of doing so. 
Greater emphasis than before will be placed on the informal sector in order to 
adequately revamp it as a vital contributor to the Gross Domestic Product. The 
mining sector will similarly be given such serious attention as will enable it to 
sustain productivity at higher levels than at present so the volume of foreign 
earnings can be boosted. 
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The development of the infrastructure sector, which encompasses dam 
construction, rural electrification, road and rail construction will of necessity have 
to be intensified, as indeed will the construction and rehabilitation of our airports, 
large and small. 
Then there is our sector of tourism which is a significant contributor to our 
capacity to earn foreign exchange, and which we must continue to enhance both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Beyond these and other measures directed towards the current food 
emergency situation, Government has worked out a comprehensive economic 
recovery strategy whose components integrally addresses the issues of economic 
empowerment and indigenisation; restoration of confidence in management of the 
economy; and formulation of appropriate, consensus based responses to the 
problems of reduced foreign currency inflows, inflation, high prices, dept 
management and low investment activity in the economy. 
The details of the strategies and other solutions to the challenges cited 
above are either already enshrined in our Millennium Economic Recovery 
programme or will shortly be presented to the nation following necessary 
consultations. However, the current severe foreign currency crunch requires that 
we immediately provide further stimulus to national export performance including 
that of the general agricultural and horticultural sectors; promote beneficiation for 
high value exports; encourage both local and direct investment in the economy 
and market our country more professionally, innovatively and effectively to boost 
tourism. 
On inflation, which has had a devastating effect on the standard living of 
our people, we are determined that fiscal policy shall focus on strict control of 
government expenditures, especially recurrent or consumption expenditure. 
However, Government must and will invest in productive, employment 
generating activities, including infrastructure. In particular we plan, as already 
stated, to increase production in agriculture which, among other things, will have 
a tampering effect on inflation through increase in aggregate supply. 
Economic empowerment is a vital part of our economic policies. We 
intend to further enhance this thrust by way of initiatives that aim to produce an 
overarching legal framework on economic empowerment; create an enabling 
environment for employee ownership and management buy-out schemes as may 
be mutually agreed; strengthen the capacity of micro- finance institutions to 
deliver loans to the informal and micro-enterprises sector; increase funding for the 
land reform programme; give preferential treatment to indigenous businesses on 
Government tenders, whilst ensuring efficiency and value for money; and use the 
budget as a central tool for economic empowerment, where a significant amount 
of resources would be set aside for such empowerment. 
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I should, however, wish at this stage to state that in tackling these 
problems we shall be moving with speed and in a time-framed and result-oriented 
manner. We cannot afford the luxury of dilatoriness and bureaucratic sloth and 
indecisiveness. 
The day is gone and gone for good when the business of the people could 
be half-done, postponed inordinately or even recklessly and irresponsibly set 
aside. Government has no purpose at all unless that purpose speaks in words and 
deeds to the needs and aspirations ofthe people. 
This economy must grow, not contract. Growth will be restored as 
investment by, above all, Zimbabweans themselves, is deliberately and 
systematically embarked upon in all sectors, but principally in agriculture. Land 
reform is not merely an exercise in rectifying a monstrous colonial injustice, vital 
though and necessary this has been. The resettlement programme is also an 
opportunity to unleash the spirit of self reliance and creativity of our people; to 
foster the economic empowerment of our people; to increase agricultural 
production and therewith to expand the domestic economic base and foreign 
market access; to create and enhance employment creation; and to assure national 
food security on a permanent and reliable basis. 
In addition, and in complementary fashion, we have set out to evolve an 
integrated rural development strategy that covers provision of enhanced 
agricultural extension services; infrastructural rehabilitation and development; 
rural electrification; and the development of largely agro-based small and medium 
enterprises around the country. 
Other programmes directed, for example, to improving social delivery will 
be announced in due course. This will include improved approaches in our fight 
against the HIV -AIDS pandemic that has so ravaged our society in recent years. 
Beyond our borders, our country has in recent years attracted a good deal 
of international attention, most of which has been extremely negative and quite 
hostile. Indeed it could even be said, colloquially, that Zimbabwe or Mugabe-
bashing has become an obsessive compulsion in certain circles abroad. The reason 
for this is obvious: our land reform initiative and its impact on the affairs of the 
white community and certain foreign interests in our country have inspired that 
attention and the hostility from the former colonial power Britain and its allies. It 
is greatly to be regretted that we live in an age where racial and socio-economic 
injustices still prevail after centuries of their callous and systematic perpetration 
against many of our African communities. 
In most of our colonised countries, the oppressed, suppressed and 
repressed people had no option but to organise themselves in order to fight these 
injustices both politically and militarily. It was these liberation struggles that gave 
birth to their freedom and independence as they regained their sovereign right to 
determine their destiny. In 1980, as we celebrated the advent of our independence, 
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here, we least expected that twenty years down the line we would, once again, 
have to wage another struggle for the defence of that sovereign Independence 
against our former colonial power seeking in a determined way to diminish it so 
as to regulate our policies and our lives, including the choice of our rulers. 
Ladies and gentlemen, comrades and friends, you certainly have now been 
able to see how Britain and its white allies have blatantly sought to ensure that 
this last presidential election be won by their protege and not by ZANU (PF) and 
me. But thanks to the people of Zimbabwe for loudly saying "No! No! Never! 
Never again will Zimbabwe be a colony". I thank them for their resolute ant-
imperialist stand! 
Finally, I want to thank our brotherly African and non-African countries 
for their full solidarity and enduring support. It is indeed against that background 
that I want to welcome all our guests, especially the Heads of State and 
Government from outside Zimbabwe for being here with us today as we celebrate 
our victory over colonialism. May I mention, however, that we will continue to 
need your support in the future as imperialist manoeuvres against Zimbabwe 
persist. 
Thus as we now move to face up to the two daunting tasks, on the one 
hand, that of our socio-economic recovery and stabilisation, and, an the other, that 
of nation building, we humbly call upon you, our friends and allies, to remain 
steadfast behind us. Simunye! 
To all of you here, may this historic occasion be to you as much a source 
of joy and aspiration as it is to me. I thank you all for being with us and for 
sharing this day with me, my wife and family, Party and Government colleagues. 
I thank you. 
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